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tv   Deputy Defense Sec. Delivers Remarks on Natl Defense Strategy  CSPAN  May 10, 2022 3:34am-4:39am EDT

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>> good morning, everyone. the d.c. office of the ronald
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reagan presidential institute. it is so nice to see so many people in the building, friends, colleagues, we welcome those watching online as well. now in every generation, every administration the washington crowd watches with great interest to see who is appointed to fill the positions of a new administration, it is like our version of the nfl draft. sometimes you hear about an appointment and say to yourself, ok, that is an interesting choice. that is not entirely a compliment. other times it feels like the person has the background and expertise so well matched for the position it is like an obvious choice. that is a reaction i had when i heard dr. kathleen hicks would be docked -- would be deputy secretary of defense. she is a leader for whom the role made perfect sense.
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i have had the pleasure of knowing the deputy eric -- the deputy secretary for many years and i learned from her, i had the good fortune to start with her on the national defense strategy commission in 2018. and i have to say, i was appointed by the republican side and dr. hicks was not. i did not know what the dynamics would be like, and i think my primary take away beyond being impressed with her knowledge, intelligence, and kindness and decency was kath listened, which is a quality that many in washington do not have. they like to talk. and i learned a lot that she was even willing to listen to someone like me, and that is probably why we had a commission report with concession --
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consensus across all commissioners. and over the years, she has been a regular at the reagan national defense forum where the voice man's respect on both sides on the aisle. we would be calling her abrupt -- calling her up around this time of year actually. kath, we need you on a panel again, yes again. and really always willing not only to participate, but give me and the reagan institute advice in terms of who should be there and what issues we should talk about as we bring together the national defense community, which we are so very grateful for. her pedigree is impeccable, phd from m.i.t., senior vice president as the henry kissinger chair and strategic -- she was
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secretary defense for policy in the obama administration. she led many leading that -- strategic reviews in 2012 and 2010, a general defense review but certainly made a big impact and crafted guidance for capabilities and military posture. kath is clearly no stranger to saturday -- to strategy and planning. in her current role she has asked with overseeing internal management at the pentagon as all deputy secretaries do. but her background is so stellar and her responsibilities are broader than that. that is why we are so honored to have her here today to talk about the administration's vision for the strategy we need to meet the global threats that we face and how we can properly resource the strategy. given how much the world has transformed in just the past few
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months, the national defense strategy is of course highly anticipated and this is the unclassified version of those who have seen the classified one since march, they know what will come, although they cannot speak about it. i think we all know that it will highly be consequential. how does the shifting security environment in europe change things? of course the war in ukraine, russian aggression, and even as the strategic conflict rages on, we have to focus on the indo pacific, specific to china and how to respond to their advanced technologies and redefining the future of competition and conflict. and how much do we need to spend for all of these priorities? we will have a wide ranging conversation from threats, strategy, to budget and more and i want to thank everyone for joining us and to please welcome one of the sharpest minds in government, the 35th deputy
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secretary of defense kathleen hicks. [applause] kathleen: hopefully this microphone is on. you would think after running think tank events he would think -- you would think i would know better than to wear a dress and i'm going to speak. also they have elevated me to the highest tight ever. thank you to the full team here for hosting. i have had the great pleasure of working with roger for years in the past, and attending the events out west. and you all do really important work and i will say, i think it is a testament, to our ability to continue to bridge across really challenging political divides. to have a conversation on serious topics and keep that going on across the political
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spectrum. thank you for hosting me. i am here to talk about the national defense strategy and the present fiscal year defense budget request. as secretary austin noted when he was addressing the reagan internet -- reagan international defense forum said that ronald reagan had an implacable opposition to a talker see and just walking through the halls relief reinforced -- really reinforces that from the many court -- quotes and artifacts in the building. president biden shares those convictions about the importance of protecting our democracy which faces a myriad of challenges. the people in ukraine remain foremost in our minds. russia poses an acute threat to the international system as illustrated by its ongoing war of choice and brutal tactics. our national defense strategy accounts for russian threats in europe and beyond.
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even as we confront russia's aggression, the strategy is clear that china is our military most consequential strategic competitor and challenge. our strategy also acknowledges that we face additional, persistent regional threats including those emanating from iran, north korea and violent extremists organizations as well as boundary challenges like climate change that affect our missions and operations. in an address to the american people in 1983, president reagan spoke about his defense budget request in this way. "the budget is much more than a long list of numbers, for behind all the numbers lies america's ability to prevent the greatest of human tragedies and preserve our free way of life in a sometimes dangerous world." similarly, this administration built our budget request in
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direct response to the directives of our national defense strategy. our strategy has four priority objectives. first, defending the homeland and face the multi-domain threat that china faces. second, deterring strategic attacks. third, deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict. prioritizing the p.r.c. challenge and then the russia challenge in europe. finally, building a resilient joint force defense ecosystem. the president's fiscal year 23 request of $773 billion, roughly 8.1% increase over the 2022 request and 4% above the fy 2022 omnibus it makes the investments we need to implement the strategy by pursuing three approaches, which connect our means to our enda -- ends.
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our first approach is integrative deterrence. we seek to have efforts across the domain and a spectrum of conflict to ensure that the u.s. military in close cooperation with the rest of the u.s. government, allies and partners makes the cost of aggression very clear. the combat credibility of the u.s. military to fight and win is the cornerstone of integrated deterrence. that is why our topline request includes $276 billion for procurement, and for research development tests and evaluations, and that is across land, air, sea, cyber and space, domains that must be netted together for deterrence. of note across that spectrum of conflict, we are also investing $34.4 billion in recapitalizing
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the nuclear triad. campaigning is our second approach, and it is related. campaigning strengthens deterrence and enables us to gain advantage against coercive actions. the united states will operate forces, synchronize department efforts, and aligned to department activities with other instruments of power to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion. complicate advocate -- adversaries' military preparations and coordinate with allies and partners. readying us with the threats of today is central to campaigning which is why we invest 135 billion dollars in military readiness. and while we maintain the ability to respond across the globe, are campaigning efforts will be focused on the indo pacific and europe. through the specific deterrence
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we make investments that support a comparative military advantage, and bolster logistics in the end the pacific region. regarding europe, our request supports the european deterrence is in it -- initiative, u.s. european command and the ironclad commitment to nato. america's ongoing support to the people of ukraine exemplifies these priorities in europe as president biden has stated in the perennial struggle in democracy and freedom, ukraine and its people are on the frontline. thanks to the responsiveness of this administration and the united states congress we have delivered over $4 billion in security assistance to ukraine since the start of the administration, and over $3 billion since the invasion on february 24 which is remarkable. to ensure that ukrainians continue to get the capabilities they need to defend themselves,
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the president made a request for 33 billion dollars in assistance, 16 billion for the department of defense. earlier this week, i was in troy, alabama visiting the lockheed martin facility where our javelin missiles are produced. we were there to thank the women and men who work at that facility for their tireless efforts in supplying the department of defense and our allies and partners. the work that they do in troy and across our entire defense industrial base is central to the execution of our national defense strategy. that is the third approach for connecting the ends to the means and building an enduring advantage. this requires us to invest in people. like providing us the largest pay range -- raise to personnel investing and childcare and
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ensuring food and housing security. this also means focusing intensely on innovation and modernization. and that is why we invest roughly $130 billion. in our largest request ever. finally to combat the effects of climate change on our military, we invest $3 billion to deploy new technologies, create efficiencies and prepare infrastructure. as i outlined our budget request makes the investments we need to secure our nation but are security depends on more than dollars. we must outperform and out innovate would be threats. this means making sure that at the department we knock down barriers that stymie innovated thinking and then we face external barriers like delays and annual appropriations. moving forward both inside and outside the five sides of the
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pentagon we must find solutions to problems such as these to realize the concepts and capabilities that the century demands. i'm going to conclude just by thanking you for inviting me to speak this morning. the department of defense today is ready to play a vital role in advancing president biden's security objective as articulated in the national defense strategy, and connecting the ends ways and means we have proceeded with the objectivity and rigor that our national security demands. as secretary alston has said, in doing so we seek a 21st century that is far more secure and far less bloody than the 20th. i look forward to the questions. [applause] roger: thank you for those comments and for being here today.
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we will have about 25 minutes or so of discussion and then we will open up to the audience here for the questions again. we appreciate you doing this. running a defense strategy, coordinating with the white house, you want to make sure that follows a national security strategy and you probably think let the world cooperate so the strategy does not change. how is that going for you? kathleen: it is going well. [laughter] which part of it would you like to tackle first? let us take russia, russia has not been shy about its intentions. we have seen from chechnya, georgia, ukraine, syria, and even last spring with the exercises that the russians were undertaking on their border with ukraine. a very clear set of aggressive activities. that signaled well to us that it
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was an acute threat. you can bind that with the election interference and other nonmilitary approaches that the russians have undertaken, cyber activities and etc.. it is a pretty clear pattern. the fact that this time they actually went across, we had been signaling well before the invasion -- the most recent invasion they were going to do was not a surprise in our strategy development. in the united states has invested very well since 2014 in particular in the european deterrence initiative -- initiative with over 100,000 u.s. military forces today in and around the european theater. we are in a good position. that piece, i think fit very well with how we are thinking about challenges of the future. nato allies, the biggest surprise is around ukraine and the fact that the nato allies have really embraced the moment,
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partners have as well, both in the region and beyond and of course the ukrainian people have demonstrated that the will to fight for your country and to protect democracy is probably the most powerful tool that any of us have in protecting the international order and our freedoms within it. roger: we will get to the white house and the coordinating in the white house to follow the national security strategy has yet to come out. it pretty creative way that you guys handled it, unclassified to the congress and you tried to nested within resources, but certainly it has not been the rollout you have anticipated. kathleen: i will get to that now. national security strategy, you pick a time when it has followed an easy course or pathway across any administration i think it is appropriate to take your time on that strategy and get it right. strategy is something that you
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live and execute and it should be constantly reviewed and up dated, that is true of the national security strategy and you will see that in the coming months. the statutes from the united states congress is required to be delivered -- delivered in classified form. we have done that with an unclassified summary. we do like to be above and beyond the rule of law, and in the spirit of how we try to operate in the department provide that fuller description, but it is appropriate to wait and see how the nsf is built out, so we make sure it is best nested. roger: let us stick to that thread for a minute. back when bush 42 came into office they rolled out their strategy and of course the president george w. bush ran on a campaign of not doing humanitarian intervention. 9/11 happened, freedom agenda
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comes in and it was a major market shift in strategy because -- is that a construct -- controversial thing to say? but they changed. is this moment a similar moment? you said that the nts's continuity and that you anticipated that russia might do something like this, one could interpret that the national security strategy not coming out or reporting is just meaning more than personnel changes or shifts in the strategy suggests that what is happening in europe and in russia is that there is a shift in orientation from the white house as a result of the war in ukraine. what is your take? kathleen: my take is that first of all focus the time and energy on ukraine as i pointed out since february 24. we have been doing at light speed. that is to support cross diplomatic -- economic sanctions
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in his suit -- in history and the diplomatic effort is immense. it takes a lot of time and energy. i do think you will see the themes where it will end up, i think it will be consistent with where it was headed. it is not a finalized document, it was in process. i think that process picks up and the president and his public remarks has been very clear as i have repeated today about how much this really continues, this latest crisis in ukraine, continues to cast the united states and its approach to democracy in market contrast to autocrats in the world. i think that is a continued statement you will see play out. roger: i want to go back to the response to my initial question, and i agree with your response that the strategy not just for this administration and the previous information where the
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congress went with the european defense initiative, we were concerned that russia might do this again. it was not the first time that putin invaded a country in europe. georgia, obviously was the first. during putin's reign. at the same time it is reasonable to say that the terms did not work, meaning that we anticipated this and followed the problem and tried to put the tools of deterrence into place whether you want to call it some other deterrence, we need to agree that we did not deter him from what we sought out to a him from doing. kathleen: this is a war of russia's choice and can stop at any point if the russians used to and they choose to continue and by all accounts vladimir putin chose to go forward into ukraine, and that is a fact. are focused on integrated deterrence is fundamentally around combat cut ability of the
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u.s. forces and we are confident where we are in that sphere that that will be the cornerstone of integrated deterrence. ukraine is not a place where the united states had the security commitment it has around nato or it has even with regard to taiwan. in which regards to the military assistance. what we focus on in the department of defense is bringing that combat credibility forward. you note that the russians have not attacked nato territory. and we continue to stand by that that -- that deterrent as effective. roger: very smart answer. but -- [laughter] if it was, you did very well. but just to really understand, you are right, from the view of the department of defense, we
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want to make sure that we have a combat presence and no one will challenge up in the next layer, challenge our line within nato. when she would agree that part of what we are thinking -- seeking to achieve with the strategy and this administration was to deter the russians from going into ukraine, and that was part of it, i think we all sought with the onyx -- occupation and annexation of crimea. kathleen: there is no doubt that the united states has been clear that violating the sovereignty of another country is against the principles that we stand for and that we would bring all of our thoughts to bear on how to do that. the economic sanctions that we put into place around this particular invasion alongside importantly not just nato but other countries of the world, we have not seen the full effects and russia has not seen the full
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effects. i think those are tremendously powerful. they were clearly not convincing to russia in advance, not clear that anything would be clear to russia in advance. i am not trying to get into the head of vladimir putin. what i can tell you is that they would be devastated, all of the diplomatic movements and the companies that have self-selected out of russia, international companies, the talent drain, tens of thousands of high end talent leaving russia that i hope are coming to the united states into the west to help us to advanced technology in-line in line with appropriate democratic values, and i think that is the cost that he will bear. the fact that you have leaders who cannot understand rational deterrence frameworks is something that we have always lived with. we have always had those who will violate international norms and challenge us to deter them,
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which is why we must have the credibility to stand behind the commitments we have made and we have that. roger: let us stick with ukraine miller and then move on to china and it will be noted that we focus -- we have not focused on the budget in the first five minutes of our conversation. we obviously want as a government in the department of defense to make sure that the sovereignty of a free nation is not violated in the ways that we are seeing with every passing day which is true for other countries in europe and obviously true for taiwan as well. that has to be important migrating from the european theater and into the indo pacific to deal with china. in part -- and part of the strategy and what you're doing every day as a department, what more do we need to do to restore the terms to even make sure it is not a nato ally or another
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country that we have an alliance with, it is kind of more complicated as you know very well. what else do we need to do to restore deterrence, whether it is to putin or xi that they do not come away from what is happening and say i can get away with it? kathleen: so we are facing what i'm calling conflict attacked dynamics. they span the spectrum of conflict from day-to-day activities through what is often called hybrid activity and all the way up to advancing their nuclear capability. the united states traditionally has been agile across that spectrum of conflict and that holding together. all of the elements of the domains of conflict. we have talked about this obviously as you were referencing in integrated deterrence and comprehensive
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approaches that can lock the term used. there is a strong thread of continuity in that. and we chose integrated because we think it helps to communicate this idea that to deal with these complex attacks vectors and to have this fact, you have to be equally agile. we need to overcome a lot of cultural barriers internally to how we work across that spectrum first inside the military, and then -- from our perspective first inside the military -- and then how we work with allies and others. i think that is the core and executing that through our approach in a day-to-day way, exemplifying that we can gain advantage in a day-to-day way through campaigning as we build that enduring advantage over the long term, three approaches are our answer to your question
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about how we ensure deterrence. roger: we actually dealt with is a bit during the national commission work in the last administration with the national strategy and how you deal with the competition. it was not what we were witnessing in ukraine, but all of the things that we were happening from little green men to the cyber and space realm. i wonder if we were not necessarily successful of that but putin decided to take a form of aggression that was so conventional, tanks, missiles, aircraft. is our eye off the ball from that conventional attack, are we missing something in that framework? the traditional side, which maybe is having these lat forms that we had in the last entry today, and do you worry about that when it comes to taiwan? maybe people talk about the
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approach that relies heavily on conventional capabilities. in conflict with integrated deterrents but it makes it primary and how you might deter a china vis-a-vis chat -- vis-a-vis taiwan. kathleen: where i would differ is that you should always think about an adversary as being pretty smart. if they are not smart, that is great. they are looking for weaknesses, and the answer is to minimize your attack surface area and maximize your advantages. in the case of russia they have taken a conventional approach and it has not worked well. we can talk about why it did not work well. i would also say back to what the u.s. has been doing since 2014 we have built substantial dimensional capability alongside allies and partners. but to include the u.s. and in
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europe and inside the bounds of the territory and that conventional deterrence, and i will add our nuclear deterrent, they seem to be holding very well right now. we will continue to always look to strengthen those. at the same time if you relieve the deterrent elsewhere, smart adversaries can go to those spaces. that is what we have seen the russians trying in different ways, cyber is obviously one and attacking democracy and information warfare is another. the corruption, if you will is another in support of assad in syria is another. it just requires the united states to be very thoughtful about how we ensure that we can deter, that is my russia answer. roger: let us go to the budget. so, the national defense
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strategy fact sheet and in your march 28 gaggle of reporters, the release of the budget and defense strategy. you talk about continuity and the planning construct of the strategy which prevailing and turn the second. that is what the trump administration, that is what that defense strategy had and based on years -- on your strategy, that is what the biden administration will do as well. to me, where there should be continuity in recognition that we should not become so regionally focused that we take the book -- our eye off of the ball. of course, to do that, you need a budget that can support that reach. a budget that is trying to build a force that is global in nature. many people are concerned about that look a budget and say you
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are not resourcing the strategy seriously enough that can sustain that kind of construct and that type of strategy, in that case we have to realize that we will do less with less and make hard choices, what is your answer to that? kathleen: we have more than a quarter of a trillion dollars as i said in my remarks, eight percent above what we asked last year and we matched it to the strategy, so i promise if anyone has opened the books i have done my homework and i have -- and we have matched those. let us talk about inflation as a separate answer because i want to come back to it. we have put together a program that i am very comfortable can executes that force planning construct and i want to add the nuclear deterrent and also the homeland piece which is a little more aggressive on homeland, or a little more focused than in
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2018. so that i am very comfortable with. we have dealt out the capabilities that we need to do that. i think we get very focused because it is simple on sort of adjust the dollars. the dollars matter. we have to have the dollars. but we are very focused on numbers, number of this type of system versus somebody else, this missile gap kind of theory. we need to look at what the unities -- the u.s. needs to execute the campaign, which makes sense for us, max amassed -- maximizing asymmetry and focusing what we can comment upon, and i think we have done that with this program that we have put together the budget. you are kind of anticipating that critique to divest to invest, and the budget has 24
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ships, you have aircraft carriers that do not have enough aircraft to utilize and the whole purpose of that platform, we just kind of came out of a conversation and i am arguing with you right now, that conventional capabilities is something that is essential. you have a construct that says we need to do this in two theaters, at least near simultaneous, i have not seen the classified piece but i am assuming it is simultaneous and then the strategy talks about the middle east and other challenges and threats not necessarily focus. i just kind of come out of this moment where it seems that those platforms and numbers matter more. you say it is simple, but simplicity has an elegance of its own because it is right. so we just are a smaller force and it does not seem to be a
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mission set and a strategy that is asking us to do less. give a little more about why we do not have to worry about the numbers and capabilities. kathleen: we have to worry about capability including either your ability to die -- to disperse and the quantity of what you can deliver which matters. i am not saying there is not an issue around overall capacity. but we do have to elevate -- we have to elevate this conversation. capacity might mean what is my firepower, not how many platforms does that firepower move from, what is my ability to shoot and scoot with folks more familiar with the l tillery battles but the maneuverability of our force versus as the russians are seeing lines of tanks, so quantity is not going to be the way to think about the capabilities that we need for the future. while it is an input to overall
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capability. so, let us learn from the russians and what there are -- what their experiences that we are seeing. losing the lead cruiser because it does not have adequate air defense, how does that approach take into account the survivability and capability of our forces. if we lose that out of the conversation we are not using taxpayer dollars wisely. i think you have to go to the specifics of how we have a combat credible force and show that one year into this administration. how have we built effectively on what we inherited to develop capacity and capabilities for the future. where is the industrial base, something that you all care about appropriately here. one of the biggest challenges that we face, you cannot magic capability overnight. we need to work for it, we need to have manufacturing capability.
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we need clear investment strategy that demonstrates where the market is going, so companies can plan, and we need to bring in small business, which we lost 40% of our small business base out of the dissent -- out of the defense sector which is where the innovation comes from. we cannot say we will build all of these new ships and etc., you have to look at the industrial capacity. roger: i want to get to that in a second and then inflation. one more on this, this is a lot of fun for me. thank you for being here. so, your response to my pressing you unconventional capability, i think it means more at this moment and our program should reflect that and your responses that we have to be smart and look at how russia is failing, they did not succeed even kyiv and we will see what happens in terms of ukraine, one of the things that we saw and we were
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on the commission together and i am curious what your experience is since returning to the department of defense. the strategy was not operationalized. the concepts of how we wanted to fight were not clear. the new systems that we were going to realize the fight to make real -- to make it less reliance on a tank, the replacement wasn't identified and not in the program and there was a concern about a gap. it sounds like you are confident that we are there or we can get there soon. tell me about transitioning from 21st-century warfare and combat to where you are going, 21st-century smart fight, is there a way they are? kathleen: the way i talk about this is that i am out there proselytizing about a three set up approach and you are hitting on the core challenge that every
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defense planner faces which is what do i need now? and then out for us is 23 to 27, that is the defense program and the five-year program that we are focused on right now. 20.7 is an -- is a notable year in china with regard to the capabilities that they have publicly put forth with regard to taiwan. so, what you are faced with is what can i do, which is going to be less on new capital investments which takes a long time to come to fruition and other -- and to maximize that capability today. there i would say that there a number of focal areas that i will not do justice but to the extent that it is survivable, cyber and space resilient, those are significant investments. the persistent guide munitions and a continued steady pace on nuclear modernization which we
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were under investors in -- under invested in that we have to pay the price. let me jump ahead. third set up, force design. the robots, you name it, all of the future stuff that we want to make sure that we can get to. because that is the way to make the concepts and be enlivened and actualized. the challenge everyone faces is here to there, and the trust and confidence of the united states congress that any department of defense has a viable pathway through that. the lack of that trust and confidence is what keeps sliding us back so that first is the reality that we live with forever. that is the task that i think i face right now as the department of defense, more than anything is how do we build out given the great authority that was
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developed alongside support from congress and middle tier acquisition. in this under the joint war fighting concept. that is really the challenge. how do we show that we have a viable pathway through the middle period to the force design. a number of initiatives and i do not know how much time you want to get into this. a number of initiatives to do that, pathway finders, making sure the digital back -- backbone, the raider initiative which is tying the concept to capabilities that can be fielded. that is where we have to make progress and that would be true in any period of time. roger: that is super interesting and i have two issues i want to
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hit on, inflation and industrial capacity. it is somewhat a discussion about investments and conventional platforms. first, inflation. i will give you that it is 4% growth from enacted, but the inflator was just so incredibly low, and you acknowledge this in your briefing, 2.2%. you have the chairman of the joint chiefs testifying before the house services committee, it was obviously inaccurate, and the reality is that because of inflate -- inflation you will not have the buying power that you need to realize that his program and share with us, you probably had to wrestle to get that 4%. the world is where it is. the fed increased rates knowing that and it will be anywhere between eight and 10% by the time we get to appropriations
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then next fiscal year and that should basically be in the department of the defense. feel free to diss -- disagree i am more interested in that and i will highlight and say in the notes, something to the effect of i will work with congress through this summer and zooming about where i am right about inflation. kathleen: the first thing i would say and i said this on the hill. the best is time appropriation. that is 4% more than what we would get if we stay on the cr and i think we know we will be on it. i think we need to put our money where our political malls are. and get the appropriate combination on the regard last. also for 23, we do not know what
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the inflation number should be. the inflation number that we do every year, that is always just a forecast. where inflation will be in september let alone this time next year we do not know, but we want to work with congress on the 23 budget to make sure that we have the purchasing power for this program. it is -- if at the end of the day this program with an inflation factor that is again going to be a projection by the united states congress that we all feel is closer to accurate, and then we work through supplementals year, anything where we are off, i think that is a good outcome. we want this program, bottom line. this summer my point is we have trouble in 2022, and congress had just passed the omnibus and gave a little bit of support for fuel, that actual inflation
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issue is a now inflation issue because i do not know what the inflator should be. i can deal with how we are thinking through this. roger: this summer is about 22 with the $25 billion addition and realize as much as you can and then 2023 you think that the 2.2 will hold. kathleen: that is not what i said. as we go into the end game for 23 appropriations as we would do in any year we want to be working with congress on the collected best estimates. it will still be an estimate. it might be an estimate that is too high or low. if it is too low we would need to assume to come back for supplemental, but we will have to make -- we are going to have to make our best gas collectively. it is never going to be quite right with the question is how close to right are we and how much can we absorb that inside of the program. if we do not feel like we can
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absorb it, rest assured that the secretary of defense will go to the president and seek assistance to get for further resources. the buying power from this program. what we do not want is added topline filled with new program that we cannot support and afford and that does not cover inflation. that is my number one concern. roger: the deputy secretary gave a message the u.s. congress in terms of what she does not want as congress will likely try to add to the budget in part to deal with inflation with other priorities. this is why want to end. ukraine has revealed many things, and the one thing is limitations of our industrial capacity. and whether you are talking about javelin, you mentioned that you are at the lockheed martin plant. and other types of capabilities. it seems like there is insufficient production capacity.
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in your press conference at the end of march, you focused on industrial base and the need for development, but i do not disagree with the kinetic capabilities and strategic and critical minerals. would you say that there is a six or seven required. i will give unit -- i will give you an example. even if you agree that we needed more submarines or surface ships or fighter aircraft, like we thought that was the way we needed to fight in the next decade. you could not do it, because there are not production lines that could support it. we all know that that is critical, you could only get two a year. don't you think that should be added to the list as you talk about industrial-based capacity and how did ukraine reinforce that? kathleen: i want to clarify, the
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five-year issue that you mentioned are specific supply-chain challenges. you are raising a broader industrial set of priorities that are not quite the same thing. on the industrial base we are concerned on shipbuilding. i visited a number of harsh facilities and, as i mentioned, a strong theme coming back is our supply chain issues and workforce training and availability, making sure that we can pay the wages and companies can pay the wages needed to attract workers. all of these are important to getting the workforce that we need. that is also an issue and we put significant investment on the shipbuilding side and other investments on the shipyards because i think that is a particular pain point area. we are behind on the summering
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side and circus ship -- circus side in production that we already have projected, industry is trying to play catch-up. some of that is covid affects going forward workers who were not able to come to work and a falling out and etc.. we will have a lot of fault -- a lot of work to do there. we cannot have an industrial base without a market signal and we need to continue to have a strong market signal. the ukrainian crisis will boost that market signal that is a subset of capabilities on allies and partners and ukrainians or that the u.s. might need it backfilled. your reference to the man pad is an example. the united states for ourselves are focused on next-generation. there are many desires elsewhere in the world and we are looking
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ahead to what do we need next, and we need to support the industrial base that can support our highest priority at the same time that can support the arsenal of democracy. that is a content -- a continuing priority. roger: question from the distinguished audience. we are going to go ahead to the former undersecretary for acquisitions. >> thank you so much for being here. i am hoping that you are working with our close partners and allies specifically with respect to implementing august using some of the rather hollow authorities right now. and how we can manage the demand signal to demand with the lumpiness of the demand signal
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for industry and how release and exportability can help that. kathleen: that continues to be a key leverage points, an area where we can lean in with u.k., canada, and australia. the most recent package in the supplemental we have actually tried to specify areas where we think we want to move to a-based approach to some of the backfilled requirements that we are trying to meet. some folks more broadly refer to this as allied shoring and it helps us think about the capabilities where the australians have capability to bring to bear. we are working through the submarine approach and the
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series of other critical technology areas and learning from the brits and australians where there might be relative advantages that each can bring to bear without getting into detail where there are areas where the australians in the research and develop men side some really good advances that we in the united states can lean on and i think that it has created a good opportunity to share that and the same with the brits, and potentially beyond other partners. roger: a question over here. >> hello. earlier this week the pentagon sent a one point 5 billion reprogramming request to congress asking to shift funds around so that the pentagon could ramp up singer and javelin production. obviously, there are some issues
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with both lines, javelins and the funds to expand that. they have obsolescence issues. this money that you guys are asking to shift, what does that cover specifically? does that cover some of those issues or how many singers and javelins does is actually give you coming off of the lines again? kathleen: so the funds that were requested were a result of some of the supplemental funding that we have been provided. and it is at the end of the 30 day notification period for congress which is why it is coming out this week. it has been in the plans and we have had the notification and we are approved for the army to stop working -- to start working on that. now begins the process of getting into exactly what you are asking, which is with those funds working between the army in contracting and the manufacturers trying to understand what is the smartest
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application of funds to get the best output. there is not a set answer to your question yet. what i can tell you is the approach is how to apply the funds to ramp up the production, so for javelin potentially going up, not quite double but significantly -- i am terrible at math and public -- but 1.5 times where they are now in monthly production, what would that take, so we are working with them on that. and on stinger, a similar set of questions around obsolete parts and planning efforts in addition to production. i mentioned the workforce so some of the funds might be going to the facility, some of it might be going to workforce. that is something the army might be working with the manufacturers right now. it is important to remember those capabilities, we want to
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be able to produce those capabilities for allies and partners but we are looking ahead to where we want to go. that was on track. now it is also about managing through both creating that capability for others, some amount of potential on the u.s. side, but making sure we are staying on track with the capabilities we need for the joint force in the future. roger: we have a few minutes left. i apologize i will not get everybody. i saw tom from csis. >> good to see you. in your remarks you talk about your aggressive and focused attention to the multi-domain threat to the homeland. we have seen hundreds and hundreds of cruise missiles being used by russia and ukraine. over the past several years joint documents have talked about the threat of nonnuclear cruise missile attacks.
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some of your documents talk about this as well. i wonder how do you think about that threat? what are some plans going forward? this is something the commander and other folks are pounding the table about of late. kathleen: i will broaden it a little. great to see you. i will broaden it to integrate air and missile defense, whether unmanned systems up through the cruise missile challenge, which we have long had that challenge from russia to think through. all the way up through the more advanced threats we are seeing today. the way in which we have to think about missile defense, both regionally and in the united states has to evolve substantially. there is still a key component for defeat and kinetic defeat, but increasingly we have to be
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looking at opportunities that are non-kinetic. cyber jamming and other capabilities. cruise missiles are one of these places where the detection is so challenging. there we put a bit of money into our radar and our systems. i know you are a big advocate of and hopefully are pleased with what we have done on this base architecture in terms of sentencing for this very reason. defeat is very challenged. i do not want to sugarcoat that. we have long emphasized, and i will emphasize today, our strategic deterrent and our conventional deterrent with regard to how seriously we view any kind of attack on the united states homeland, whether that homeland is guam, hawaii, alaska , or the condo united states. a cruise missile attack, any
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kind of attack, we have to be able to rely on the full suite of capabilities and the time and place of choosing for the united states to respond. roger: two more and then we will wrap up. michael gordon? >> what of the strategic [inaudible] prevent a fate a complete -- prevent a fait accompli by russia or china. i have two related questions. is it still the pentagon's objective to develop the u.s. military capability to deny china the capability to conduct an invasion of taiwan, or is the goal more general than that? that is to deter china by
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imposing a range of military or other costs under your integrated deterrence concept, if you see the difference? kathleen: yes to the first question. >> the second question is what you see as the lessons of the ukraine conflict for your ongoing efforts to deter action on taiwan, the other at -- the other lessons and what are they? kathleen: we are not done in ukraine and it is important for us to acknowledge lessons will build. i think a major lesson is the importance of the demonstrated will to fight in the capability to fight of anyone who is trying to defend their democracy. i think taiwan has that is a clear take away as well. making sure they are investing themselves in the self-defense they need to have and under the
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taiwan relations act we are here to support their self-defense efforts. working closely with them on those capabilities. it is not just capabilities, there are also institutional or more reform efforts they need to undertake that they are focused on where they to support them on that. more broadly i think the takeaways are when you get one of the asymmetries united states has that china and russia have lacked is the substantial throw weight of market economies that when they choose to bring that to bear it can have devastating effects. i think that will build over time it is a big lesson, not just for the europeans to see what they can bring to the table that they can also bring their citizens along to increase investments in defense as well,
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but also what the chinese will take away from the costs of aggression. roger: quick, because we are already over with the secretaries time. >> a quick question. upon your conference asian -- upon your confirmation -- as well as unmanned maritime. how have your key investment areas changed at all since that memo about one year ago, especially given events in the world? kathleen: that was not a key investment memo. that was a memo on issues for the program review and we will do another one this year. we are always shifting the areas we think are most important to investigate, which is little different from most important to invest in. i would say coming out of the analytic work we have developed
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some of those areas. we have a few others who want to invest this year. i will highlight broad areas. contested logistics is one we are very interested in exploring. that was before watching the russians be so challenged on their own border. we know logistics is a big challenge we want to make sure we can protect cyber defense. i would also point to homeland defense, how we think more broadly about the way in which our homeland plays into challenges, those complex threat dynamics that come against the united states and any major conflict. there will be several more than that, that is just a few examples. >> thank -- roger: thank you, dr. hicks, for sticking around with us. [applause] roger: we will have a
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distinguished panel coming up next. [room


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