tv LIVE U.S. House of Representatives CSPAN October 25, 2021 12:40pm-1:29pm EDT
a future csis event, which is, tell me the successes of the 19 90's treasury secretary and 2000's led bilateral and now secretary of state and secretary of treasury led bilateral, you tell me what they've accomplished and i'll tell you where to go from here but i'm a big believer in the two biggest economies in the world having an intimate, regular dialogue. and sharing with each other why we feel the way we feel. and it's important for it's important for america to lead there along with g7 allies and make sure our talking points are all in the same vein because i believe xi is taking china down the wrong path and that's got to be a voice not just from the united states, but
from our allies around the world, so i think that dialog is very important. stephanie: thank you for that. matt, i don't know if you want to have any kind of concluding comments for this portion of the program? matt: i just want to thank congressman hill again. i know you have other things you've got to do, but this has been terrific and appreciate, by the way, the homework you and your team did in reading the report and obviously obviously absorbing some things that stephanie was commenting on and that's unusual and we appreciate that attention to it in addition to your comments and thoughts. thank you so much. matt: -- rep. french hill: and, thank you for having me. matt: and not another 30 years before we get to do this again. [laughter] thanks so much. stephanie, back to you. stephanie: great. well, let me just add my thanks again to congressman hill for really illuminating comments, i
think, kind of bringing to us the perspectives on this very complicated issue of u.s.-china engagement. i think having that sort of insight from how this issue looks from capitol hill and in particular, from someone who is sitting at one of the key committees that's looking at this issue in house financial services, really valuable and a perfect segway for us now into the panel discussion and a bit more granularity as far as what is in the report, we have a great set of panelists that can help us kind of dissect a little bit more our detailed research. if i could just take five minutes or so and give you kind of the headline messages from the report itself, and then we'll dig into the details with our panelists. as matt mentioned, this report, degrees of separation, is an effort that was launched in the spring of 2020. we divided the project up into
two distinct pieces. the first piece was a historical piece, resulted in a report that we issued in february of this year, and that really looked back to the late 1970's, and the normalization of relations between the u.s. and china. and followed the evolution of that engagement up through the present and, basically, the goal there was to understand the rational for engagement, so the u.s. wasn't engaging with china as pure benevolence, but a way of advancing u.s. objectives and we see an evolution over time of how those objectives were geo strategic initially, but how the economic objectives really became more prominent as that relationship evolved and then began to include things like
global public goods and global norms as china became a much more important player on the global stage. so we took that historical framing and that historical understanding of how u.s. objectives are impacted by u.s.-china engagements and we brought it forward to the present and have used it in our frame work to evaluate both u.s. objectives and whether or not u.s.-china engagement in specific activities advances or hinders achievements of those objectives. so that's really the core of the framework. there are four distinct pieces to it. the first piece is a risk assessment, and that risk assessment should be common across all participants that are evaluating inactivity.
so that's the starting point in the framework is what is the specific risk that we're concerned with in looking at a given activity. part two, i mentioned objectives really being the core of the frame work. which u.s. objectives are impacted by a particular activity. and does that activity advance or hinder u.s. objectives? that is step two. if the answer to that question is that activity hinders achievement of u.s. objectives or maybe ambiguous, costs and benefits to it, we propose that the framework does affect the effectiveness of restrictions, so at that point, one should evaluate restrictions for their possible effectiveness and that means what is the leadership position in that particular activity and what's the likelihood that you could get
others to go along should the united states move in the direction of restricting an activity? that's step three. and then step four that really gets at what the congressman was also referencing is rule of law. so any activity should be consistent with rules of law, consistent with u.s. laws and u.s. obligations internationally, and any efforts to restrict an activity should also be consistent with rule of law. and we underscore that piece because it really is critical, as far as differentiating the united states and china. and the adherence of rule of law and transparency of rule of law is something that we can't lose sight of in looking to either endorse or restrict certain activities. so those are the four basic components to the framework. the report itself has key findings that are general across
all sectors and a few that are specific to the case studies that we looked at. let me just go through a few of the high level take-aways, and then i'm going to get to our experts here to get to some more granularity in the sectors. on the high level takeaways, i mentioned the first two components of the framework, the risk assessments and then u.s. objectives and whether or not they're advanced by a particular activity. one take away is that these assessments are incredibly subjective. they can be educated, but they are very subjective and i think there needs to be an appreciation of that going in, that there are different perspectives on an activity and that influences how people see the activity and whether or not engagement is good or bad for the united states. that high degree of subjectivity is also the reason why we need a common risk assessment when we
start this process. it should be a risk assessment that is common across all u.s. government agencies that are looking at activities, so at a minimum, every participant that has a voice in a debate understands what is the specific risk that we're looking at. so that's lesson number one. i would say lesson number two that emerged in the course of writing up our case studies, and that is a discussion of when we assess a particular activity, and we talk about whether or not u.s. objectives are advanced, there's a debate ongoing whether we should be looking at overall benefits or at net benefits to the united states. and this sound kind of weedy, but if we think really big
picture, the rationale for engaging with china historically and in economic areas has been that that engagement is actually very efficient and objectively benefits everyone and it's that overall benefit that has been the rationale for economic engagements since normalization of relations. that has shifted a bit in the last few years, where we're not really looking so much at overall benefits, but we're thinking about net benefits, so, yes, the united states might benefit from a particular activity, but is china benefitting more? that's not an approach that economists tend to take. it's not the approach that the united states historically has taken, but increasingly, you're hearing that exact point, that yes, the u.s. might benefit from activity x, but china is benefitting more, therefore, it's something that should be
restricted. we don't answer the question as far as whether overall or net benefit is the right way to look at the issue, but similar to meeting a common risk assessment, we need to be on the same page as to what is it that we're looking at. overall benefits or net benefit. a third take away, and now i'm going to shift to our panelists after the third takeaway, is this push toward fragmenttation in certain areas. when we started the project, again, going back nearly 18 months, i think our prior was that the united states was looking for global concensus, global rules and norms, and that an objective of engagements was to have those global standards. we have reconsidered that as a u.s. objective and we've actually concluded that the current u.s. objective is
accepting some fragmentation. i think if you talk to the u.s. officials, they would say, we are accepting fragmentation because china has forced that fragmentation and we are now having to respond. i think we need to maybe not consider so much the history, but where we are right now at this particular point in time. and it is a change, i think, in u.s. policy if we are accepting frag fragmentation in certain technological and data-driven areas, it seems to us a change in u.s. policy, and i lied, one last key takeaway. we're talking here about defensive measures for the most part, restricting activities , potentially, but our big takeaway from this project is we do need to play off defense, but the most important thing is for
the united states to be playing offense. we will not win by defending areas where we're already good. we need to get even better and so, while so much of the report and so much of the our discussion will be on the defensive side, we can't lose sight of what really is critical and that is competing and kind of augmenting our offensive capabilities. so i hope everyone will take a look both at the february report and the report that's issued today. there's much more details contained there-in. but as i mentioned, the deliverable here really is the framework and then we tested the framework in three sectors and that's where i like to pull in our experts here. the three sectors that we chose to look at were artificial intelligence, and specifically research collaboration in ai. we looked at biotechnology and specifically data sharing,
sharing of human genomic data in biotechnology, and then the third issue was on the capital market side and looking at cross-border portfolio flows. to apply the framework, we needed to pull in experts and the three experts that we have with us today participated in at least one of each of these round tables. i'd like to do just a brief introduction and then turn the microphone over to them. first we're going to hear from dave rank, senior advisor with the cowan group. he has a long and distinguished career in the u.s. foreign service, including postings in beijing, shanghai, and taiwan. his last posting was in 2017 with final assignment was that of deputy chief of mission at the u.s. embassy in beijing. we will then hear from remco,
an expert in artificial intelligence, he is a research fellow at security and emerging technology better known as c-set at georgetown university and he's a prolific writer, not just on ai, but also on immigration policy and research security, which are very relevant for today's conversation. we'll hear from anne stevenson yang, co-founder and research director at day capital research. she lived in china for a number of years and covered sectors ranging from finance, but also on the technology side. i did note as i was doing a bit of research for this that anne actually authored a book called
"china alone: potential return back to isolation" back in 2013, so, if we can say that someone was definitely ahead of her time and appreciating where things are now, i think it's anne. so, let me just thank all three of you for joining us today. i want to pose the same question to all of you, actually, to kick us off and start with dave and that is your reaction to what you heard from representative hill. he covered a lot of ground in his comments. he had a lot to say about the current status of u.s.-china relations. i'm wondering if you could respond to the comments and also give us your assessment where things stand on u.s.-china engagement. dave: thank you. tough act to follow between representative hill, stephanie, and you, and matt as well. thank you for inviting me. and i thought representative hill was terrific. i thought he was really refreshing and really well-informed both historically, historical background of the united states relationship in
asia, and the current state of play in washington. so congratulations for getting such a great keynote speaker. i thought it was particularly -- i was particularly impressed by the way he started by noting that, you know, that the current state of tensions between the united states and china aren't the norm. they have not been the norm. if you look at the 20th century, roughly, what, 80 of the 100 years of the 20th century, the u.s. and china were allies, either formal allies or defacto allies, so, you know, the current state of tension is an abberation from what prevailed in the 20th century. with that as background, a couple of comments on what the representative had to say. first of all, and this gets back to something you said,
stephanie, is that you can't beat something with nothing. and, you know, the concerns we have about chinese, whether chinese subsidies or support and national champion and commercial behavior at home, externally and huawei, i think are all legitimate concerns. the united states is right to be concerned about those and exactly what you were saying, that complaining or pointing out problems is not sufficient. i think that it will be important as the united states thinks about what we do in terms of, ok, how do we respond? what do we put on the table, rather than what do we take off the table and that comes to, i guess, my second general comments on representative hill's remarks and your report more generally, which is that the conversation in washington to date, i will quibble with your language, you talked about offense and defense.
i would phrase it more in terms of subtracted or additive. my concern is that a lot of what the conversation in washington has been has been focused on similar to the representative brought up, were subtractive, tariffs, sentients, where do we do less of things? my preference would be, and your report highlights, the need to look at additive things. how do we add to what the united states has, how do we recognize our shortcomings and address some of those? which brings me, i guess, to my next general point, which is, as we think about the u.s.-china relationship or the u.s. role in the world, i think it's important to remember the country over which we should have the most influence and it's not the people's public of china and representative hill is right
that engagement has not been a -- we did not move from success to success in the course of engagement with a country where we don't share -- where we have many interests that aren't in common, we don't share common values. the country we have most influence over is the united states. i think, as we think how do we address the problems that your report highlights, how do we best address it, i think that engagement is important and i think that simply having channels to communicate are important, but as we try to address the problems we see, i think our first stop is to, one, get our own house in order and take the steps we need to take domestically, and then finally, one final comment, for a while i spent six month as the head of our embassy in china and met with a lot of business people during that time and i would say that people don't come to the
american embassy, business people don't come to the american embassy and i suspect they don't come to capitol hill to talk about successes, about the good news, they come with problems and headaches. in my current position, i deal with a lot of companies that have headaches and problems. in china, not out of the milk of human kindness, but because they're making money there, because china is an attractive place to do business. the question of decoupling and single source of supply chains, in my current career, you know, again, it is anecdotal, it is hard to -- i don't think there has been comprehensive study of supply chains, whether they have shifted because of the pandemic. there's some anecdotal evidence that people, companies were moving to places like vietnam and having gotten to vietnam and realizing it is a tougher place to do business than china and have shifted supply chains back into prc.
so lots of different threads to pick up from what the representative talked about, but really a strong way to start. so thank you. i'll stop there. stephanie: thanks, dave. yeah, i actually kind of made a point that i should have made upfront. i should note that the report is a targeted approach to decoupling, which means the premise of a wholesale disentanglement of u.s. and chinese economies is rejected and we should be focusing on the narrow areas where there is a risk, that's what is proposed in the report, and how one identifies that, and that's informed by exactly what you just said, that the two economies are so closely integrated and private sector participants and also our allies and partners, i think, the
congressman referred to the siren song of the chinese market, but the reality is that those entanglements are so entrenched and that it is a very tough argument in my anecdotal experience suggests that there are not -- there is not kind of an across the board agreement on the need to separate that, but really have a more narrow and targeted approach. colleagues of ours at csis and the asia programs had done a survey that looked at thought leaders and private sector, not just in the u.s., but also looking at key u.s. allies, and they similarly rejected this notion of decoupling, so it's an important thing for all of us to keep in mind, i think, in this discussion. let me turn to remco and the introduction, it will be clear to people that you participated in our ai research collaboration
round table. i would ask you the same question that i asked to dave, as far as your reaction to what you heard from the congressman, but also your observations on what u.s.-china, both collaboration and competition, looks like in artificial intelligence. go ahead. remco: thanks, it's great to be here. i have very little to add beyond what dave said. i think it was -- the remarks were great and dave's responses were great. i can talk a little about what some of that nuance looks like in the ai space. i think it's a really complicated eco system and so i think it's helpful to break it down a little bit. we in the sort of ai world tend to talk about kind of four parts of the ai system and framework, what my colleague calls the ai
triad consists of data, algorithms, and hardware. the data used to train and the algorithms, and the algorithms, run on very, very intensive computer systems and tens of millions of dollars to training, computing power is a very important tool. computing power, it is hard to control data. i think the report goes into this and u.s.-china competition in data is a really complex topic in and of itself in the context of ai. a lot of data that's used to train cutting edge ai models and algorithms, as well as the second part are open source and it's a big part of the culture of the ai field to be open to share, both to be able to replicate and to be able to innovate. it encourages adoption in businesses. if you have your code open source, open source framework, people can adopt more quickly
and so that has innovative benefits to the united states, but also means, china can access technology developed in the u.s. much more quickly on the data and algorithm side. on the hardware side, the third part, you know, we've seen a lot of talk about semiconductors in d.c. they're important for lots and lots of sectors, not just ai, but because of the nature of ai systems, hardware is a key part of the ai conversation and ai competition between u.s. and china. i think that's an area where people still see the u.s. as having a fairly large lead. but at the same time, we also see china really investing, you know, billions and billions of dollars in building up the semiconductor eco system in contrast to data and algorithms, so much is open and even if you try to restrict is it, cyber security systems are hard to lock anything up that lives in the digital world, and in hardware, it's a little bit
easier to control. you can actually apply controls to certain items, especially in semiconductors, we've seen this on the manufacturing equipment side, so not necessarily the chips themselves, but the machines use today make the chips. that is a very concentrated industry, it lives mostly in the united states, netherlands, and japan and so far we've seen relatively expert controls in those areas, so on the hardware side, i think you see a little more control being possible and a little more competition there as well. and the fourth part, which i think underlies that ai triad of data, algorithms, and hardware is talent. the people who work on all of these parts of the eco system and that's the scientists and engineers who are training the ai models, innovating on the algorithmic side, are pushing forward the cutting edge of semiconductor r & d. and there, that's, you know, i work on it, so i have an
incentive to say this, i think it's almost the trickiest or most interesting part of the eco system. because it is very possible, like hardware, to control talent flows. we have mechanism, unlike data and algorithms, you can pick it out of clouds, so to speak, there is things you can do. but the benefits of having open talent and the desirability of controls there, that's a really tricky issue, so, i think there we've seen the u.s. be open. we've seen the u.s. historically benefit from international talent flows. if you look at the ai work force in the united states today, roughly two-thirds of people with graduate degrees from the u.s. universities in ai related fields are in fact international students, and so, you know, the work force today, that's a slightly lower proportion,
around half maybe, but it's still, that's a really, really big part of the u.s. eco system. there was a steady done in 2019 or i think in early 2020 by polo , looked at some of the top presenters in machine learning, in the very prominent ai conference, and she found there were twice as many chinese nationals working on ai presenting at that conference who lived in the united states that lived in china. so when you talk about the context of the united states, that is huge. when you talk about who gains more perspective, i think some people would say that the big problem for china as well, i do something that benefits the united states, but also has costs for china, that the united states has absorbed a lot of china's best ai talent. that is where we see competition playing out and be controlled the question of can you control ai in the context of this
conversation also looks a little bit different. stephanie: thanks, remco. your answer actually got at another one of the kind of key takeaways and something we heard consistently from the roundtables, was we really need to be specific in describing what is the activity. folks that know ai will know that it's kind of comical to think about controlling ai, what are you talking about exactly. you kind of broke down the specific components and then kind of within that narrowly what is the area that one is concerned about and, therefore, would be thinking to control, that that kind of take away for us at needing to be very tailored and specific in the activity that you are concerned about was a lesson that we can learned from all the roundtables that we convene. i'm glad you got to the net benefit, because that was a
question i wanted to pose to the three of you as well. let me shift over now to anne, who participated in the capital markets and cross-border flows roundtable. the representative spent a good portion of his time talking about this and we know there's a tremendous amount of activity on this front, both in terms of announcements coming out of the united states, also policy actions in china that are impacting portfolio investment in particular. but anne, if i could turn this over to you, what did you hear in the congressman's comments, and what are your observations about the nature of cross-border portfolios between the u.s. and china right now? and what sort of risks, or not, do they present to the united states? anne: thanks, stephanie.
i really like the comments on talent. pretty much agreed with everything that the congressman said and was very impressed with the depth of his understanding on china. i think the background on japan provides a whole lot of value. the one thing where i question ed a little bit was the questions about the value of engagement policy through the 1990s and arguably the early 2000's. i think that the benefits of cost reduction and efficiencies that we gained through engagement were, and, of course, to the benefits of the chinese people were enormous. the problem was more in the allocation of those cash flows throughout the united states economy, and i do think that we need to really focus on building our domestic infrastructure now and a lot of the infrastructure is talent infrastructure. that's a very complicated issue. i think that it's important to
remember that china, throughout this period of expansion and engagement with the world, has really not changed its domestic institutions hardly at all, but instead has coupled with international institutions kind of the way you would couple a train. a very thin interface between, for example, the domestic trade ministry and the international wto, the ppoc and the imf and so on and so forth. that doesn't mean that we shouldn't protect our own interest in the united states. i think it's not realistic to expect china to move farther towards a rule of law. i think that the united states made -- a lot of players in the united states made the mistake of thinking that xi jinping when he took over his party role in 2012 was going to continue the
reforms of the past, and that's turned out to be very much not the case. it doesn't mean that we shouldn't protect our own interests and i think the way we do that is through a lot of the financial measures that the congressman mentioned. i think that the sherman bill, law is very important there. i think it needs to be tightened and i think, ultimately, auditors need to be paid by some central fund rather than by the company so they stop seeing their interest with the companies. i think the fdr bill is a good idea. many measures particularly that the congressman mentioned to manage financial flows between the united states and china i think will be very helpful. why don't i pause there and let us go to questions? stephanie: thanks, anne. let me just remind the audience,
we're scheduled to go until 10:30, so we're going to reserve time for audience questions. we're getting a few in the please go ahead and submit them if you have questions. i'm going to take just one more question to the panelists. it will be a common question again to save time for audience questions. and that's on the issue of allies and partners. the congressman highlighted the importance of cooperation with allies and partners in his comments. we have in our framework one of the ways to assess effectiveness of any restrictions is the likelihood that allies and partners would go along with any decision to restrict. but i don't like to ask all three of you again, dave, maybe more in general, how you see allies and partners and their assessment of the risk coming from china, how like-minded are we in that assessment?
and then i will ask remco and anne maybe more tailored to your sectors, but dave, let me go to you first with that question. dave: sure. if i can go back, not to beat up on the congressman a little bit. i thought he perhaps undersold the extent to which the ship we saw in the trump administration was already in the works at the end of the obama -- in the second obama term. i think whether hillary clinton had won or donald trump, that we would have seen a much sharper focus on china than had been under obama. i also think he may have oversold the extent to which policies that steven mnuchin and pompeo implemented some enter the alliance view on china. i think using some of the tools, tariffs, that sort of thing on china certainly got the
attention of beijing, but the fact that trump administration also use similar tools on canada and japan and the eu undermined the extent to which the trump administration was able to rally allies and partners. i think you're seeing a little bit of an effort now to take a more allied-centric approach to trade issues and i think it is bringing up the challenges that that will bring along. i mean, tpc i think is encouraging. one thing, and not become in different languages, you know, that trade and technology council, if i got that right, u.s.-eu meeting that took place in pittsburgh, the first of many, i hope is more than a long , drawn-out talk shop that a
-- that quickly goes from discussion of issues to implementation of the joint approaches. the challenge is, and remco, maybe you can talk about this better than i can, is that on a lot of things, the u.s. and european interests are really different. our technology sector is much more advanced than the eu's in a lot of areas. and so our concerns are not their concerns, and it will be a challenge to get alignment on things because we don't fundamentally share the same interests in areas. and then, finally, allies and partners. i think sometimes we overly securitize, the department of defense kind of security, our allied partner relationships. i think the aukus agreement is a good thing. the fact that very quickly a
french ox was gored by cementing that partnership though shows how hard it's going to be to cobble together different groups of relationships into a united sort of posture towards china. i will stop there and turn it back to you. stephanie: thanks, david. you mentioned kind of the ttc, the eu-u.s. trade and technology council, which, from the outside, looks like it was quite a heavy lift, ten working groups i think came out of that. so clearly a lot of work and a lot of ambition, but as you pointed out, now comes the deliverable stage, and that's really where we start to see some of the tension. i should mention, we had a biotech expert that was unable to join our panel at the last
minute, but the take away in the biotech case study revolved a lot around data, asymmetric approaches to data when looking at the u.s. and china, and data -- we could have another 18 month project on just the topic of data and what that means. but that's an issue where we do not have a common approach with our allies and partners in these key strategic sectors. beverly could be a big sticking point so we have an asymmetric approach when it comes to u.s. visavis china but also u.s. visavis europe, and that we are over and over again that that really should be kind of prioritize as a top issue to forge greater consensus among allies and partners. let me go to you, remco, and
kind of ask you that same question. data, obviously, is a big chunk of what is implicated in discussions on ai, but how do you see kind of the allied cooperation in artificial intelligence? remco: yeah, i think it's a big topic. the cooperation side i think you mentioned ttc and ai working group there. i think there is a big focus on responsible and trustworthy ai. so trying to get ai systems which learn in ways we don't fully understand from data and interacting with the world, trying to get them to be aligned with human values and to do what we intend them to do, i think that's an area of common interest and so a lot of the working groups and looks like we'll be focus on that in the area of ai, but a lot of the working groups activities, i should say. values, making sure we can reap the benefits of ai systems without needing to violate
privacy, so there's a subfield called privacy preserving ai or privacy preserving methods. maybe you don't have to centralize all your data in one place. you can train models in a decentralized place, you can send a model to your phone and a trance and local data and since the model back so you don't have to rip up all your personal data to a company to get the benefits of ai. those are areas of common interest and also that gets into framing a democratic alternative to china's authoritarian model as technology. that's the scenario where there is cooperation. i think there are lots of areas where there's competition or where there's disagreement. semiconductors is another ttc working group. u.s. is now investing i think the chips act money is not appropriated yet, but if it is, i think the u.s. is going to invest around 50 billion in domestic manufacturing in semiconductor r&d. europe has now said, we want in on that, so we also want to
invest tens of billions. those companies find the same market so there's competitive element there for sure as the u.s., or the eu doesn't want to be dependent on the u.s. for its semiconductor manufacturers supply chains. that's an area of competition, talent is an area of competition, too. we have canada advertising with big billboards in silicon valley saint if you have h-1b problems, visa problems, come to canada. we are very open, we have low taxes. that campaign has been running for many years and having a lot of success. the u.s. says we want to cooperate on talent with other countries but that often means getting their people to come work in the u.s. which is obviously a little bit of a competitive element. that's an area where there is competition. on the china side, there is a little bit of collaboration on the talent side. i will stop after this point. that there's a lot of countries similarly concerned to just china trying to figure out what to do about china's attempts to use overseas talent to transfer
technology. canada, the uk, australia has been working on this for a few years, the netherlands, they've all had parliamentary inquiries of what we do about these concerns and we want to be open to chinese researchers, students, workers, but we are struggling to strike the right balance and that's an area where you've also seen a lot of dialogue, not very publicly, but an area where there's common interest. it's a real messy mix of cooperation and competition, i think. stephanie: yeah, and on that, the last point, i think, part of it is a question of risk tolerance. so while welcoming researchers may entail certain risks, can those risks be managed? and are we really trying to live in a world of accepting zero risk or managing the risk that we have to maximize the benefit? and that's, you know, clearly
evident in your sector, but i think it applies across many sectors as well. anne, on this question of kind of allied cooperation, i think you picked up on it in your comments. it was a theme that came across in the roundtable on cross-border portfolio flows, which was at the effectiveness of restrictions is really dependent on others, other centers of wealth, basically kind of going along with some of those restrictions. and so this point of getting cooperation from allies and partners is every bit as relevant and i financial flow context -- in a financial flow context as it is in a technology transfer context. what do you see there as far as the prospects for collaboration, cooperation among allies and partners? this is pretty unchartered
territory in some respects. we don't have an understanding of financial flow restrictions that's on the same level of export controls where you have multilateral control of regime. so where do you see things going when we're talking about capital flows? anne: i'm not sure i completely agree with the premise. i think that china has put itself forth under xi jinping as a financial capital, one where the renminbi is internationalizing and the marks of becoming a partner at think it's not true. i think you see progress in the other direction in china, and as long as the renminbi is non-convertible, the idea its markets are going to be challengers to the united states, public markets or the renminbi itself will be important internationally is simply just not a nonstarter.
so i think that -- and i also think the united states needs to protect its own market and its own investors regardless of what the consequences might be. so if someone else wants to list chinese companies that are fraudulent in the united states and deal with those ready literally issues, then my -- regulatory issues, then my feeling is be my guest. i do think that there are areas for important cooperation because i think that china has very much established a set of parallel institutions, as the congressman mentioned, particularly in finance. and that signing onto those institutions instead using the more transparent and better government international institutions is a mistake. it was a mistake not to join the ttc when we made that decision, and pushing china to use the
world bank in the asia -- what's it called? the asian infrastructure bank, is that what it's called? rather than its own separate institutions for the bri, i think, is the right idea. i think the legislation on sdr is right idea. there's been this siren song of china's capital, which we also saw in japan in the late 1980s, where localities internationally and in the united states and international institutions like the imf have felt like, oh, they are just so important and so powerful, and they have so much influence. we have to accept their sort of different rules in order to have them participate. and china's inclusion in the sdr basket back in, what was it, 2016, 2015, i think was one of those mistakes, as has been china's inclusion in the msc i index and things like that.
i think, gradually, that sort of thing will fade away. stephanie: all right. i want to come back actually to some of those financial, we've got a few questions and related to capital market issues. let me go to some of the audience questions that we have been receiving, the first one, >> you can see the last few minutes of this event at our website c-span.org. we are leaving this here to keep our over 40-year commitment to live coverage of congress. u.s. house of representatives today is considering legislation to award the congressional gold medal to service members who died in the august 26 terrorist attack during the u.s. evacuation from afghanistan. now live coverage of the house here on c-span.