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tv   Legal Experts Discuss Proposals to Change Supreme Court  CSPAN  January 22, 2022 6:59am-7:57am EST

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>> as you likely know in april, president biden established a commission on
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>> -- for and the events supreme court reform, including an appraisal of the merits and the legality of particular reform proposals. i think we are awfully lucky to be in conversation today with two experts who can help us shed light on the commission's processes and conclusions. the first is kim roosevelt, who served as commissioner on the presidential commission on the supreme court of the united states, the professor for the administration of justice at the university of pennsylvania school of law. very pleased she is a faculty advisor at the acs student chapter as well. she focuses on constitutional law and conflict of laws and is
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published scholarly books including "the myth of judicial activism," making sense of supreme court decisions, which said that standards by which citizens can determine whether the supreme court is abusing its authority to interpret the constitution. his new book, "the nation that never was," is a book that considers the period of the civil war and reconstruction were relevant to thinking of the values of our nation as opposed to the revolution and the original constitution. if i've mischaracterized that, you will get a chance to fix it. he is a graduate of yale law school and served as a law clerk to justice david souter on the u.s. supreme court and judge stephen f williams on the d.c. court of appeals. our other expert is a professor
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of law and interdisciplinary legal scholar researching the quality at the intersection of law, history, sociology, and politics in the united states, and globally. she has authored dozens of articles and books about imperative constitutional law, about the procedural implementation in the united states and europe. she received her doctorate in politics from oxford university, where she held a marshall scholarship, and a jd from yale law school. following law school, she clerked for judge edwards of the u.s. court of appeals for the d.c. circuit. -- provided written testimony to the presidential commission on the supreme court of the united states and i thoroughly enjoyed reading that testimony can which
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i thought was fascinating in terms of comparing aspects. let's get into the discussion. blast 15 minutes i will turn it over to help us with q&a from the audience. we will get into the some of the process and some of the substance of what happened with the commission, and finally where we should go from here. let me start with the central findings and the key takeaways from the report. >> well, i think mainly weather reported was what the commission was charged with, which is looking at the leading proposals for reform and trying to state and not really assess the arguments on both sides. court expansion was prominent, term limits was prominent. and then there were less central considerations -- we look at transparency, we looked at the use of emergency orders or the
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shattered docket, we talked a little bit about--shadow docket, we talked about cameras in the courtroom, code of ethics for the supreme court.
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even though it focused on expansion and term limits, it did a good job of giving some account of other proposals. >> for a lot of people, at least on the outside and maybe for those of you who are commissioners, the commission's charge is limited and did not call for recommendations. did either of you feel that this hamper the inquiry? let me start with julie. >> so, well, i think that if we just start with the problem to which the commission was a response, which is the last five years changing the composition of the court very quickly and it's why
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-- might have been more helpful. >> can you elaborate on that issue with regard to the commission's charge and any other concerns you have about whether it was unduly limited? >> first, i would say i do agree with julie that the problem is broader than the supreme court. the way that things are in the country, the way our political system is working has to do with parts of the constitution other than the supreme court in the senate, electoral college, all of that needs attention. i think the commission that looked at the health of american democracy generally would be good. it would be a very different commission, it would require different procedures in a different body. with respect to the supreme court itself, the complaint that i have heard most often is you did all this analysis can you set out all of these arguments, but you didn't tell us what we
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should do which argument are good, which arguments are bad. i think that is a valid complaint and i understand why people are frustrated, but i encourage them to think of the report is just the first step in the process. you can imagine two different kinds of commissions. one would be we think there is a problem, we know we want to do something about it, and we would like you to tell us what to do. for that you want a relatively small commission of experts who are mostly on the same page and are going to figure out the details of how you fix this. that is not what we have. i can understand why president biden didn't want that kind of condition because maybe he wanted more flexibility. if he didn't know exactly how to proceed. -- maybe he didn't know exactly how to proceed. we had a different commission which was a broad range of views, people from different sides of the spectrum, people with different institutional backgrounds.
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there was no way we were going to agree on recommendations. the charge to the commission i am on had been to come out with recommendations, it would have exploded. half the people would've resigned and we would not have been able to see the report, something like that. the report we wrote was the only one we could write as a commission. what i would encourage people to do is think of this as he was the first step. the commission has given you all these perspectives, and now someone else, the american people or the biden has to decide which of these arguments is plausible, which makes sense, what we should do going forward. if this report is the end of the process, then yes, you should be frustrated. if this commission report is the first step forward, then we can still believe that things will get better. >> i find it interesting, because we get complaints as an organization, as many did, that
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there wouldn't be conditions, but it might not have been very pretty what would have come out of there. as i read the two key chapters, it helps people accept this issue as a first step, to understand what are the range of possibilities. at least it is accessible to people instead of just being a mishmash of different ideas that were never organized. that is an interesting reaction. again, what can you share about the process itself? we know that right a number of points of disagreement. how are they approached? i understand that in addition to two conservative commissioners that resigned prior to the completion of the work, how did the process unfold? >> well, we were subdivided into working groups. we had one working group basically for each chapter which that different working groups were assigned a reform
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proposals. and then disagreements within the working groups, you could hammer out in the back and forth and people would say this argument should be included, this argument shouldn't be included. there was a sort of normal give and take there. with respect to the broader commission, it was a little bit strange, because all of our deliberations had to be public, so we did that during the public meetings. and we didn't have the normal academic back-and-forth email among commission members, we had to do all that it public. the way the disagreements got resolved was that the co-chairs would return us to the principle that it is not our job to decide whether this is a good argument or not. it is just average up to put the arguments out there in the best form that we can--it is just our job to put the organs out there in the best form that we can. people with particular positions would have the primary responsibility for drafting the
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arguments in support of those positions. we ended up with a lot of proponents will say this and critics will say that. russ: how did you find a process in the handling of the points of disagreement? julie: well, i think the commission invited a wide range of people to testify, as far as i could tell. there was a pretty broad ranging hearings including, i was pleased to see that there were many scholars who focused on constitutional systems outside the united states and compared to it, including a former justice of the canadian supreme court. and so i think there is a range of ideas presented, and to some degree you can see that not everyone testified but certainly the commissioners and some other things that were written
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afterwards, there were clearly disagreements. as kim was stating earlier, the purpose of the exercise was to lay out just the history and the range of options to make the recommendation. russ: the testimony, as many others did, julie -- can you take a minute to give us an overview, perhaps by category or constituency, of the views that were expressed during the process? who was the commission presented with? julie: i think there were many law professors who focused on u.s. constitutional law and constitutional history. i think certainly there is a lot to grapple with regarding proposals to expand the court because of the history of fdr's court packing plan and just fears about the over -politicization in the
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diagnosis of the current political moment as to whether the court has already been delegitimized. and i think there was a range of scholars who brought in perspectives that we might not have had and the possibility of the legislative override, which is more common in other constitutional systems outside the united states, constitutional systems that were designed in the 20th century or even in the 21st century rather than in the 18th century. i think that there are -- it was interesting to see the perspective that many of the practitioners and advocates, people who are part of groups that litigated before the court -- it is predictable that many of their concerns are more concerned with the immediate moment we are currently in. and i think there was an
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interesting conversation in the report, in the hearings about the extent to which the constitution would have to be amended and the barriers that article v would place politically to any proposal to a constitutional amendment as a feasible option. russ: kim, as a member of the commission, you have alluded to this, that you folks emailed each other -- presumably you didn't have close to sessions with the group to discuss. did you find the public hearings meaningful? were there any other opportunities to exchange views other than just in the public settings? kermit: there were not really opportunities for change views across the working groups. each working group was pretty much a silo, working on its own chapter. the cochairs would check in on
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the different working groups, and sometimes they would tell us "you are saying something here that is from intentional with something another working group is saying." the public meetings were actually quite important and informative, because, first of all, we didn't know what the other working groups were going to say until we saw those drafts for the public meetings. we didn't know what the other commissioners thought, either. there is a tendency to think we are group of reasonable people, so everyone thinks like me. understanding the range of views out there was actually quite valuable. a lot of people spoke up and during the public meetings and said things that i found very compelling. it definitely affected the way i thought about these issues. russ: different commissioners
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were responsible for drafting different sections of materials. near if you come with the division of labor good, -- in your view, was the division of labor good? do think it influence the report's findings? kermit: well, the way the liver was divided up among the working groups probably--labor was divided up among the working groups probably did influence the ultimate shape of the report. since we didn't have particular recommendations, i don't think you can say we went in a different direction. i think generally what the co-chairs did was to assign positions to people who were interested in the topics, and then have people who supported a particular argument be the ones putting forward that argument can which i think is probably the right way to do it, because that way you get what the supporter of the argument thinks is the best version of it, and you don't have someone who doesn't sympathize with the argumento r doesn't fully
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understand it trying to put it forward. i think that was good. in terms of how the assignment to the working groups and the silo effect that we had because of the public accountability requirements, . it is an unusual way to work but it worked out pretty well. >> let's turn you guys to the substance on this report. i will kick it off with you. what about the threshold matter of terminology? court packing means one thing to some. i know what it means to me. with a couple of recent confirmations. i believe there were some complaints about the use of the term "share a docket," which the supreme court is using more and more to the oral
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arguments. what is your reaction is a member of the commission? >> yeah, so, sometimes a term is used by people who owned expanding the court. i think that is the term that's been raised largely because i think increasingly, those who favor expanding the court think the court has already been packed. it's been kind of interesting to see the shift. with regard to the shadow docket , in general, there's something tied up with a much larger issue of how we control the supreme court jurisdiction, over a range of matters. whether we should be considering even mandatory jurisdictions over certain matters.
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so i don't know. i think shadow docket is an appropriate term. most americans don't think about or know about this regard. they don't realize they are not briefed in the same way or they are not treated in the same way procedurally. >> it is a relatively new term to have been coined in the not-too-distant past. people are definitely beginning to figure out what it is. how problematic was the court packing in the shadow docket commission? >> it wasn't a major disagreement. i think we should have expected that it would come up because people always like to describe circumstances and language that tilts the field in their favor.
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court packing sounds like a bad thing. it is generally used by opponents. the commission ended up using a more neutral term, court expansion. shadow docket is interesting. it was coined recently by professor will bode. one of the conservatives. didn't pen it as a critical term, but doing things in secret, it did come to take on that connotation. and so, some of the more conservative commissioners, we shouldn't say shadow docket because it sounds as if they are doing thing in an underhanded or sinister way. we were trying to be neutral. we substituted emergency orders. >>'s let me amused that something called shadow docket does not have a negative connotation. let's get to the major substance here. to the extent it can be set, for
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any proposal, commentators have characterized this report in support of term limits. i would like both of your views on why or why not term limits would be the answer to the problems the court currently suffers as you see them. julie? >> so, i think term limits are helpful. the various forms of design that are covered in the report would stabilize the term limits. it wouldn't go into effect until later. so i don't think it would cause a current crisis. but i think that term limits would actually overtime properly restore balance.
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to reflect what is going on politically in the country and what the people and voters' preference is. the real problem with term limits that comes up is whether this can really be done without amending the constitution. there are some work arounds, that would involve supreme court justices rotating off, and doing other judicial tasks. or becoming a circuit judge or something like that. my thought -- it would seem those oppose it, they believe term limits are necessary to protect judicial independence. i just think the opponenta went to the problem of the office of the supreme court justice being nominated and confirmed.
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certainly you can make that argument. that it would be challenged. i don't see term limits actually happening without a fair amount of controversy, about amending the constitution. one way or another. >> if you could give me your reaction on the term limits issue in general. >> i definitely want to talk about the statute versus constitutional amendment. are term limits a solution to the problem we are facing? and depends on what you think the problem is. they are sort of three different problems. which would require different solutions. may be some of them are not appropriate to try to address. one problem would be -- we just don't like to the station's is issuing no. -- the decisions the court is issuing no.
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term limits could fix that eventually because they will overtime bring the supreme court more in line with dominant political opinion. it is a sort of slow and crude way to do it maybe. but if we think they are out of touch with mainstream public opinion, constitutional consensus, the term limits will take us there eventually. the second problem is the membership of the supreme court as being determined -- is being determined by random chance when there is an involuntary departure from the bench because of ill health or death. it's being determined by strategic behavior by the justices. it is being determined by a
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hearing to merrick garland was pretty extreme. i don't think we can expect nothing but escalating problems. i'm sort of astonished that there is opposition to term limits because it seems like such an obviously good idea. the second problem is a composition of the supreme court is determined by these factors, which are not the factors we want. the composition of the supreme court should be tied, i think, to success in national elections. so that if you win the presidency, you have some impact on the supreme courts. and the fact that it is not -- has not been done that way and the fact that despite democratic success in past presidential elections, we have a republican majority now, this could perpetuate itself indefinitely, as long as republicans win one out of every three or one out of every four presidential elections. that's a problem.
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because i don't think the supreme court should be a way in which the political minority can control the country on very important issues. term limits will solve that problem. not immediately, but eventually they will bring us to a rational system, which i think is vastly preferable. to the one that i have no. then there's the immediate crisis. which is what is happening to our democracy. will we have fair elections. going forward. term limits will help with that, but they will do it slowly. i'm not sure that we have the luxury of time. on that issue. >> i would add in terms of getting the public to be interested in this, and probably bothers them like it bothers me,
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is this notion that justice ginsburg was quite ill, was hanging on, in a way, that does not look like the right thing to happen. oliver wendell holmes was on for a long time. until he was 90 or something. but i think that all relates to the question of stoning the moment that you have constitutional amendment to do this. -- assuming the moment that you have constitutional amendment to do this. assuming that. at the states, the people might adopt it. i want to get your gut reaction.
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right now, the status quo favors the republicans. anytime you have something with a partisan inflection, you are to have partisan conflict over it. i think it is very unlikely that republicans would want to give up the advantage that they currently have. because with strategic retirements, they can maintain that more or less indefinitely. >> i agree. i think that once you talk about the constitutional amendment, 2/3 of congress -- both houses of congress, i think that basically tilts republican. even if it doesn't, it is hard to imagine two thirds of congress agreeing to anything. i think there's a sufficient
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division about the composition of the supreme court. i think there is certainly a public debate about it but i don't see two thirds of congress coming out in favor of amending the constitution for term limits for the reasons described. i don't think that would be politically visible -- politically feasible. >> then we need to go to the other question. what about instituting this by statute? you spoke a little bit about this already. if you could expand where you come down on it. the behavior, the appointments clause, you spoke about the supreme court. does the constitution allow for the implementation by statute of
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senior and junior justices? julie? >> so, i mean, i think certainly, you can imagine some possibility, where the proposal -- at least at the circuit level, you have to have judges junior and senior, though you have to choose one they go senior. -- when they go senior. they occupy a certain judicial function. i don't think it is wrong reading of the constitution, the junior and senior judge proposal being consistent with the text. but certainly, i think that one might read the good behavior as the office you get to keep. if that is the case, then you
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might see some litigation a bout it that would make it difficult to pass such legislation without it being invalidated. >> this is one of the issues where my views actually sort of changed. because i think if you look at it in the most straightforward and intuitive way, you would say the point of term limits is to have people stop being judges. and the constitution says that judges hold their offices during good behavior. obviously you can't say after 18 years based on being judges, consistent with that constitutional provision. and you can't. so my view is, you cannot say, we are removing you from office after 18 years. the key question is, what counts as removing a justice from office? and it turns out that under our
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current practice, under our current statute, when a supreme court justice retires, they are still a justice of the supreme court. david s. is still an associate justice. if you read his resignation letter, it says, if you would like to retire from active service and retain the office, this is what you do. he says i'm retiring from active service, i intend to continue to render substantial service, as an associate justice, which he still is. and it is pretty clear that he is still at least some kind of judge, because he is out there deciding cases. he is exercising the judicial power of the u.s. what she couldn't do, if he were not a federal judge -- which he couldn't do, if he were not a federal judge. i think he is a federal justice because that is what the statute says and there's actually a supreme court case on this week to bring out a lower court judge, who took senior status,
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then congress tried to cut his pay, and one of the other constitutional provisions that protect judicial independence says your pay cannot be reduced while you hold the office. so here's this guy who has taken senior status under the same statute that governs supreme court retirement. they now say that they are cutting your pay because you are not really a judge anymore, and the supreme court says no, he retains the office. congress has lightened his duties, they changed the duties of the office, but he still holds that office. it seems to me that the most strict forward analysis is that answers the questions of whether the good behavr tom
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ginsburg, said if writing the constitution now, there is no way that we would pick life tenure. on the second question about whether judges identify with political parties of the president who appointed them, i think it is true that they don't. you can see in the recent past some trump appointed judges
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ruling against trump. because i think justices generally do not identify with the president as a person. so much. they probably don't identify with a political party as a party very much. although you do see some or related decision that seem to be favoring the republican party pretty consistently. what that means is that judges are different. and judges acting in good faith will reach very different conclusions. in order to say this matters a hold of the judges are. that is what these reforms are >> let's go specifically not adding seats. nancy gaertner and larry t.,
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none of the reforms that have been proposed precisely for the problem that presents. i was amazed to see that two of them come out, changing their mind basically, favoring term limits -- sorry, favoring court expanding, moving to them, writing this is a uniquely parallel moment minding a unique response -- perilous moment requiring a unique response. many of us at acs have come around to it. i think it's very interesting that during this process, these two folks wrote this. where do you guys come down on? julie? >> i think the fundamental problem is, i think the problems
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that lead to where we are have much more to do with problems of constitutional structure. we have the senate process. that leads to the confirmations of these expanded seats. again, it really comes down to whether you see the crisis we are in and the outcomes being very conservative, or if you think it is a much larger problem, about presidents winning national elections and not necessarily having any judicial appointments. some having as many as three to the court, and that being undemocratic, with regard to the extent to which the court reflects the evolution of our
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democratic politics. the fundamental problem is that the senate as a matter of constitutional design is extremely undemocratic and unrepresented. the long disturbing member of the house proposed a couple of years ago that the senate be abolished. i wouldn't go quite so far right now. but certainly the point was that it over represents underpopulated states and under represents the more populated states. if you have the senate and only the senate voting on the confirmation, with so much power to the majority leader of the senate and the senate judiciary committee, with regard to whether there will be a floor vote at all -- so i don't think
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that any proposal to expand the court is really much of a solution, if these other problems of constitutional structure are not also tended to. there are other issues which i talked about in my own testimony. which we can get into. but i also think that maybe making the court less political, the solution to -- the way to make it less political is to be more upfront about the fact that constitutional interpretation is complicated. that people are different and judges are different. one way in which other systems do that is by making the confirmation process -- by distributing it across a wider range of institutions.
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i think there are much larger questions. i think that expanding the court would probably better than -- be better than not expanding at. the problem as a constitutional structure, heading in the direction that we are in. >> let me ask him a possibly unfair question since he was a commissioner. let's say, proposing that in six to the court, how would you come down on that? >> i would support that. i agree with julie that the problem is broader.
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i would say the problem is what pam called the new difficulties. which is basically that it is possible for a minority to capture and retain every branch of the federal government, you can control the senate while representing a significant minority of the population, and you can gerrymander, the controller house with the minority, too. now you've got the judiciaries, too. what do we do about that? it's a big problem. it has a bunch of different features in the constitution. with respect to the supreme court, the only thing that can fix that now and quickly is expansion. i wouldn't necessarily support that, if i didn't think that
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there was also not a concerted attack on democracy going on. that is the view that i came around to. that's what has made me think that we need to act now. >> all three of us have gone through that similar process. it is a slow realization. what was going on. we are getting near the time for q&a. julie, i want to go back to your broader comments. because you are an expert in constitutionalism, your testimony was about other supreme court approaches, where they resolved disputes among major political issues. the oral argument in dobbs, the challenge in mississippi, the abortion ban, in texas, not far in her rearview window -- our rearview window. what you think the commission's
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report has considered alternative models -- do you think the commission's report has considered alternative models? >> i think the comparative view focused on the number of justices, and whether or not they were term limits and how they were structured in other systems. it is important to understand that constitutional courts -- courts that have the power to evaluate a situation, particularly invalidate legislation on a range of controversial social and political issues. i think in many other systems, it operates differently from our own. if you think of a constitutional democracy, the different branches, the judicial branch and the executive branch, working together, you could imagine healthy dialogue
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emerging. part of this focuses on the possibility of a legislative override. what i focused on in my testimony was the abstract view that is constitutional courts actually review legislation before it goes into effect. before anyone who has been injured by. of course, because of the case or controversy requirement in article three, you would have a court -- wouldn't have a court -- you wouldn't have federal judicial power doing a review. i actually think the abstract review allows constitutional courts to look at a statute without the focal point being a particular injury. thinking about it in relation to a whole range of constitutional arguments and values. and striking it down.
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often defeating the course is not immediately invalidate the statute, sometimes you will see attempts to come back and rewrite the statute. that is often what happens. you end up reaching some kind of compromise. the legislature liberalized abortions by guaranteeing abortions on demand within the first trimester, i believe. and the constitutional court struck it down. on the other hand, it went beyond and said that of course there are some abortions that have to be -- that there is a constitutional right to have, because of the dignity and freedom of personality of the woman. the court went on to say that
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even though abortion on demand is not constitutionally permitted, certainly we would need protection for abortions for socioeconomic hardships that a woman faces in pregnancy. you get a wide range of abstract opinions like that and the legislature -- even though they didn't have as liberal an abortion statute as they originally intended, they ended up writing a statute that permitted abortion in most circumstances, where the evidence we looked at today would lead them to have abortions, not just threat to life, but mental health and social and economic circumstances. it is interesting to see in the dobbs argument that they argued -- there was a question that came up about abortion restrictions and other countries. it was pointed out that these are nominal restrictions. because of the way in which the
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legislature has written some of these laws. it really allows for abortion, it takes place not on demand, but in most circumstances -- you have the legal -- a legal way to choose. i think that is one thing that we can consider. and may be considered in the u.s., but a constitutional amendment i'm a particularly if you can think of a kind of hybrid legislative court even, and article one court, exercising abstract review over constitutional questions or constitutionality before controversy erupted. the abortion fight -- i mean, texas for example, the cleverness of the texas statute is creating a situation where no
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one would ever have standing to sue the state of texas for the constitutional violation. but if you had abstract review, what most people want from both sides is some enforcement review. of the statute. if we started thinking more imaginatively about institutions that we might actually be able to have, outside of article three, that might be a way of looking at changing the ecology in which constitutional interpretation occurs. >> i commend your testimony on this interesting subject. i do want to ask one more question, this will be a lightning round very quickly, getting more positive vibes about sort of the possibility of this commission laying the groundwork for reform efforts. very quickly, each of you -- what would you suggest pro reformers do now? >> i think what we need to do is
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push our elected officials with the message that there must be a next step. this commission report set out lots of different possibilities. now is the time for political actors to weigh those options and decide what they want to do. >> julie? >> as i have been saying, i think the problem is with our constitutional structure. i think the president should have a much broader commission on constitutional democracy and constitutional reform. and study that. >> very good. i hope i have not cut it too short, i know you've got some good questions. >> i will try to put some of them together for you all. there are questions about whether specific reforms were addressed by the commission or perhaps what your opinions are of them. a super majority vote for
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confirmation of justices, like a two thirds requirement perhaps? and/or, age limits, mandatory retirement age, or perhaps another proposal might be, if not those kinds of reforms, jurisdiction stripping. >> i will speak to that. age limits, the term limits to consider age limits, generally we considered they were not as good. because it will give you a finite term, but they will not regular relies appointments in a way that we thought was important if you are trying to equalize the influence had on the court. jurisdiction stripping, i am not really a fan of. i do think there is powerful case to be made that some of the problems that we have arise from the excessive role that the supreme court plays in the resolution of social debates. but i don't think the jurisdiction stripping is going
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to be a good way to fix that. for one thing, if you take jurisdiction away from the supreme court, there are still other courts out there. you can strip from the lower federal courts, but that just means state courts are going to be doing this. so, i am not sure that jurisdiction stripping is a good solution. what was the other one? oh, super majority senate confirmation requirements -- i think the problem is it is too hard to get a nominee confirmed. not that it is too easy. one thing that has to be stressed with term limits is it is not going to work unless you can ensure that each president gets to appointments. that is something that we struggled with. it assigned to say the justices will come off the court. >> julie, do you want to weigh in on that? >> to the extent that you have
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imposed requirements on procedure, to and validate a statute -- invalidate a statute, invalidate an act of congress, i think -- or a requirement that invalidated an act of congress, it would require that the statute is manifestly unconstitutional or clearly unconstitutional. i think i would be in favor of those types of proposals. >> ok. we've got two minutes. i'm going to ask you two questions that you can maybe handle real quickly. how should those in favor of reform ensure the charge that our complaints are really about preferred outcomes, not underlying problems of the court itself? but require institutional change?
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we is to sacrifice the [indiscernible] that is number one, the second one is following up on the next step question. nor specific suggestions, should there be a congressional hearing, and the action. >> concern about decisions is the weakness grown for reform. the concern about institutional relationships between the supreme court and the presidency or the national people is not about a particular decision, it is about the functioning of our system. concern about democracy and a system that can undermine the democratic process. that is not partisan. we are supposed to be a country where people elect representatives of their choice. trying to defend that it is not a partisan position.
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our next steps, all of the above. another commission would be good, congressional hearings would be good, executive action would be good. i want to see something happen. >> i think that there are a much larger problems and that the next step should be another commission looking more broadly at constitutional democracy, including but not limited to the supreme court. >> i wish we had more time. this is up to important conversation. i want to thank all of you for joining us. the topic of supreme court reform is incredibly important to us. it should be important to all americans. i think this is one of the first conversations in the country of this kind about the report and i am glad we got it done so that
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people can move seriously on this into next year. if you want to learn more about it or is you can find us online at
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discusses, her children's book pinky promises. hello, miami book festival. i am so sorry that i'm not able to join everyone in person, but i'm glad we're gonna get a chance at least to connect by video. so i'm here to talk about


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