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tv   Jeffrey Garten Three Days at Camp David  CSPAN  October 13, 2021 6:20pm-7:18pm EDT

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and there he is. >> follow american history tv on twitter, facebook, and youtube for schedule updates, to learn about what happened this day in history, watch videos, and learn more about the people and events that have shaped the american story. find us at c-span history. >> our weekly series "the presidency," highlights the politics, policies, and legacies of u.s. presidents and first ladies. we continue our look at camp david with a conversation about a pivotal nixon era meeting at the presidential retreat. up next, author jeffrey garten recounts president nixon's decision to end the connection between the value of the u.s. dollar and the gold standard.
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♪ world affairs world affairs ♪ >> when the nixon administration untethered gold and the u.s. dollar, it set shock waives throughout the world economy and up ended america's most political, most important political and military alliances. why was this decision made? what are the current challenges to the dollar from china's dominance to new forms of currency? luckily, we have with us tonight two individuals that can help shed light to this topic. thank you for joining us, president and ceo of the world affairs council of dallas/ft. worth. our program this evening features jeffrey garten, author of "three days at camp david." hoy a secret meeting and n. 1971 transformed the global economy.
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you can find the book at our local bookstore partner. our audience receives a 10% discount from the online store by using the code dfwworld. and remember, the code is good for any of the books in your shopping cart, no the just jeffrey's. the council will continue to offer top tier virtual programming through summer and into the beginning of fall. so continue to check out our website at dfwworld.org for newly scheduled events. and now, i'd like to invite richard fisher to kick off the program. richard is the former president and ceo of the federal reserve bank of dallas, as i mentioned. and most importantly, our recipient of the council's most prestigious honor, the h. meal malon award. he began his career in private
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banking before becoming assistant to the secretary of the treasury during the carter administration. his experience also includes working for secretary of state henry kissinger's strategic advisory firm and founder of his own fisher capital management. he holds a bachelors degree in economics and mba from stanford. we're in for a fascinating conversation. gentlemen, thank you again. with that, take it away, richard. >> thank you, liz. and i want to introduce jeffrey beyond what is stated in the flap of the book. he and i have been friends now for 44 years. jeffrey is a true public serve and the. he went to dartmouth and then into the army. following, by the way, the
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tradition of his father who was decorated for bravery in the battle of pork chop hill in the korean war. his dad was also a world war ii veteran. a very distinguished military officer. and jeffrey has served in the nixon and carter and ford administration. i had the privilege of meeting jeffrey when both of us were called to write some decision memorandum for president carter on economic policy issues. and he has gone on since to be a director at lehman, to serve on corporate boards, and as you mentioned, liz, to be very distinguished dean of the yale school of management where he still professes. jeffrey gartner is married to his wife ina. they've been married 53 years. she is better known as the barefoot contessa. one of the best chefs in the
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world. one of the most famous of all his classmates at yale where he met her. by the way, his classmates include robert wright and harpg paulsen. the most famous person that was at yale at that time is ina garten, the barefoot con tes yachlt we're going to talk about this book, "three days at camp david." it is a remarkable summary of the key events that happened in the global financial world. and i would also argue one of the great events for most important events in terms of so, jeffrey, welcome. i want to open this up by asking you why you wrote the book. and why you think this is a subject of crucial importance.
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jeff? >> thank you. thank you, david. >> i wrote several books about global economy but they dealt on big trends. i wanted to try something else. i wanted to identify a single event really focus in on it. focus in on it in great detail so that you knew the people, you knew what was in their heads. you knew what was influencing them both in terms of global environment and their own background. and you could really feel the decision. but in doing that, you really got also a larger picture.
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i was looking at what landmark i event i wrote about and secondly, when brought to bear the domestic economic policy, international economic policy and foreign policy. and this event that i wrote about at camp david three days at camp david was a weekend in which president nixon and six of his top advisors met in secret, nobody knew about this meeting at the time. and they made a very momentous decision. since 1944, the dollar had been backed you about gold. that was the heart of the agreement. the agreement that basically established the post-world war ii economic system.
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and this link between the dollar and gold was $35 for an ounce of gold. it was irrevocable. president kennedy and johnson went out of their way time and goen say the dollar is as good as gold. they say they want gold for their dollars. and that was a corner stone of the prosperity that ensued all during the 50s and 60s. the miraculous recovery of western europe and japan. the almost unprecedented prosperity in the u.s. which was a different kind of prosperity.
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and so it's a real question. why did nixon and the advisors decide to delink the dollar from gold? or to put it another way, why did they take a sledgehammer to the agreements? and that's the storty that i told. >> we'll get into that. the important thing for our audience and for people that are looking at the book is a description of the characters that were involved. i had john conley. you had arthur burns. you had henry kissinger, george
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shultz. you had paul volker that made it. and i wonder if can you give us a little insight into how that impacted the dynamic of what president nixon is seeking to do. >> first, let me explain why they delinked the dollar from gold. >> right. good. >> it turned out that during the '50s and '60s, the united states was exporting a huge amount of dollars. we had big military commit ments and foreign awed programs. the world wanted to use dollars so we printed them because global trade was expanding and the dollar was the currency. there was no other currency that people could use internationally. it turned out that there were so many dollars abroad that we
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actually didn't have enough gold to make the conversion that we committed to. inform 1950, for example, 1950, 1955, we had 160% of the gold we needed to exchange for dollars abroad. in addition, the administration felt that value of the dollar was too strong. it had been set in 1944 when the u.s. was, you know, so preeminent but in the two -- in a sense that the dollar was a victim of its own success because in the 50s and 60s, west germany and japan emerged as major power houses.
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congress was up in arms and proposing major protectionist legislation. nixon knew something had to be done. the post-world war ii era ended and we need aid in you this stum to replace it. we have to delink the dollar from gold. we have to allow the dollar to be devalued. so that was why they did it even though there was so much prosperity around. >> you had a delicate internationalist in paul volker. you had an advocate for total free floating currency in george shultz.
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can you give us a little insnigt how the personalities came to this decision. >> that's raily great way to put it. nixon new something had to be done. he didn't really have a grasp of the international financial situation. in fact, only one person there did and that was paul volker. let me take one step back. what was remarkable about the people around nixon was that most people had never heard of him. as richard said, john conley was the secretary of the treasury and in many ways he would have been very much at home in the trump administration. he was a fierce nationalist. he basically, his motto was
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let's screw the foreigners before they screw us. and he arrived in washington thinking that the europeans and the japanese had taken advantage of us over the last two decades and they owe us big. in contrast, there is paul volker. he was the undersecretary of treasury. but he was the only one there who really understood the global financial system. he realized the dollar had to be devalued. the only way to do that is delink it from gold. he really felt okay. devalue the dollar and then you relink. he wanted fixed exchange rates. connolly couldn't have cared less about what the system was. he just wanted to be sure that we could take advantage of the europeans and the japanese who
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he thought were really ungrateful for all the help that we had given them. you had connolly and voeker who is a real traditionalist and then george shultz who at the time no one heard of either. he came from the university of chicago business school and he was a labor negotiator. but coming from chicago, he had very strong, very strong free market leanings he couldn't understand why currencies would be linked at all. he just thought you let them float just like any other commodity and let supply and demand take their course. now there was one other person there. peterson who had come from industry, again, no one heard of him. of course, went on to be a major
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figure. but at the time he was an industrialist. he had a whole different theory which was we blame foreigners too often for our own problems. and the key to american competitiveness would be that we invest heavily in ourselves. that we invest in technology and that we invest in the workforce. he didn't think that changing the value of currencies or forcing other countries to open their markets would do anything -- anything as much as the kind of unvestments that we should make. so nixon had surrounded himself by these guys. and there was one other player who wasn't at camp david because he was secretly negotiating with the north vietnamese. and that was henry kissinger. when the u.s. announced, when
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president nixon announced the dollar is no longer linked to gold, when that happened, the allies went crazy. they couldn't understand how the u.s. could do it. and as if that wasn't bad enough or as if that wasn't a big enough shock, nixon said that until the allies agree to a substantial u.s. devaluation, we would put 10% tariffs on all their sales to the u.s. and so 10% across the board tariff. europeans and japanese thought this was enormous bad father-in-law, that we had led the world in terms of preaching free trade and here we are putting up a protectionist
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barrier. kissinger had to be wheeled in after the meeting to keep the alliance intact. so you had nixon who really didn't know much about the global economy forging a common position among people who had very different views. and he was very skillful. and i have a lot of friends who have read this book and they say have you trud to rehabilitate nixon? and i said, no. no. actually, i'm just looking at the situation as it was then. i'm not filtering it through what we know in watergate but in 1969, 1970, 1971, there were many areas in which nixon was actually a very skillful commander in chief. >> and you know, it seems, jeffrey, that you didn't understand monetary affairs.
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but he did understand that we were no longer omnipotent. he wanted to open the door with china. he dealt with russia. he also it seems to me one of the great differences was to despite all this legacy of watergate, et cetera, he worked with congress. he had a congress you could work with. i'm wondering about -- i don't want to get too far ahead. you see a lot of similarities what you just describe to the situation today. you mention being a mini trump. i came from the central bank as you know. i hear people saying that powell is another arthur burns. so burns was also in the room. we need to remind our viewers of that. there are difference ands regardless of the image and legacy that stuck on president
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nixon, he was more of an internationalist than people give him credit for. again, he could work the congress. there is donald trump in the white house or with the current president in the white house. do you have any thoughts on that and what the similarities are and the differences between what you covered in that book at that time and what we have now? >> yeah, that's a really crucial question. when i started to write the book, i was really intending to write ai contained history. you know, history of a momentous decision and what followed from it. and as i was writing, i became much more conscious of some of the parallels to today and also some of the major differences. so i like to talk about that for a second. but the one thing i want to make really clear is that history never repeats itself exactly.
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i think we all no he that. so i think what what is important about the book is that it gives really interesting and sometimes instructive context for today but you can never make a direct, you know, a really direct parallel. so let me talk about some of the similarities. richard, as you astutely said, nixon understood that we were coming to an end of an era. he believed that american leadership was possible in the future. but that the relationship between the u.s. and its allies and the u.s. and china and the u.s. and russia had to change.
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it is no longer possible for them to be so powerful and act like it was because that really wasn't the situation. in the particular meeting i wrote about, they realized on the economic side, on the financial side, the dollar was just shouldering too much burden. and also that other countries needed to open their markets to us. so i think one kind of similarity here is i think we're coming to an end of an era now. you know, over the last several decades, the u.s. is really -- has had to see more and more power, not necessarily
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leadership. but we have to -- we need the cooperation of other countries more and more than we ever did before. i think that's true. you were in the middle of the crisis in 2008. it's true with the pandemic. it's true with climate change. there is almost no big problem in which the need for stronger alliances and stronger cooperation even with countries that we don't care for is really important. i think we're entering another era in which we have to reconsider how the u.s. relates to other countries. that's one similarity. we go back to what peterson said. you know, we can blame the europeans and we can blame the chun he's. i'm not saying that, you know,
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i'm certainly not saying that it's without that. but until we get our act together at home, until we really begin to invest in technology and particularly the human capital, until we build the infrastructure and not just, you know, keep talking about roads and ports. cyber infrastructure, we're not going to be anywhere near as competitive or prosperous as, you know, as we have the potential for. when big difference is -- and you eluded to that, richard, is that in 1971, nixon was able to get a consensus behind big policies. nixon faced a house and senate
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controlled by democrats. not one or two votes. democrats really controlled them. and yet, he managed to get coalition of liberal democrats -- i'm sorry, conserve tough democrats and liberal republicans and that was a big part of our political establishment. so when it came time to deal with the dollar and all the associated issues, he had enormous support. now he was very skillful. but it was there. and that is a huge difference from today. in 1971, i found this very interesting. we were just beginning to experience what globalization was all about. we had a trade deficit. there is unemployment that was coming from automation and
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imports. but we are -- our interaction with the rest of the world was still in the infancy. today, of course, we're so incredibly linked to other countries. that our room for maneuver is nowhere near as great. i think they challenge that are much deeper than nuchl on did. i'm not sure it has the same level of talent that nixon did. there is a lot of sobering thought here. >> well, of course, back then as you mentioned in your book, he was empowering germany. due gal was empowering france. they had their own image of themselves. they were rising in prominence post-world war ii. they were difficult to sell on this announcement and the program to delink. now we have xi ping in
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particular. nixon recognized china. but now they are the opposite poll of what we're doing now. but i'm just wondering if you, you know, our audience, i've already seen a question here on the dollar itself. this is a footnote, jeffrey. dollar bond issuance and dollar valuation has gone up dramatically in the last two years. and somehow seems to increase. well over 75% of commercial transaction in the world are denominated in dollars now. but is there an alternative? chinese, i wonder when your thoughts are there. the euro. baskets of currencies. how do you view this now against the background of what we set in place by this meeting in 1971? >>. >> it's a great question. i'm going to get to that. i left something out which i think we should just interject.
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when you asked me about sim similarities and differences, i should have talked about inflation. because in 1971, inflation was rising. and, you know, the inflation stemmed from the vietnam war and president johnson's failure to raise taxes in a timely way. and so when nixon became president, inflation was beginning to be a real problem. and nixon held a very strong view that in the tradeoff between inflation and employment, employment was more important. he had been vice president under eisenhower and he ran against jfk. and he was convinced he lost that close election because the
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use enhour administration decided to deal with controlling inflation as opposed to stimulating the economy and creating more jobs. so nixon, as president, was extremely clear to his advisors that he would allow inflation to flair if that meant increasing employment. very clear about that. now in other circumstances, you might have had head of the central bank but his fed chairman was arthur burns. very complex person. burns was, above all, he wanted nixon's admiration.
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and burns simply wanted to be in nixon's good graces. but he also is a distinguished economist. he knew he had to do something about inflation. he came to the conclusion that neither fiscal nor monetary policy is the right policy. in fact that, inflation was being caused by labor unions which were negotiating ever higher wages, which made companies raise prices and was a spiral. he convinced nixon to do it. it's ater ubl decision. and, of course, when those controls came off, prices really shot up. inflation played a big role in
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noichl on years. when i think about it today -- i'm not going to let you off the hook here, you forgot about this morning i know, we face a very tricky situation. i don't know if it's a parallel, but the biden administration is very focused on getting everybody back to work. and i hope they understand that you can't deal with inflation once it's totally recognized. there are lead times and expectations. but let's put it this way. the approaches to inflation in '71 and today are of more than just academic interests. because a lot of people are looking at the 70s and saying are we there again.
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let me just throw this ball to you for a second. i told you all i know about the analogy. but how do you see it? >> of course, jeffrey, you and i work together when it reached its zenith in the carter administration. it keeps growing and growing and growing. once you build a behavioral pattern and expectation and now we have a decision rule it at the federal reserve which is different than anything before. which is basically react you hav reactive. once we see the whites of the eyes of the inflation and we don't think it will be trans it torre. if that's the case, then we tau less accommodative monetary policy. you pointed out correctly, there is a lag between when you adjust policy and works its way into the real economy. i'm not talking about the financial markets. they can react because they're changing on a moment's notice.
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but to get companies to reorient their capex and receivables and payables and how they lag and whether they don't lag, et cetera, it takes time to work through the system. so the current decision rule is risky. there could be another 12 to 18 months to affect the real economy, during which time you could have as we saw, you and i were there when it was the most painful, you could have expectations change and competence diminish and it begins to grip on its own. so that is the risk that we're running here. we have to see if the fed is right. i will say that in the last press conference, chairman powell seemed a little less confident in that decision.
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but there are these similarities, as you mentioned that the biden administration has to deal with. it is a good question whether he has this kind of talent, not just because he's president bud biden. i'm not being critical here. but you document in this book the incredible talent pool that nixon had to draw. that truly was a remarkable group of people, many of whom became lions, paul volker, moses of central banking. pete peterson. evolved into one of the great financiers of all time. i will say one thing about arthur burns at the fed. this is what haunts everybody there. no chairperson wants to go down with arthur burns' legacy. at the end of that big table where the fomc meets, at one end is the chairman's office. you go through a door, the other you go through a door and it's -- they have a portrait gallery of former fed chairs. nobody looks at arthur burns
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portrait. he's viewed as a big mistake. and as you mentioned, it was because he wanted to please the president. and the question now being debated in markets is powell want to please this president? is he looking for reappointment when it comes up in february towards the end of the year all that decide. or is he really preserving the independence of the central bank? i can tell you this. i know jay very well. we text each other. we play golf together. we don't talk about policy anymore, i'm not allowed to. but he doesn't want to be arthur burns. and that should be hopefully a saving grace. we'll see. >> let me ask you one other question. fascinated me as i wrote the book. because in 1971 there was a huge debate about the so-called phillips curve. the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. and a lot of the distinguished
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economists said the phillips curve is no longer guide for policy. a lot of them admitted that they knew how to stimulate the economy, but they really didn't know how to deal with inflation. that the kind of inflation they were seeing had not existed in in the u.s. except maybe in wartime. do you think that we really understand this phenomenon any better today? you know, i mean, i -- i -- as i follow the current thinking, obviously, it's a lot of conflict among, you know, so-called experts, but here it is 50 years later. are we more sophisticated about inflation or in a sense that paul volker has it right that there is only one way to do it and that is to tighten rates to the point where the economy
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softens and everyone -- and to do it in such a way that there is no doubt that the expectations of continuous inflation are sleighed. are we smarter than that or destined to use the very crude methods? >> history repeats itself or at least rhymes. i'm not sure we're smarter. there is a piece in "wall street journal" this morning which recalls milton friedman in the picture that was just thrown up here with arthur burns and president nixon. inflation is everywhere and nur a monetary phenomenon. and we'll just have to see. the monetary base now has increased at 36 -- actually 39.4% year over year. his formula was mv equals pt if you remember. m is going up, velocity not so big, that's the v.
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but price is going up and then the question is what happens with transactions in the economy? so we'll have to see, jeffrey. i'm not sure we're any smarter than we were before. the point is when you have an accommodative fed and aggressive fiscal policy, you run a significant risk of inflationary pressure. but i don't want to deviate. >> i'm going to come back. >> the dollar, again, it -- this was driving part of the decision. is there a way to help deal with this? >> there were two ways to go. one was to go back to fixed exchange rates. but just allow more flexibility. >> that's what volker sort of -- >> that's what volker wanted.
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a second was to go to floating exchange rates. that's what shultz did. and that's where we ended up. i think a third was to try to replace gold with what a creation of international money from the imf which they called special drawing rights. and people thought, you know what? it will sure to go. let's create something else and have a fixed system that was backed by something solid. in the market, the private markets were just they weren't buying it. i'd like to come to your point now about the future of the dollar. let me just put it this way. anybody who thinks they really know, knows nothing. but it is -- if you had said to
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any of those guys around the table we can remove golden tirely and the dollar will get even stronger and it will stay that way for decade after decade, i don't think they would have believed it. and the question is why did that happen? there really wasn't an alternative. no other country grew so big and so powerful that you would want to use their currency. no other country wanted their currency to be so ubiquitous. so there was, everyone had been using the dollar in kind of a network effect, it continued. the second is, that actually the world had a lot more confidence in u.s. policy and u.s. institutions than it did most other countries.
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and they really focused on our institutions. independent fed, or very credible -- , the rule of law, the way we made decisions. the deaths of the democracy. but i don't think anyone worried that we would put money in the u.s. and they wouldn't be able to get it out. it was the same for the countries. what worries me -- here is what i think, it's a great advantage for the u.s. to have this currency. it certainly allows us to finance at a much lower cost and at an easier way than we would otherwise do, because everybody is willing to hold out. but here is what i worry about. i think that we have been using economic sanctions far too indiscriminately. and that it is a fact that the
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europeans and the chinese are really looking for a way to get out from under the u.s. dominance of the plumbing of the international financial system. we levied section secondary sanctions on the europeans. and i think if there is a way around the dollar, the europeans and the chinese -- they are certainly looking for it. and you have to believe that they are going to be fairly creative. especially as we continue to use sanctions. secondly, i don't pretend to fully understand the digital world, digital currencies, but when i look at china, i am not so worried about the rmb but they are way ahead of us in terms of central bank digital
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currency and they will use. this in china but also currencies traded heavily with china. before we know it, i think that a sizeable part of the world, given chinese trade, may actually be using china's central bank digital currency. i can't prove it, and i'm sure nobody knows whether that's the case. entebut we are entering a really new era when it comes to digital currency. and you set aside cryptocurrency. i think that younger generations willie don't trust government when it comes to a lot of things, including currency. so i'm not predicting that there is going to be eclipsed of the dollar, but it's a situation we haven't faced before.
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and why are strong military position is, which has also been a cause of people coming to the dollar. i think that is going to account for what we have going forward, and the nation of warfare is not going to be -- >> so jeffrey, you mentioned there was confidence in those u.s. institutions back then. now we have a hyper divisive society. cultural issues, racial issues, both sides are wondering about how they're supposed to perceive democrats and republicans. it's almost impossible for a president to deal with congress, as opposed for nixon being able to. so there are those significant obstacles. i mention this on the chinese renminbi and the digital yuan, which is that she jinping is
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using it for control. and block chain is a remarkable thing when you think about it. however, in terms of what the medicis created in terms of double ledger accounting, and now we have block chain. so with block chain, as we know, xi jinping and the ccp contract down every single transaction and use it to allocate better or penalize people you don't want to have credit. so it may not be as ubiquitously used, although they are way ahead of us on this front. and that raises an issue as to the yuan because they got 4% of the str but they had opener capital accounts. and it would be difficult to explain to our listeners the importance of having an open
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capital account, which the europeans have. the euro is the only deep liquid pool that is an alternative to the dollar. and their central bank is spending even more even more accommodative than ours. so i'm just curious what your views on that are, in terms of the need to have an open capital counting china. and whether that limits or maybe gives them an advantage, i'm not sure. your views on that? >> well, let me say, my starting point is, you are dealing with a lot of factors. all of which are very new. so, anyone has to be somewhat humble about predicting what will happen. i don't think that china's currency will become an international currency until they do open their capital account. until money can flow in and out of china without restriction.
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but, you know, they have a policy called the belt and road initiative, which is basically financing infrastructure throughout eurasia, now in south america. certainly in africa. and i just worry that many of these countries are not going to care so much about the ulterior motives of control. but the ease of which they can actually obtain the currency and the fact that they are not going to be subject to a whole range of u.s. foreign policy goals, you know, from elections to human rights and labor standards.
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and so we could be -- china's international role could creep up on us. they are not going to have -- the currency is not going to be widely used in the u.s. and europe. that's obviously a really big thing. until they totally liberalize their financial markets. so that's way off. but i think in terms of foreign policy leverage, that comes with currency, it would be a real mistake to leave them out, especially because of the digital capabilities. >> so jeffrey -- >> -- >> go ahead, please. >> the digital role is going to create a new era. most of the people who are in charge of the different generations know that basically we live in a digital society. i think that when you look at
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the internet in 1990, 1992, 1993, you never would have been able to calculate what it would mean to the world. and i think that's where we are with this digital stuff and this crypto stuff. and i'm very cautious about predicting american economic power as though nothing has been confronted. >> well, you and i didn't grow up in the digital world. we grew up in an analog worlds. [laughs] so it's hard to understand it. we are getting close to the end here. i want you to sort of summarize. what do you think the biden administration can learn from the nixon experience? and what you documented? >> well, when the nixon guys met at camp david, they had a
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very extensive analysis of the global economy, the u.s. role in it, how the ball could balance in the future, and what we needed to do long term. they may not have followed that script exactly, but they had a real understanding of the alternatives. and i just hope that the biden administration has done the same thing. so that's one. let me just say, the same thing, meaning, taking account of all the underlying changes and looking ahead as far as you can. not to say this is where we will be, but here is the range of possibilities. and following from that, the man who -- and they were all men then. today, of course, it would be
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men and women. they -- nixon surrounded himself with great diversity. i mean, the difference between connally and volker anne burns and peterson, it was quite something to get them in the room and basically make decisions that everyone could agree to. i don't know if biden has this diversity. i hope he does. i don't follow it so closely. but when you are making big decisions, the most dangerous thing is to have everybody feel exactly the same way and not present any challenges. and third, kissinger was acutely aware that there was a relationship between our foreign policy and international economic policy. and in the end, they were really merged.
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i hope that biden is able to do that to. there is no kissinger in this administration. and there is now connally, who basically thought the opposite viewpoint. so i hope that this whole question of inter linking foreign policy and economic policy is taken very seriously by biden. and i think it's one of the lessons of the camp david meeting. >> i'll hold up the book here as a show. because i really -- not just because it's on monetary policy or i've spent time as a negotiator for our country as you have. but it gives you incredible insight into how this is developed. and how important it is that the personalities involved influenced the decision. and the way you document this,
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jeffrey, i just found it spellbinding. i'm just saying it's really well written. and it draws you into understanding these broader issues that are at stake, in terms of the different perspectives that were brought to bear in a president who did surround himself with different people. the only thing i regret about doing this virtually, for our audience, is you have to understand -- jeffrey is a real mensch and he's not just a brilliant intellectual. he understands people. and that's what is so well-documented in this book. so jeffrey, we are at the end here, i want to thank you, i want to thank you also for your friendship over almost 45 years now. and had we've been live, i would have insisted that i you
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cook for you so we give people food for their thought, and food for the stomachs as well. >> we'll put a couple of pounds on everybody there. >> [laughs] i think i will turn it back to council and thank you jeffrey. >> well thank you both, for this amazing conversation, we really appreciate you guys spending your evening with us. and we invite you to come in person whenever you go to dallas, feel free to common moderate that conversation. >> i'd be delighted. >> please do pick up a copy of the book, iowa local bookstore, we appreciate the support. if you're not a member of the council yet, please join us, i love to me you all in-person, it's been way too long syncing you all. go to the astilbe world.org. thank you for joining us.
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our weekly series the presidency highlights the policies of u.s. presidents and first ladies. up next, what do thomas jefferson, abraham lincoln, lyndon johnson and richard nixon heaven common? they face not just political opponents but americans who actually hated them. what were the reasons? an american historical association panel

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