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tv   Fmr. Homeland Security Secretary on Heritages China Report  CSPAN  July 26, 2021 7:13pm-8:04pm EDT

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>> thank you, and thank you to everyone joining us online for this discussion.
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you know, on servers have known and lamented the lack of transparency in the china across the board going back many, many years from economy to military to influence operations not knowing the full extent of the chinese threat to the united states and, frankly, not knowing the extent of the outrages they commit on the human rights front. because that's a real problem for the policymakers in the united states which, no doubt, is one of the reasons why china's government is so opaque to begin with. it's a feature of their system, it's not a bug. our report that's coming it next week on china transparency is seeking to get at exactly that problem. i'm going to say a little bit more about the report in just a minute or so, and we're going to talk to a couple contributors to the report. but first, we're very honored and please to have with us congressman steve shadegg who's
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going to make some opening remarks. the covid-19 crisis involving china has served as a wake-up call for the united states on a range of threats posed by the rise of china. more and more people are now asking what else are the chinese hiding. well, mr. shad egg didn't need any wake-up calls. he's long been a leader in addressing threats from china as well as powell issues in general -- policy issues in general. he's currently the chairman -- well, he's the ranking member, maybe chairman in the not too distant future, but ranking member of the house foreign affair subcommittee on the asia-pacific having served several years ago as the chairman of that subcommittee during republican control. so with that, i want to welcome mr. shadegg to make his remarks. >> thank you very much, walter,
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i appreciate it. i want to thank both you and the heritage foundation for this invitation to speak on what is really, i believe, a very important topic, and that's the lack of transparency and cooperation inherent in the communist chinese government. fortunately, as is the case with so many of the initiatives undertaken by the heritage, the hard work and focus and innovative thought that you've dedicated to the china transparency project will help to expose the fundamental flaws in our understanding of and approach towards the prc and should serve as a critical resource in developing more effective policies to combat the strategic challenges that the prc poses to both the united states and, let's face it, to our allies across the globe. as i think your report will make clear, we need to continue reevaluating our basic approach towards engagement with the
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chinese government. ever since nixon went to china, the united states has attempted to play nice9 with the prc inhopes that incorporating them into the post-world war ii order would push them to become more responsible global citizens. it's now become cheer that those hopes were -- clear that those hopes were, at best, overly optimistic. the communists in beijing were never interested in joining our system. instead, they've used our efforts at engagement against us, hiding their strength, investing heavily in their military and developing strategic initiatives to remake the world in their own image. make in mistake, on every front beijing is challenging the free world and our premise that open societies, free markets and the rule of law automatically result in a prosperous and equitable
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>> result in a prosperous and equitable -- the chinese communist party, to replace my premise with their own ideology, whether we look at the fundamental disregard for human rights, the rampant stopping intellectual property, their manipulation of the international trading system, or their penchant for secrecy and the cover-up which only worsened the covid-19 pandemic. as a result of this direct challenge throughout way of life, the united states finds itself in a strategic competition that, we do not seek and we really do not want. but which we must win. for republicans in the house who are in the affairs subcommittee and the entire committee overall, this competition is our top priority. that is why, as you mentioned as ranking member of the asian pacific subcommittee and formally chair of that committee, i made advancing our
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strong policy to counter china by principal objective, fortunately and our subcommittee i've been able to work across the aisle with chairman -- and he has actually been my ranking member when i was chair. and i was the ranking member when he was chair. we worked together the lack of transparency, and i hope and expect that we will continue in a bipartisan manner. we have to do that with republicans in democrats working together in that committee. -- that was in congress of us dedicated to oppose and combat the strategic economic national security threat threatened by the chinese communist party. there are certain issues with our understanding of what china is doing is a complete.
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we see openness as a virtue because in democratic society we derive our strength directly from the people and they have a right to know. where representatives like myself are doing. the chairman and his ccp -- derive their strength through division and manipulation and consequently there is no need for the ccp to directly impact these activities of people, which means it is accountable for itself. whether it is the belt and road initiative, the origins -- of china's to economic situation -- it's a human rights practice. -- an it's drive for electronic supremacy, we need a better
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idea of what is going on in these areas. the pr sea capacity is dangerous for three reasons. first, it increases the miscalculation risk. no one fully understands what is happened in china. on the one hand, china seems to be an unstoppable juggernaut posing an existential threat throughout asia and the pacific region. on the other hand, they came beset by internal problems like pending catastrophic -- and serious demographic challenges. the problem is that so many of our economic, military, and business decisions depend on accurately judging china's trajectory, intentions, capabilities and more immediately where they are investing and what they are doing. without a better understanding of china's activities and intentions we may under react in the track record as we have
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in the past decade, or overreact as the case may be, excuse me, to any given signal. there is inherent danger presented by miscalculation that can only be avoided by better, more thorough understanding of beijing's activities in a tent intentions. the less we know about what is going on in china, the greater the risk of china's problems will become the world's problems. in the last year and a half, and if it is taught us anything, it is that we live in a highly integrated global society, and significant events in any nation can potentially impact every single person on the planet in ways that are unimaginable just a few decades ago. if beijing had a simply shared information about covid-19 earlier, and in a more honest and transparent manner, there is a chance it would not have become a pandemic, then it is
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certain that the death toll would not have been nearly as devastating. even without cooperation from beijing, better access to information from china might have allowed us to see the pandemic coming sooner, and better prepared to deal with the ramifications in a more timely manner. ore thatthe more we understand e challenges, the more it becomes clear, excuse me, -- pardon me, sorry, if we want to win our strategic competition with china, it will require a far greater and deeper understanding of china that we currently possess. there's a great chinese strategic figure, son's to, he once said, if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of 100 battles. but the pr sea capacity makes that quite difficult and make no mistake, that is by design.
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they see secrecy as an accent. both economically and militarily, and they are correct. breaking through this veil of secrecy is critical to helping us design a more effective response to the challenges trying to poses now and in the future. the more we understand these challenges, the more becomes clear why heritage is work with china transparency project can be so valuable to the policy community since the ccp won't discuss its own activities, we must do our best to discuss it independently with beijing, and what they are capable of doing. that's just as important. now the work that you've undertaken to make that information more readily available would go a long way towards helping policymakers craft the appropriate policy response in so many areas. whether it is china's economy, their outbound investments, their approach to energy and the environment, they're
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atrocious record on human rights, there are growing global influence operations, or their massive investments into a military system and technologies, is critical for us in congress and in the administration, and analysts across the policy community to have access to the most complete and up to date information possible. it is my hope, and prediction, that heritage is annual report will become the touchstone for understanding the prc in years to come. i know it will help congress to craft better legislation in the struggle and ideological supremacy between beijing in the free world. so i would like to once again thank the heritage for doing its very important work. and i yield back the floor. >> as we say in the house, thank you. good to see you. i don't know what else i need to say about that. that was better than any pitch
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we made on its importance. we are going to dig into it just a little bit here. i don't give maybe just a few highlights, so you have an idea of what to expect in this report when it comes out. what we do is systematically look at what sort of information the ccp and the government makes public in identifying gaps in it. needless to say there are tons of gaps, but more importantly what we do is that we surveyed dozens of international efforts, private efforts outside of china they're doing their best to provide this information despite the lack of cooperation from authorities in beijing. we evaluate the state of those private sectors efforts, you know, the overall picture that they paint, how transparent and get into the areas that they
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are providing. but we have provisions of a reading but with how the chinese are doing, and how well private efforts are addressing the gaps in information. so, that that way we have a basis, baseline for deciding how much progress is being made, or lack of progress in similar and several areas. there's not much progress at all over the last few years. we posted a summary in the the equivalent of the chant on the software here. so, if you are looking from home you should be able to download that and see some of the areas that i'm talking about. but again, this is just to give you an idea with respect to the report when it comes out. on the economic issues, congressman shabbat touched on this a little bit, needless to say the chinese information on
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the economy is notoriously unreliable. no surprises there. what we have identified is a need to go behind the numbers and find exactly where the chinese corruption is, and at what level of progress it is. and is it in their calculation? the gdp? is it at the local level? is it at the province level? where exactly do these numbers become unreliable? and why? maybe it comes directly from beijing, you know, they have certain figures and they will hit them at lower levels whatever they can apparently do so we're not. another area we're looking at is energy and environment. actually, in the range of these things, the chinese are probably best, for transparency -- while it's still not great.
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they have industrial projects and environmental costs under the guidance of secrets. and those are secrets that you have no -- you probably find yourself in a tenure, wrap you try, you try and the american reporter and your finders of escorted out of the country. the environmental piece is very important. because of so many areas out there and this is the one thing that people hold out on. maybe this is an area we can work with them in. if they can provide us reliable environmental information. and we can find ways to work with them on the environment. the worst performance, is the transparency around human rights issues. that's no surprise. but then what we identify in the report, is the prospect of the cutting edge technologies that are being used to study
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particular problems in china. there's been a lot of work done there with satellite technology. with personal stories press stories and internet presence in that sort of thing and it's the sort of approach that -- with other human rights issues. and then, the last thing the last area to mention, is on political development and military issues in china. >> wealthy access of documents and the online resources have become increasingly scarce in both of those areas. believe it or not there was a time when you could walk into a bookstore in beijing, and you could buy a book that was written by a pla general, and
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was read by recruits. but that axis is not there anymore. and with military and political information, and the database that had been made publicly available, but this is difficult for us to know what is going on. but the level of spending in a particular category, and the number is mostly for propaganda, it does not mean much at all. what matters is when you break those numbers down into how much they spent an operation of maintenance, it's a trendsetter. so the report tries to identify some of those gaps, and suggests ways that we can improve them. the report, the bigger transparency from the report, also includes a range of tropical and analytical essays from leading experts in their fields, in order to drill down the specific areas of concern,
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which brings me to our next speaker's. both of whom we are lucky to have with us today, and who have worked closely in the gornment and out of the government. the first speaker, and the first person i will turn to for questioning here is chad wolf the former homeland affairs and he's currently a visiting fellow at the heritage foundation, he is our vice president for national security and foreign policy. and he has contributed an essay to the influence of the chinese, and u.s. research and universities. so and david five, is coming off of the state department work, where he most recently served as deputy erie deputy sorry assistant secretary undersecretary. and that was for the center of american security. the david, coauthored along
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with laura -- , and in her personal capacity, she is a professional staffer. the but in her personal capacity, she worked out this report. it concerns -- and that is the threat of the chinese post and deployment in the potential for. and how in using them it could damage u.s. and all its security interest. we're going to jump right in here with the discussion, i have a lot of questions. but, there's a way for you to ask questions online as well. so put your question in chat, and we will track it to them before we're done. so the first thing i wanted to ask chad, the is the could you
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break out the issue of chinese influence in the u.s. university. it's a complicated one, and it is to be broken out into its essence, but what is the current state of knowledge about what is going on there, and other areas you would identify as things we just don't know quite enough about. both known, and unknowns, and unknown unknowns. >> thank you and thank you for the heritage for doing this event. and allowing me to be part of the report. it is critically important, and when i was at the hall the department of homeland security, we used to look at a variety of threats facing homeland, and the threat of the malign chinese influence to the homeland was at the top of the list every week every month that's a good look at. it's something i would talk about, and department of homeland security is taking a closer look at this beyond the traditional cap threat of
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counter-terrorism and other threats the country is facing is the threat from china. a big part of that is what's going on in our universities today. china's ultimate goal, as we all know is to be the world leader in science and technology and to do that they're going to need to recruit individuals and foreign experts. the way that they do that, is looking at u.s. institutions, universiti ancolleges. so they can do that a couple of different ways that we have seen, they can do that by recruiting u.s. researchers and professors to do that, and through a couple of different programs one of which we will talk about the confucius institute. but also some sending a lot of chinese nationals to the u.s. on u.s. student visas. and what they do on those visas while they are here, and the knowledge transfer that they can take back to china on a variety of sensitive subjects. i think we need to take a closer and harder look at that. they did that under the trump administration and hopefully
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that will continue. i think that is critically important, to make sure the thousands and thousands of student visas that we issue to chinese nationals who come here to study, they need to be better checked and screened, and that it. and we need to periodically check up on them. because what we saw, if you can do one check, but if they're here in the country and they get extensions to the students visa and go onto the graduate gree programs, you don't have a good idea about what they're doing. so we need more oversight, and it's about transparency, and it's about disclosure, and holding them accountable. and with doing them with with checking to see that they're doing what they said they were going to do, especially after being here years and years and years. i think it's a growing issue, to really address within our university system. and i think what we have seen over time, and there's a lot of university colleges out there that are willing t accept a lot of funding from the chinese government, or chinese-backed
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institutions, without disclosing or making it apparent what is that relationship. and what does that relationship entail. i think that is what we need to see more of at the end of the day. >> can i ask you, how do you sort the purpose of the students being here. clearly there's some feel they can go into as a student, or as a graduate researcher, or as a professor. it has no real impact on u.s. security. and then there's probably some area in between, so how do you make a call how do you sort that? >> i thinwe see the vast majority of chinese nationals coming over are in the hard sciences, more than in the liberal arts degree. we certainly see them in the stem field, and elsewhere and that is concerning. but i think it comes back to that transparency, and that disclosure. making sure that we can, that we can look into these
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individuals, and what type of programs are they going to study in the u.s.. and where did they study in china perhaps. and who is backing them? who is providing the funding for them to come over to study. where did they study previously? what is their and goal? i think after these questions, making them be transparent about that, so they can't hide the fact and you know that's what we've seen as we do a lot of these investigations. these ties to universities back in china, that have a direct tied to the military. and that's concerning when you're studying and looking at a variety of them. >> david the area you looked at, in one way it's vastly different it seems in the area that chad looked at, and that's the area of information. but you know chad area you have to dig into and go to university and find out.
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and so much of this is hiding in just plain sight. the public information, press reports, it's a trendsetter. can you give us a bit of background on the issue and maybe shed some light on that? >> certainly, and thank you for the question, and i'm grateful to have the opportunity to participate in this project. the the issue is interesting as you suggest, because aspects of it are hard the or are hard to see or hidden. and yet as a major policy, and strategic challenge for the united states and for our allies, the issue has been long overlooked in some key ways. one aspect of the problem, is that in the internet age, it's hard to actually understand the systems that we rely on because,
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we are dealing with the invisible transmission. enormous amounts of data. through telecommunications infrastructure, that is also visible in the way that we can see cell towers. but it's still hard to understand, and at a minimum complex. and part of the challenge, the can be seen as looking at the contrast with the public understanding, or the publish consciousness of satellite. people's have in all of our public imagination, a sense that satellites are out there and they're very important. we all see movies, where they are dramatic scenes of satellites doing this or that, and yet it's almost not known at all. it's 95, to 99% of global data flows, not through satellites but through cable.
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an undersea cables, are visible but almost untie early unseen. almost no americans, and very few american officials have seen an undersea cable at the bottom of the ocean, or seen one where plugs into a landing site the in offense didn't area along the coastline. but it's not something we have a real consciousness of. and in our policy debate, in recent years in our international diplomacy in recent years, we've had a major expansion of understanding of the chinese communist parties dedication to dominate the telecommunications. to take advantage of telecommunication infrastructure, to access data, to be able to manipulate data and hold vulnerable data in the future. we have had all of the awakening around 5g and huawei. as welcome as that is, almost all of our attention, from a
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policy perspective any diplomatic perspective has flowed two five g terrestrial hardware. and the question of who will we, or who will our european allies or developing countries in africa use for their 5g-based stations. and this is an important question. but all of those risks of compromise of the data, to the chinese communist party apply to the undersea cables. and one of the main points of our paper is to note that the concern and the policy creativity, and the diplomatic seriousness that we increasingly understand, we need to apply the 5g when you're looking at teestrl systems. when you're looking at huawei, it needs to be applied and when you're thinking of the u.s. government, and our allies overseas, to the undersea cables and who build them and finances them. the >> you mentioned the, the
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start of different ways that the 5g issues and terrestrial hardware and concerns have contrasted in terms of the amount of attention they get compared to undersea cables. being undersea i guess you cannot see them. you can only see cell towers, and you know have some concept of how that might work. but there's disparity between the way that we have treated in the past, to the extent that we're focused , it the threat from russia and china. i mean a few years ago, maybe during the obama administration they began to hone in on the threat to the cables. but what happened there? the >> absolutely right, there's a telling difference in the way that policy makers have looked at the undersea cable issue, as regards to russia and china. it was very visible, and surprising ways inside the u.s. government, the the u.s.
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government has a vast inter agency that goes back literally generations. and the focus of undersea cables, and focus cease focuses on undersea cables, are overwhelmingly in their defense from foreign adversary, and military sabotage. or in their defense from natural disasters. like earthquakes undersea, that might cause outages in these cables. what you mentioned about the russians foreign military, there were a lot of navy versus spy versus spy type dynamics between u.s. and the russians during the cold war around access to undersea cables for espionage purposes and possible military sabotage. this is an aspect of the undersea cable challenge where there is real awareness across governments and military in the u.s. and among our allies. what happened about five or six years ago during the obama
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administration was we saw the use of news reports about russian navy gaining new capabilities that might allow to threaten undersea cables in europe and transatlantic in ways that were concerning. those concerns about military sabotage are indeed real and need to be addressed. but what is interesting is that as those sorts of concerns generated greater interest in undersea cables, there was a almost complete oversight of the fact that we have real commercial concerns as well that come from china. china, as a military rival to the united states, you know, also poses potential risk in the military domain. but why china poses that russia does not is the major ambition in the commercial domain. is it what we see with china especially with many areas of technology and international commerce? they have great backed
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companies including huawei where the main construction undersea cable from china is known for a long time at huawei emory networks. it's now been re-branded as h. and am tech but it is essentially the same company and what it wants to do is capture a large share of the international undersea cable market, not by sabotage undersea but by winning contracts for companies and governments all around the world to build cables. ,,,,,. ,. ,,.
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,,. whether those projects are built by trusted providers, from the united states, japan on the one hand, or built by unfortunately, on trusted providers from china, subject to all of the data fest and subversion of the chinese communist party, is an enormous statistic question that will be addressed over years. because an enormous amount about private data, consumer data, governmental, scientific data will be flying through these pipes for years to come. >> great, thank you. >> jared like to come back to you for something, if we have
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some questions from the online audience. can you tell us a little bit about the -- associated similar type of programs, where they are aiming at, what's the track record is that was a focus of the administration in the last few years. could you? >> sure. the program overall is one of many, i would say, talented crewman programs at the chinese government has. the idea here again is to incentivize these individuals in the u.s. that are engaged in research and development to transfer that knowledge from the u.s. back to china. and to do so in exchange for money, salary, for grants, lap time, and other incentives. and so, that is concerning, right? because usually that transfer of knowledge is for national security military aims for the chinese government. and so, the idea here is, if you want to make sure that we shine line on that.
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i think the goal at the beginning of that program was -- i think it started back in 2008 -- was to recruit somewhere in the neighborhood about 2000 to 3000 individuals, upwards, they ended up recruiting over 7000. >> americans? >> this was internationally. hardly successful overall, but then i think of the world and the u.s. started catching on more and more, they put a spotlight and focus on the thousand talents program. as a bill introduced to congress. there is reports talking about how, you know, we're not really taking those seriously. this goes back to disclosure and transparency, making sure that if again, a researcher gets a grant from a chinese institution of some kind, let it be known what that is. instead of hiding it out which is the main concern. so, i think overtime, now, the chinese government has re-branded this program.
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it's no longer the thousand islands program, it is three or four different names. we talk about that in a report. but there's a lot that we still don't know about it. again, that goes back to that transparency disclosure. again, the idea that chinese institutions are going to engage with academics here in the u.s.. and it is not necessarily bad, but it is concerning, because not understanding with that relationship is, what are the incentives, one of the being paid, by who? let's bring that out into the public. bring it out into the openness that we can make informed decisions. >> it is a big country. the united states is a big country with thousands of universities, right? it is hard to know exactly what is going on and how big the chinese are engaging in it? >> this ties into some of the confusion that are here in the u.s., which have been dwindling overtime because i think we are shining a light on this relationship between u.s. institutions and chinese institutions, and the lack of
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transparency. not really understanding, several high-profile justice profile cases that have been prosecuted, and not been transparent about the funding in the research they're doing. >> i think at one point, last year, maybe the attorney general made public and or an indictment, actually, every day for sometime, which was actually, it turned out to be important function. because by showing where the needs are, you can also direct resources there. that's the issue as well. knowing what is going on as the first step. it's a second step. but when you think about it, you have the resources there, and it's been pretty stretched already. >> i think that is right. and director wray from the bureau talked about this as well. not only the chinese threat to the u.s. but certainly the threat to universities. and what is going on at the
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university level. >> right, thank you. jeff, do you have a question from the audience? >>... sorry, my mic is not working. we have a lot of questions here. the first one is -- so, we've obviously seen the u.s. administration and congress and u.s. institutions -- we've seen multiple impacts. but why has it been harder to address? and what makes it so difficult to target the program directly? >> so, the question was really about the thousand talents program, and what makes it so difficult to target that likely done with the confucius. i think if you go back, there's been a, i believe the senate homeland committee security committee two or three years
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ago, a very expensive report on 80,000 talents program. and how it works, what is the design behind it, the influence here in the u.s.. its ultimate goals. so, i think there's actually been a lot of effort to shine a light on this program. i talk about it hand-in-hand with the confucius side, because the more light that you shine onto it, the more education that we provide the people. we've seen it on the confucius side where a number of u.s. universities have said, well, it is not worth it. it is not worth having this relationship where, i do not know what is going on. because we've seen the number of confucius around u.s. campuses drop considerably. i think there was a high of a close to 100, now there's probably a handful. and those that are still there, i think need to be, again, more proactive and more transparent about that relationship. you know, part of that relationship that we found was, in some of those institutes that you know, university professors could not talk about,
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could not research certain things. things having to do with the prc. so, it was concerning, right? you're talking about stifling research and development fraught on u.s. campuses, not really what you want to do at the end of the day. , so i think that both of them have the confucius issue. that's taken off more recently whereas the thousand towns program is always been there, it's been there for several years as we've been looking at the chinese, i think, the chinese government has been re-branded the thousand talents program. they now call it two or three different names, but the intent is still there, and the intent is still to recruit individuals who have the transfer of knowledge back to china. again, i think the best thing that we can do, i know there's a number of bills that are being introduced, and stopped at practice. the fact that we can do more transparency, more disclosure. we understand with our, julie? and making porn decisions based on that. >> support for our partners and
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allies, not least of whom are the chinese, where we have a lot of sensitive information that could help the chinese. and also have the cultural and linguistic connection, and proximity. so, it makes us a greater target than we are. david, i want to ask you a similar question which is around this policy. how much transparency is there on the u.s. side in terms of policy development, and where we are on the sort of -- the amount of information being shared by the government for an american people, both on the extent of undersea cable problem, and what it is doing to address it? i don't mean to imply that there's any sort of purposeful effort to obscure it, but sometimes, action on something that's already a little bit obscure, there's no effort made to get the information out there. so, what is the state of
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affairs there? >> it is a mixed bag. when it comes to u.s. policy, in terms of our domestic conversation infrastructure, the federal communications commission plays a leading role in giving licenses for the construction of undersea cables that come international and land on u.s. shores. there is a high degree of transparency, and there's been a visible hardening of u.s. policy with respect to cables that are should be built by china's huawei marine networks, or even cables it would be built by trusted providers but would correct directly between u.s., you know, mainland and china. and so, there was a -- there are, several, three or four of these connections right now that are direct from u.s. to china. but the last license was given by the -- for such a link, in 2017. and since then, you've seen several proposed projects that
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have not met the regulatory blessing from the fcc, because the fcc had to overcome, unable to trust the cable that were landing in shanghai or hong kong would be free from chinese state subversion. another piece of the u.s. domestic policy mix has to do with technology controls. and there, it is a little bit more opaque. which is, how are we managing things like export control? to see the sophisticated fiber optic technology needed to allow the chinese players to really compete at the top tier against the more, you know, long-standing and more advanced democratic country players. are we preventing american institutions and companies from exporting that advanced technology, or are we seeing a leakage of the damaging variety, and some of that frankly, has to do with u.s. companies that will be exporting this technology. and some of it, in a way that speaks to some of the points
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that the chat has been raising, like what american universities are doing. often with the sponsorship of chinese technology in telecommunications companies, and whether they are providing technology to china that we would rather not see them provide. and all of these are important policy areas. >> yeah, just something to add, and i think it is critically important. you talk about the fcc and the undersea cable issue. they rely on -- you know, this is policy decision at the end of the day. they rely on state department, department of homeland security, treasury department, and ten a calm -- telecoms, providing recommendations on these undersea cables. they've indicated, i think the trump administration took a very proactive view about a threat of chinese not only control in these cables, but it is a policy decision. so, i think it is, we're going to take a look at the biden administration, and what kind of you do they take on this as well. is that a very strong and hard interview, or are they going to,
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you know, sit back and be influenced by some of these service providers who are funding somebody's cables at the end of the day because it makes business sense to them. >> and i would note, just further on that point, telecoms very important institution for advising the fcc on national security issues. process that you saw the first denial on the license application to the specific cable about one year ago in 2020. an additional piece of the regulatory regime that is emerging was initially teed up in the trouble administration and has been taken forward by the biden of administration is the icy ts process, this is about the information and communication technology and services supply chain, it is essentially a regulatory inner agency process for scrutinizing cross-border data flows. which is so much of our economy and clearly seen in the cable
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issue, it's an inner agency process led by the treasury that scrutinizes what would be foreign investment in the trouble administration inviting has taken for an inner agency fashion is all about getting ahead of the game in critical technology and sort of information and understand what the chinese are trying to do at the base of the, we can always control at the end of the day we
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gotta get back closer to the start, that's what the report is all about, identifying all the threats that maybe we do not see that are emerging because there in impulsivity and hidden behind in activities across the board. in the me think you both for being here today and talking with us and the contributions to the report, we appreciate and value them june 30 is a release date, were expecting to see it and they can agree to the rest of it touching on all the areas, thank you very much. of 2021.
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the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. pallone: i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. pallone: thank you. h.r. 2467 is a comp comprehensive set of strategies to regulate pfas, clean up contamination and protect public health. i'm proud to support this bill which will deliver the tools communities across the country need to get pfas out of our environment and out of the pathways that lead to our bodies. pfas are an urgent health threat, they are toxic, persistent and being found in the environment

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