Skip to main content

tv   History Bookshelf Condoleezza Rice No Higher Honor  CSPAN  April 9, 2021 9:56am-10:40am EDT

9:56 am
a book with contact information for every member of congress. also contact information for state governors and the biden administration cabinet. order yours at next on "history bookshelf" former secretary of state condoleezza rice talks about her memoir "no higher honor." she turned from 2005 to 2009 during the george w. bush administration. in this event in 2011 she was interviewed by university of miami president donna shalala and also responded to questions submitted by students. >> thank you. >> madam secretary, welcome. how long have i been inviting you here? >> a few years. a few years. >> most of our questions today
9:57 am
were submitted by students. let me start with the first one. one of our students asked, how do i get to be secretary of state? >> good question. let me just start by thanking you very much. and i have known president shalala as secretary shalala, but also as my friend donna. and so thank you very much for having me here at the u, right? [ applause ] >> i want to thank my good friends the cobs, ambassador cobs for their service to the country and for their extraordinary friendship as well. and thanks to you university of miami students for having me here. so how do you become secretary of state? all right, you start as a failed piano major, that's how you start. i actually went to college to be a concert pianist. i studied piano from the age of 3. there was never any doubt that's what i was going to do.
9:58 am
in the summer of my sophomore year, i went to something called the aspen music festival school, which a lot of proteges were there, and there were 12-year-olds that could play from sight what i couldn't play after one year. they were 12. i was 17. i decided i was either going to end up teaching 13-year-old beethoven or playing at nordstrom someplace, fine career but not for me. then i wandered into a course of international politics. it was taught by a specialist named carville, who was madeleine albright's father. and he opened up the world of diplomacy to me. and all of a sudden i knew what i wanted to be, i wanted to be a soviet specialist. so the first lesson of how you get to where i am is you find something that you absolutely love to do. and so i would say to each and every one of you as students, find your passion. not what job you want, not what
9:59 am
career you want, but what you're passionate about. what's going to make you get up every day and want to go and do that. secondly, if you're fortunate, your passion and your talents will come together, and i went on then to become a professor at stanford. and i met, when i was a young professor at stanford, a man named brent skull croft, who had been an adviser to gerald ford and would become the national security adviser to george h.w. bush. he took an interest in my career and when president h.w. bush was elected, he took me with him to be the white house soviet specialist. and i was fortunate to be the white house soviet specialist at the end of the cold war, and frankly, it doesn't get any better than that. but the second thing is find people who are interested in you and in your career who can help guide you and open up opportunity. we sometimes say, i want to get there on my own. nobody gets there absolutely on their own. there are always mentors.
10:00 am
and there's another important lesson, sometimes we say you have to have role models and mentors who look like you. if i had been waiting for a black woman soviet specialist mentor, i would still be waiting, so your mentors, your role models can come in any color, shape or size. just find somebody who really cares about you and cares about your career. the final part of that story is that when, in 1990, mikhail gorbachev came to the white house and we were sitting together in the lawn of the white house in marine one, presidential helicopter, getting ready to take off for california, this me, gorbachev and his wife and secret service i thought, i'm really glad i changed my major. so if you find your passion, if you find people who support you, and if you work hard and you don't worry too much about what comes next, incredible opportunities do open themselves to you.
10:01 am
finally, i'd say get involved in politics at some point, you know. find a candidate you like. work for them. ultimately, that's really how i got to be secretary of state. i worked for george w. bush and i became his secretary of state. those are some of the thoughts i have but the most important starts right now, find your passion. [ applause ] >> wonderful. let's talk a little about the organization of decision making and your role in the nsc, national security council. that role is -- was almost painful for me to read it, it was herding cats. if you were to advise now, after your experience in that job in particular, a president of the united states, would you suggest to them that one characteristic of the members of that team, whether it is secretary of defense, treasury, even the vice president, would be, gets along
10:02 am
well with others? >> well, that might eliminate a fair number of people in washington. so i'd be careful about that criteria. no, there's no doubt we had very strong personalities. but i hope that i gave the impression in the book that they were debates about substance. these were not personal issues. nonetheless, we got along just fine until the most stressful times. and the most stressful times were on the war on terror and on iraq. so the so-called normal times to the degree anything is ever normal in decision-making in washington, you can -- it's important to have different voices. you can even do with some tension. but, you know, when things get really tough, it is easier if people get along. and that, perhaps, is the lesson that i would say to the president. it's a new president, you can do fine with personalities that may clash if things are going well.
10:03 am
when they get rough, it's a lot harder. >> let me follow up on that question. it's the personalipersonalitiess also different points, very strong points of view. some black and white, some more nuanced as you described it in your book. does the fact that each political party has kind of this big-tent strategy, does that need to be reflected in the foreign policy leadership, or can you just bring people in to consult with them? i'm pushing you pretty hard on how you put the team together. >> right. well, it's -- it is a really fine line, because if you put a team together where people have views that are too similar, you get group think. >> yep. >> and that's not a good thing. when i was secretary of state, i actually had a couple of curmudgeons on my staff what would come in and challenge me about just about everything i wanted to do. i always thought if you're constantly -- and this is true for you in school, too, if you're constantly in the company
10:04 am
of people who say amen to everything that you say, find other company. because you don't actually test your assumptions in that way. and so i would tend to err in the direction of people who do have strong views, who do express them, but who can also put them aside ultimately and find a way to work together. >> and within the political party, both the republican and democratic party, they do have people with widely different views. if you were actually advising a president, you can't anticipate that you're going to go through tough times. >> right. >> so what characteristics of that foreign policy team -- in past years we had people on foreign policy teams that were lawyers but not necessarily had the kind of substantive expertise that you have. >> that's right. that's very true. we actually had on our foreign policy team, when you think about it, we had quite experienced foreign policy hands. >> yes. >> don had been secretary of defense before. vice president cheney had been
10:05 am
secretary of defense and chief of staff in the white house. colin powell had been chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and deputy national security adviser. i had been in the white house before. so we actually had a lot of expertise. i'm really, to this day, not quite sure why sometimes the personalities didn't gel and i'm not actually sure -- i don't actually think it was observable before we got to washington. that's why i say i think it was the times perhaps that tested us. but i would say to a president who's choosing a foreign policy team, do think about talking to people about internal dynamics. because it can get a bit -- >> think about the team part. >> think about the team part as well. have strong views, because strong views are important. you don't want a president who's just hearing one side of the story. but think about the team dynamics as well. >> interesting. let's talk a little about latin america, the caribbean. do you think it makes sense to focus on latin america and the caribbean as a region developing
10:06 am
u.s. policy, given the fact the countries differ in their stage of development and so many of them, their issues are really global issues? >> yes, yes. there's one sense in which i do think we want to think about latin america and the caribbean as a region -- as a matter of fact, i would say even the western hemisphere, which is that there is a kind of natural affinity for trade policy. we do share some problems of just the kind of transnational borders of trying to deal with trafficking in persons, trafficking in arms, trafficking in drugs so there are reasons to work as a region. i also think that since the organization of american states actually has a democratic charter, we should have a view of our hemisphere, first and foremost, your neighborhood as being democratic. but you make a very good point. once you get beyond those sort
10:07 am
of big categories, you really are talking about countries that are very different in how they interact with the globe. brazil thinks of itself, of course, as a regional leader but brazil is also one of the most important emerging economies for the whole global economy. it is one of, as we call them the bricks, one of the emerging economies that has a chance to really structure how the international economy is going to look going forward. when you think about countries like, of course, obviously the united states has a global role but when you think even about countries along the pacific rim of latin america, they may connect more to the economies of asia. i was always struck when i would go to something called the summit of the americas, which was really about latin america and the caribbean. we would have these discussions and hugo chavez would take off and everybody would sort of close their ears and whatever.
10:08 am
but then almost a week or two weeks later, we would go to the asia pacific economic council, apec, and there it's the pacific rim countries of chile and up at the pacific rim all the way to canada and all the way out through japan and china and korea. and the conversation was completely different. it was about global trade, it was about freeing trade. so i actually always thought in that sense, the countries had more in common with their asian counterparts than they had with their latin american counterparts. >> is how they perceive themselves, at a stage of development, significant there? >> i think it is. because if you look at places like chile, now quite developed in many ways, colombia getting there in terms of development, a country like brazil is interesting because on the one hand, it is leading the global -- one of the leaders in
10:09 am
the global economy but with huge income distribution difficulties that keep it more on the developing country side. if you look at some of the poorest countries in say central america like a guatemala, for instance, you're talking about places where you can't even reach the farmers in the highlands by highway. and so their problems are to try to build infrastructure so they can join the 20th century economy, forget the 21st century economy. so, yes, you have radically different levels of development. but when you think about it, you have radically different levels of development within countries. look at the north of mexico and the interior of the country, and you have very different levels of development, even within countries. >> does a secretary of state think of cuba differently than as part of the region because of the domestic politics and the relationship? >> i think we think of cuba differently because it is the one country in the oas that can't even take a seat at the table because it's not -- it doesn't have a democratically elected president.
10:10 am
and unfortunately we have a history with cuba of castro's decision to install soviet nuclear capability that threatened the territory of the united states, highly anti-american regime there. and so there are foreign policy reasons, principally, that we have a different relationship with cuba. but my hope is that in the larger democratization that is going on across the world, that the cuban people simply can't be left behind. it absolutely has to be the case that when fidel castro goes, the cuban people get a chance to elect their next government, it's not just handed somehow to raul castro. [ applause ] >> that was a setup question in miami. both the national security adviser and certainly the secretary of state are almost firefighters part of the time. you get woken up in the middle of the night.
10:11 am
someone does something stupid, either within your own organization or around the world. >> yeah. >> how do you anticipate the future though? there's some evidence that while there was the basis for the arab spring or others predicted the soviet collapse, how do you anticipate the future when you're in those particular leadership roles for both the president, but, more importantly, the country? and how do you organize yourself to do that? >> obviously, you try to have experts who are keeping an eye on events. in this regard, having embassies with people who really know the place and can get out into the communities. one of the things i tried to get foreign service officers to do was not stay in the embassy, not talk to other foreign officials but get out in the country. get a sense for what the conversation is on the street in the country. and that sometimes will give you
10:12 am
a bit of early warning. secondly, on the arab spring, i think we knew something was coming. the freedom agenda that we launched about the middle east, i gave -- president bush had given his second inaugural address in which he talked about the need for there to be no man, woman or child who lived in tyranny, including in the middle east. i gave a speech at the american university of cairo saying that egypt needed to lead this revolution. i can remember going to see mubarak the morning before i gave the speech and saying to him, mr. president, get out ahead of this. get reform started before your people are in the streets, because what you could feel by being in the middle east was the kind of seething anger that was growing against authoritarians who were corrupt, authoritarians who were planning dynastic
10:13 am
secessions from themselves to their sons. you could sense that mubarak in tunisia were increasingly isolated with people telling them that people loved them, but on the streets the people didn't love them. so we had a sense this was coming. but what you could never know is what is the spark? the spark would have been a man, a shop keeper, self-emulating in tunisia is what you can't see. so you see the kindling gathering but you don't know when it's going to ignite. the best thing you can do is expect it might ignite at any time and try to get ahead of it. so trying to get particularly our friends in the middle east to reform before their people were in the streets was our way of trying to get ahead of the -- what happened ultimately in egypt and tunisia and other places. >> talk a little about the collapse of the soviet union in tibltz r -- in terms of what
10:14 am
scholars knew. you were right there. >> i was. we used to laugh people would say, gorbachev is bound to fall from power. thank you, but when was the issue, because a general sense that things are going bad is not enough. people knew that the infrastructure, political economic social of the soviet union was weak. i went to the soviet union for the first time in 1979 to study language. i was there for an extended period of time. and i was a student of the soviet military. and i remember thinking, you know, i had this image of the soviet military as ten feet tall. i remember going into a store to buy some little tchotchke for my family, and they were doing the computation of the prices on an abacus. and i hadn't seen an abacus since second grade in birmingham, alabama. and i thought, wow, this isn't a very developed place. and you start to get a sense that something really is wrong there. so i think soviet specialists
10:15 am
knew that the infrastructure was weak. it took, however, a true believer in kind of marxist ideology that it could triumph over the fact that people were estonian or ukrainian and it took somebody who believed you could reform the soviet union, gorbachev tried to reform it, and then it collapsed. but i could tell you that still in 1990, the soviet union collapses on december 25, 1991. in 1990 when we were unifying germany, in the fall of 1990, i don't think anybody thought that the collapse of the soviet union was a year away. >> one of our students wanted to make sure i ask about social media and how the foreign policy establishment now follows social media around the world, and whether that's part of the intelligence gathering? >> it is now. in fact, when i went to state, i took with me someone named sean mccormack from the white house,
10:16 am
who was very interested in what was then an emerging kind of social media. there was not yet any facebook or twitter but people were on internet sites all the time and chat rooms so we started to understand better what was going on there. i also asked a former student of mine, a gentleman named jared cohen, who would later on go to work for secretary clinton, to go and start thinking about, did we want to even try to help people to use social media to democratize? he created groups of friends who would -- for instance, people who helped to overthrow terrorism in colombia, who could chat with people in the middle east who were trying to -- to deal with terrorism. so we were starting to use social media. what i've begun to understand now -- of course, social media is an accelerant, right. it's not the cause of these
10:17 am
trends, but it's an accelerant. but it's very interesting what's happening with social media in china. because the regime is doing everything it can to control the internet. it's terrified of the internet. in fact, hacking into servers to try to find that last human rights advocate who might be online and apparently social media is going wild in china. and the regime is not so certain that maybe -- maybe it's not a bad thing that people have a way to vent through social media. so you remember the story of this young girl that was run over in the streets? and people did -- that exploded into the social media in china. but i would say to the regime, it's one thing to think people will just vent, but eventually they will vent and want to organize to do something about it. so social media i think is going to continue to have a huge
10:18 am
impact on how revolutions, how reform, how democratization takes place. >> so foreign policy experts in the years ahead are going to have to follow social media? >> absolutely, absolutely. >> another dimension. plus our intelligence people. >> i think it will be one of the most important sources of understanding the pulse of what is going on beneath governments. because governments are not irrelevant by any means to this, but populations are more empowered than they've ever been by social media. >> i have to ask you about iraq, because one of the things you do is put a broader context and broader justification on the reasons to go into iraq. and you describe it i think as a kind of imminent security risk. and my question is, first, how did you change the collection of intelligence information after your experience in iraq? because clearly, there were real questions about how accurate the information was. >> yes, yes.
10:19 am
the most important thing that we did was to reorganize the intelligence agencies. by the way, both as a result of the intelligence failure part of 9/11 and the intelligence failure with iraq, because in the prior case, we had a wall between domestic intelligence, which the fbi did, and external intelligence, which the cia did, and when they crossed, as they did in 9/11, we couldn't talk -- they couldn't talk to one another. in iraq i think we began -- >> excuse me, conde, would you explain -- because many of the students may not understand why we have that -- because you're a teacher. why we have that gap between the fbi and the cia. >> absolutely. it was -- the gap -- the wall, as i like to call it, was there for very good and legitimate reasons, which was we did not want our foreign intelligence agency, the cia, being active inside the country and perhaps spying, to use that word, on
10:20 am
domestic events, on american citizens and so forth. so the cia was kept to a foreign intelligence agency. the fbi, which operated under rules and laws, think "law & order," the fbi was the internal agency. just to give you one example, a few nights before 9/11, a telephone call was made in san diego by one of the men who would ultimately be one of the suicide hijackers to afghanistan but we couldn't track across that boundary because we didn't want the tracking of phone calls inside the united states by foreign intelligence. so would i liked to have known what he said a couple of days before 9/11? when we realized, of course, we had an internal security problem, the attack on our internal security, we had to sew
10:21 am
up that gap so the cia and what they knew about what was going on outside the country and the fbi and what they knew about what was going on inside the country could talk to one another. and that's what the so-called patriot act, that you probably read about, actually it closed that seam. so that was one intelligence problem. the iraq intelligence problem was a little bit different but also structural. we had as many -- depending on how you count them, as between 15 and 17 different intelligence agencies in the united states. defense department has one, energy department has one, state department has one, the cia has one, et cetera. the cia was one. the person who was in charge of all of those as the director of central intelligence was also the head of the cia. so we had this strange situation in which we had all of this different intelligence reporting but obviously, the director of the cia was human. he trusted his own intelligence agency more than all of these others that he was supposed to be over. and we found that some of the
10:22 am
counter evidence about what was going on in iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs probably didn't get the airing and the hearing that it might have been. so we created the director of national intelligence, who is not the director of the cia, he's a separate person, to cull the intelligence, help the president understand when there are disagreements in the intelligence agency, and give more of a total picture of what's going on within intelligence. so that was the big reform that was made. >> you also have talked in at least one speech that i know of about anticipatory self-defense as part of the context for making the decision to go into iraq. i really want to ask you, when you examine the iraq situation, and there was a discussion, did you look at other countries as well? because if you look at the list
10:23 am
of justifications, you could put those on iran as well. and so why iraq rather than iran? and did you look at more than one country? >> yes. we looked -- iraq was sui generis in our view, it was unique. it was unique because we had been to war against saddam hussein in 1991. he signed an armistice. he was systematically violating that armistice. he found in 1991 to be one year from a crude nuclear device. he had used weapons of mass destruction and a nuclear weapon against his own people. the strengths against him were starting to break down, including the fact we were flying so-called no-fly zones to keep his air force on the ground. he was shooting at our aircraft practically every day. i can remember the president
10:24 am
asking don rumsfeld, what do we do if he gets a lucky shot and brings down an american pilot? so we were in a state of hostility with iraq, not a state of peace with iraq. in 1998 president clinton had actually launched cruise missiles against iraq and the inspectors who were supposed to be keeping his weapons of mass destruction programs under control were -- left the country. so he was different for his having dragged the region into war several times, including us. the fact he was continuing, we believed, to build weapons of mass destruction and, according to the intelligence agencies, had reconstituted his chemical weapons, reconstituted his biological weapons, and was on his way to reconstituting his nuclear programs. he had tried to assassinate president george h.w. bush. he was shooting at our aircraft. he put 400,000 people in mass graves. he was considered the biggest threat in the middle east. as bad as north korea was, as bad as iran was, they were not
10:25 am
in a category like iraq where there were 16 security council resolutions that said he was a threat to international peace and security. >> does that also account for the need to focus on the israeli/palestinian issues, that they're also sui generis in the sense that it's unique compared to other parts of the world? >> yes, while the israeli/palestinian issue is not key to peace in the middle east or a different peace in the middle east, it is a key to a different middle east. a student of international politics, from the time i was your age and in college, which admittedly is a long time ago, but from that time when you took a course in international politics, people started it with the most volatile region in the world is the middle east. and that is still true today. so people have been trying to do something about that for all of this time. the israeli/palestinian issue is one of the core issues that
10:26 am
needs to be resolved to get rid of that volatility in the middle east. >> and every administration has struggled with. >> every administration has struggled with it. >> do you see hope out there? >> i do. i describe in the book that ehud olmert, the prime minister of israel when i was secretary of state and mahmoud abbas, the current president of the palestinian authority, were pretty close to a deal in 2008. a very good deal put on the table by olmert. olmert was in political and legal trouble so abbas did not take it up for a variety of reasons. but the reason i actually wrote about it is i wanted to suggest it's not a hopeless cause. there is an answer here. there's a two-state solution that is available but time is not on the side of either of them. >> i would like to go back to the soviet union because given your expertise about the soviet union, how do you see russia developing over the next few years?
10:27 am
and do you think that their importance in the world will continue to increase, perhaps even surpassing china? >> yes. i think the russians are in trouble in terms of global standing, and i think they know it. russia is -- the russian economy is 80% dependent on exports of oil, gas and minerals. that's not a modern economy. and i'll tell you a little story about -- that shows how much that oil, gas and minerals is linked up with personal fortunes, political power and the state. i was at the australian foreign minister's house one day. we were having a meeting about energy policy. and he was going around asking people about their energy policy. so the russian says, well, he says, we understand that our oil and gas fields are technologically behind but no foreigner will ever own russian oil and gas, he said. he said, so we're going to buy the technology from western oil companies.
10:28 am
and so, i had been a director of the chevron corporation, and i said, so don't you understand that their advantage is actually in their technology, they're not going to sell you their technology to make you a better competitor. and he said, oh, that's a really good point. and then he said, are you still a director of chevron? i was the secretary of state. but in russia, dmitry medvedev, who was the deputy prime minister, was also the chairman of gas perlman. so state and policy and fortunes all linked up together. by the way, with a fair amount of political violence too. now that mr. putin has decided that he is the once and future president of russia, i think the chances that russia is going to break out of that and build on other strengths that it might have, including a very smart population, those have receded.
10:29 am
i think unfortunately, russia will not find greater strength in the international economy. it's pretty much an economy that's dependent on the price of oil to do well. >> let me go back to the arab spring. what do you think the lessons are? >> the lesson of the arab spring is authoritarianism is not stable. it's simply not stable. if men, women and children don't have a way to change their circumstances, and change their government peacefully, they will do it violently. when we were in romania, we learned of something that i now called the ceausescu moment. nikolai was the dictator of romanian and with situations going on in hungary, romanian and slovakia, he was in the square tell ing what he had done for them.
10:30 am
all of a sudden one woman yells liar. then ten people, then 100 people, then 1,000 people and then 100,000 people are yelling liar and he recognizes he better get out of there because something's gone long. instead of delivering him to freedom, the young military officer delivers him to the revolution and he and his wife are executed. the ceausescu movement is when fear breaks down. either an old lady yells liar or a soldier turns his gun away from the crowd, refuses to fire, or a tank turns away from the crowd and then all that's left between the people and its dictator is anger. and that's what you have in the arab spring now and that's why authoritarianism is not stable. >> what do you think about leading from behind at these multilateral coalitions and -- >> i don't mind multilateral coalitions. i'm sorry, leading from behind is an oxymoron.
10:31 am
it is. you don't lead from behind. >> agree. >> i actually think some in the white house may be sorry they used that phrase. >> let me ask you about a domestic issue, because i actually share your view and had conversations with president bush about the failure of immigration reform. and how serious do you think that issue is for the next presidential debate that we have? >> it is essential. let me tell you why, when you're secretary of state, you get to go out in the world, you get to see what people admire about the united states. and there are a lot of things that are not admired but the one thing that's overwhelmingly admired is what i call our great national myth. that's you can come from humble circumstances, you can do great things. it doesn't matter where you came can from, it matters where you're going. and that's actually led people to come here for generations from around the world to be a part of that. and it's why we have asian-americans and mexican-americans and we have
10:32 am
german-americans and indian-americans. it's because people -- the most ambitious people have wanted to be a part of that. now, i don't know when immigrants became the enemy. but if we don't fix this, we are going to undo one of the greatest strengths of the united states. because the only thing that keeps us from the sclerotic demographics of europe and japan is immigration. so i'm a major proponent of comprehensive immigration reform that first and foremost -- [ applause ] >> first and foremost recognizes that we have people living in the shadows and we've got to deal with that. we're not a country that actually wants people to be afraid to go and take their sick child to a hospital. that's not the kind of country we are. and i worry that the states, because the federal government has not acted, are starting a
10:33 am
patchwork now of immigration policies when, really, what we need is a federal policy that is true to ourselves, true to our laws, but also true to the absolute fact that the united states of america is well served by the great melange of people that we are. >> i have three quick questions to wind -- [ applause ] >> -- wind this up. next fall, let's pretend, you have been invited to be the moderator of a presidential debate. the debate's theme is foreign policy. what is the first question that you will ask both candidates? >> do you believe that america has an exceptional and unique role to play in the world? or is america just any other country? because if america is just any other country, then you have no right to ask the american people
10:34 am
to sustain the sacrifices that we have and to play the role that we have on behalf of the international community for now better than 60 years. and so why is america exceptional? >> wonderful question. second question is, even though you're not responsible and they can't officially wake you up anymore, what keeps you up at night in foreign policy? what are the things that you worry about that we ought to worry about? >> well, you worry about, you know, the list of terribles, iran, pakistan. i worry about mexico. i think that we don't pay enough attention to what's happening on our southern border. and if you live in california or new mexico, you know that the drug cartels own a lot of that space between northern mexico and the southern border of the united states. and it's very dangerous.
10:35 am
last year there were -- two years ago, there were 5,000 kidnappings and murders of officials, mexican officials, probably twice that in the last couple of years. so, very dangerous. but you know what mostly keeps me up at night? it's the question of whether the united states is going to re-affirm and somehow do the internal repair that we need to do to lead. i worry that we can't seem to get our entitlements under control. i worry that we can't get our budget deficits under control. i worry about immigration policy. i worry about the fact that in k-12 education i can look at your zip code and tell whether or not you're going to get a good education. and that's not just wrong. it is actually probably going to undo us more quickly than anything the chinese could ever do to us because if we have people who are unemployable, and they will be unemployable,
10:36 am
they'll have to live on the dole, because they have no other choice. it will indeed pull us apart as a country faster than anything else. and if we're not confident and optimistic in one country, we won't lead. and so, that's probably the one that really keeps me up at night. >> here's my final question. if you have a choice between running for the senate in california, being a university president or being head of the national football league, what's your first choice? >> oh, that's no contest. well, i used to want to be the commissioner of the nfl, but i told roger goodell, i said, when i was struggling with the iranians and russians every day your job looked pretty good. but, actually, from northern california, it doesn't look so good anymore. and these days -- and i have to say it.
10:37 am
these days, being a university professor at stanford university, where the stanford cardinal are having quite a special season, you know -- come on, you know what those special seasons are like. you've had plenty of them. let us have one. that's really the greatest job in the world. >> thank you madam secretary. >> thank you. >> that was fun. [ applause ] weeknights this month we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on cspan3. tonight we took at the cherokee nation. in the 1830s, under president andrew jackson, the cherokees were forcibly removed from their lands in the southeastern u.s. in what became known as the trail of tears. oklahoma university law professor lindsey robertson, discusses the decisions issued by the u.s. supreme court in
10:38 am
cases involving the cherokee nation, especially the role of chief justice john marshall. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on cspan3. american history tv on cspan3, every weekend, documenting america's story. funding for american history tv comes from these companies who support cspan3 as a public service. cspan's long running series book notes is back as a podcast. book notes plus. hear compelling interviews with authors and historians. this week on the inaugural episode of book notes plus, find out which u.s. presidents were caught in sex scandals. the author joins us to share
10:39 am
those stories from her book "sex with presidents". book notes plus a new weekly spod cast from cspan. get all the information about podcasts at up next on the presidency, james worthen talks about president isha sesay's treasuriry and defense secretaries and how their personalities and styles influenced policies. both men brought a business perspective to their cabinet jobs. the dwight d. eisenhower presidential library hosted the event and provided the video. >> welcome to our monthly lunch and learn program. i am so thankful you're here with us today. i'm excited


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on