tv History of U.S. Trade Policy CSPAN July 21, 2018 5:00pm-6:01pm EDT
results of my local study, nd those of you who know jim mcpherson must know he's probably the most kind hearted person working in this field. and although i was just a woodchuck from the north we engaged in a little ostal exchange with me on this subject, and he suggested that for a make life choices variety of reasons. patriotism wasn't the sole reason some enlisted. not.al truism was maybe money was not. and he really discounted the and he used himself as an example. goingd, for instance, i'm off to speak here in a few weeks and i'm going to get paid for it. not going because of the money. and my response to that, at was, there is ay difference between you and me, because if i'm not getting paid,
not going anywhere. but there are many differences mcpherson.and jim for instance, i mentioned how kind hearted he is. ut for many years, i supposed that perhaps he was right. that maybe money was not the overriding issue, maybe it wasn't that much of an issue. entire program today at 6:00 p.m. eastern on our weekly onies, "the civil war," only c-span 3. >> next, on american history tv, the panel on u.s. trade policy to approach current foreign trade. he national history center in washington, d.c. hosted this hour long event. >> my name is dane kennedy and i'm director of the national american nter of the
historical association. to welcome you. obviously this is an important generating a lot of interest. part of an ongoing historyhat the national center sponsors to bring historical perspectives to issues, that are facing congress and our country. should stress that the center is strictly nonpartisan and the of the program is not to advocate for any particular olicies but to provide a historical context that can help with , because they deal these very difficult issues. i should add that our two very rs today both have strong views on the subject, and they are very different views. unfortunately, i
--uld add [inaudible] i want to thank amanda perry in has ack of the room who organized all of. this i also want to thank the g-- congressman jerry connelly. to hand things over to levinson, who will give the general introduction. >> thank you, and good morning, everyone. policy is trade somewhat of a controversial issue around these halls. you can see that just by looking out the door. there is a sign about halfway talking about the suffered detroit has due to nafta. r perhaps you could just check your email this morning as i have done to find that the motor
and equipment manufacturers now mounting a campaign against possible auto slogan, with the merica doesn't go to war in a ford fiesta. trade is an emotional issue. long been for a very time, and the purpose of our seminar today is to provide some historical perspective on some issues that now.ress is facing we have two speakers who are very knowledgeable and very in these issues. one is susan -- she's a research professor at george washington niversity school of international affairs. she's also a senior fellow of international governance innovation. she's written quite extensively n trade policy and on the history of trade policy. our other speaker today was to he was held up in, i hink, the atlanta airport
because of the weather this morning. so dane will read his comments. a research professor emeritus in history at the ohio in athens. for nine years in the 1980s, he chairman and a member of the international trade commission. perspective on trade policy having been at it as well as hes, academic. he's the author of nine books on economic and international quite a nd has distinguished record as an editor and scholar in this area. o what we're going to do is start with susan and then dane will read out the presentation. after that, we'll open to it questions. you. >> are you going to go, chris? >> no, you are. everybody. can i just make a suggestion since you're standing -- there and me room over there hopefully we can get some more
chairs, so that you can come and may be a little more comfortable. so i was going to do a power like many se professors, that's how i teach, so forgive me, but bringunately, we couldn't it up. what i'm going to do is talk a i think t about why protectionism is undemocratic, hich is probably the take you haven't heard before. but u.s. history teaches us something about that. let me begin. okay. just as humans have always right? from the day we somehow got on the planet, we have always tried to trade money for goods and services, but protectionism has been a part of that, whether you wanted to protect companies from harm or like duals from harm, slavery, right? think there is nothing wrong with protectionism except
a great extent it can undernine rule of law in of e -- undermine the rule law in trade and that's really important because often people don't knowding, they each other and they need to be able to trust, right? trade agreements are about. they are about building trust and stability among people or who have never interacted with each other in person. so, i think protectionism strategies may seem helpful but protectionism can also cause harm because it o, can undermine that thing that makes democracy that od governance, and thing is called trust. okay. protectionism is inefficient, because it can markets. it's inequitable, because it favors some interest over the interest, and increased costs to the many over the few but what i really
anted to talk to you about is u.n. accountable. farms that receive protection are not required to inform government officials during that that they got that protection what they did with it. did they invest in their people? take that money that they got from higher prices and shareholders or give management? so the united states has this long history, right? using protectionism and trying to make it accountable. tea e for you the boston party. our nation is built on protests gainst taxation without representation equals tyranny, right? week had an opt ed this in the "new york daily news" point.that very it's a very similar thing. if you use protectionism it should be limited and there some standards. some means of holding the firms it he entities that receive
to account. and so america, i believe, has to make t on trying trade accountable. from the boston tea party to the present, and so, you know, for history, th century the united states was a very protectionist nation, right? used the tariff to fund overnment, and as a nation, we ustified it saying, we have these brand-new sectors. in trade parlance it's called -- industries, and we have to help t them in order to them become strong. okay. but what that did was, in you've , it led to, robably heard this term, logrolli logrolling, which basically means members of congress give a a constituent or a okay, and they are
essentially providing rent seek g to the farmers who the rent from the policy, right? okay. on and on and on until 1930. -- wrote a fabulous article and book which basically said protectionism got a bum rap because it didn't cause the great depression and he's right. the united states, when we instituted the smoot harley tariff, i don't know if you guys the history but it's a hoot because the united states products that it didn't even produce, which is kind of crazy, and what to a ed, is it led spiraling of retaliatory tariffs, okay? nd that was a very bad thing but in the karmaish world that e live in, what happened was,
it led to a repudiation of protectionism to some extent and t also led to people in the .s. government to say, hey, this process is not working. we need to make the process more in 1934, at and so the advice of his secretary of state, hall, president roosevelt legislation and helped to ation reate a more accountable approach, although by today's terms it wasn't accountable, to set up a committee in the of state to weigh scientifically, to come up with that says, does this eserve this tariff, deserve this protectionism? time 1930s was the last that the u.s. government really
the typesss determine of protectionism and the level of protectionism and since then, much more een a accountable process. going s laugh, and i was to show you that scene where the basically asked the students, have you ever heard of and what do you think of the tariff? you're interested, i can send it to anyone who wants it at the end. okay. world war- during the ii, u.s. policies started a different process. was, we know that protectionism, while it didn't ause the great depression, it exacerbated it, because as i said before other countries retaliated. aybe we should think differently about this equation, and maybe instead of trying to our own sectors, maybe
set of ome up with a rules that would provide predictability and build trust also open markets, right? and that's the idea of multilateral trade liberalization, and so it's actually the brits who came up but, so the a, brits states and the created a process that led to something called the ito, and i won't bore you with what that was voted on ver by congress, and what winded up was something called the gap, which was simply a club but club where reciprocity ruled. the idea was that if you give me tariffs on sandals, i'll give you lower tariffs on tires. so reciprocity wasn't ecessarily in the same product but what it led to is policymakers understood that if be willing to lower tariffs and provide greater
would find ty, they in other countries the same thing. gap was a success and over time people not only -- ted to liberalize setffs, what i mean is they rules to govern trade, not only n goods but services, and also to deal with things like procurement policies. all right. if i had to summarize that i call it rules-based trade. what it does is it essentially to protect as long as you do so in a accountable and democratic manner, and i kid you not. f you read the gap, you will see terminology that talks about process, access to nformation, okay, because you
need information to make good policies, and the ability to policy ate in the trade making process. individuals can say, i don't like this trade liberalization. it, so it hallenge set up a process and it allowed balance of protectionism and freer trade, which is what every nation on the planet has because there is no such thing as free trade. simply a mix of trade.ionism and freer here's the thing. 1947 to the present, okay, the united states has been the to use a diplomatic term, rules-based trade. and the system wasn't perfect, protectionism in check and it set up, again, being boring and redundant this process that all countries had to follow and
it builtf that process stability.t built stability that could handle the u.s. -- de linking from the in the 1970s, the global financial crisis, great recession or whatever we call it now in 2007, et cetera. there has been a lot of economic yet, the system held. held until say it today. when, i have now received, i tweets about president trump saying today, he plans to withdraw from the wgo. now, if that matters to you, let can't. you that he because congress and the xecutive branch share policy making, but what's his beef? okay. the system is unfair. riders, tions are free other nations don't treat us in reciprocal manner.
countries that are fabulous at xporting, like china and to the don't adhere rules and are too advantage of the system. that's really bad english. again?start they reap too much advantage system. i'm not going to dis any one of his arguments here. ask me about it later, but here's how he comes to these conclusions. he looks at deficits, but don't really measure trade. hey measure a whole lot of things. they also include how much a nation borrows, the strength of budget ency, the deficit, and something about people living in the united something very interesting and freaky about us, consume and love to we love to consume foreign goods and services.
french cheese and hyundais, movies, okay. you get my point. is not an e deficit dequate means to assess what he's complaining about. all right. so his solution so these things, like is oesn't protectionism. okay with that if it's done in an accountable fashion. okay. democratically determined. what does that mean? it means you and i have a voice process, and our representatives, the people we elect every two years, have a voice in the process. so what did he do? 2007, hisrew from ttp, first act as president, he threatens to withdraw from nafta wto.he he adopted tariffs on washing machines and solar panels. into place steel tariffs for national security reasons.
now, can anybody here look me in eye and say steel is essential to national security? essential to national security? but steel can be replaced by all and of other metals high-tech plastics. that's not to say there aren't steel that is needed, but secretary of defense mattis, the u.s. all ary consumes 3% of steel produced, so, that's a hard case to make. on chinese goods, and tariffs hreatened car because the auto industry in his by trade, andened o he wants to put into place car tariffs for national security reasons. hese assertions and actions have had effects on trade. they have led to a decline in trust of the united states, and don't believe me, look at polling data.
example of it is that other nations are liberalizing the united states, and i am starting to see evidence, it ill be interesting to see what mark says in this, a decline of foreign investment in the united states, and less willingness to because when you don't follow the rule of law and act accountable ent, anner, that has an effect on business willingness to invest. o let me just talk one more time about the national security exception. under wto rules, if a nation is to do that, it must notify ther countries, and it allows it.h state to determine so did president trump follow that process? he put say no, because paris who fought beside us in many wars. the process was opaque and
unaccountable, because he didn't consult with congress. he didn't provide you or i think to comment on ty it. it was very uneven, and then exception process, where firms can ask for exceptions to the rules, and uneven and opaque. as our founding fathers and mothers believed, that taxation without is tyranny and history teaches us if you want to put into place protectionism it, that's justify just fine. ut it needs to be accountable, transparent, and democratic. so thanks for hearing me out. [applause] >> okay. to imagine to have me as alford ecky.
he sends his regrets. he spent 14 or 15 hours in airports in wichita and atlanta not ecause of weather was able to make it. but he did send his remarks, and his is a completely different perspective on the issue, so we should have a lot to talk about. those of us who study trade policy, these are truly past, g times, in the talk about tariffs usually yawns and even a few loud snores. in the past month the public has trade. lot about we've even learned that a special place in hell exists for who engage in duplicitous trade diplomacy. none of us will fall into satan's clutches today. in ay be watching a change trade policy quite unlike any ther in the post world war ii era. to build the ed post war system, titled his memoirs present at the creation, today the appropriate title for
present at thebe destruction. policy debate e is between globalists and skeptics. the former are defenders of the open rules-based multilateral system. they concede it has flaws, but being generally free and fair. even see it as an ideal instrument for elevating human rights. the skeptics believe the current system imposes a heavy, burden on the united states. they generally favor free and terms, achievein greater bilateral balance and real reciprocity. merit in ere is some both positions. we need an open rules-based one that has but greater balance and that gradually eliminates surpluses and deficits. i've not forgotten what i administer ping to u.s. trade laws and discussions while attending trade meetings
geneva, but for the past 28 i have lived outside i have li beltway, first in rustbelt ohio, as a professor, and more recently in kansas where my wife ranch. ve a small what we're watching is not a classic struggle between traders nist and free as many tariff battles in the 19th century were in. days congress set tariff levels pursuant to article 1 ection 8 while the executive pursuant to article 2 section 2 ought to negotiate better market access abroad. this sometimes rutted in deadlock with northern rotectionists blocking the efforts of southern planters to gain better access to european cotton, for their tobacco and peanuts the deadlock was finally 1934 with the delegation of tariff negotiation powers to the present. until about 50 years ago, the trade debate was largely about
tariff levels. as a result of multilateral thetiations, tariffs around developed world are relatively low, around 3% to 5%. 1930, the u.s. duty on dutiable imports has fallen from of about 30% to about today. of course, some big emerging markets have higher average levels. india is 13%. and many nations apply much agricultural on products. topped by the 249% canadian applied to dairy imports. the real issues today involve beyond the border, ranging from product standards andnternational investments intellectual property, data and cyber, and technology transfer issues. as well as problems with the dispute system process. impediments in 21st century businesses. worry, too, about
somewhat related ticking time bombs, the credit and budget deficits. when i came to d.c. in 19. national debt was less than a trillion dollars and we had a positive trade balance. we were still the world's creditor. today, the national debt is over 21 trillion dollars and it is as a share of our gdp since world war ii. the public debt is owed to foreign countries, especially japan.and economists may differ over hether our international indebtedness is a sign of short term weakness or strength but that we it's a burden pay as interest or tribute. trade policy also appears to bayreuther off track. our agreements lead to unbalanced outcomes. skeptics, our negotiators have been outsmarted. measure, the current account, we have had ver 35 consecutive years of
deficit. the deficit was $466 billion in 2017. meanwhile, some of our largest trading partners, china and germany, generate chronic surpluses. why do we have persistent trade deficits? there is no single reason. conomists stress, a, strong dollar, b, interest rate and currency manipulations by banks, c, globalization, and labor costs d, investment savings rates, and e, growth.g rates of business leaders blame of antile strategies competitors and flawed trade agreements. as a historian i can offer some research.d on we've produced unbalanced outcomes not because our stupid or were corrupt, but rather, for over 80
years, because foreign policy drove our trade initiatives. fter world war ii, the marshal plan provided the generosity of the marshall plan guided u.s. policy. to reconstruct the orld economy and enabled vanquished foes to earn a living from exports. leading s country's role in world affairs and our trong domestic economy it was perhaps understandable that our leaders should accept less than reciprocal outcomes. in congress objected. is tor russell long, who chairman at the time of the senate finance committee, warned, for example, that u.s. the orphany has been of u.s. foreign policy. now, there are many examples, merit our attention today. one involved helping japan world war ii. which had long term ramifications for our u.s. industry. eisenhower administration sought to integrate japan into
he world trading community and rehabilitate it as a world -- as a cold war partner. one-sided agreement in 1955 in gap andmembership full access to european markets t our lowist tariff rates but it left the japanese home market and agriculture protected from competition.pean apan insisted on protecting infant auto. electronics, steel and other industry against foreign so as not to remain reliant on exports of textile yeah.ne by the 1980s, japan's new national champions has become world class competitors, while restricted foreign access to its home market. another example occurred during clinton's administration, when u.s. granted our lowest tariff rates to china. this was done to integrate china into the global trading regime. wto. at the time, china promised
nhanced access to the china market. u.s. business leaders viewed it as the economic equivalent of down the berlin wall. for president clinton, the moral arguments l security were more important than the economic. he said that china will agree to by the same open trading rules as we do. often happens, many of the promised gains did not materialize. to china to moved low labor age of costs and the u.s. loss perhaps two million jobs. flood of chinese exports soon produced spiral trade deficits. it became apparent that their national development was ncompatible with free market rules. among the significant violations wereina's wto commitments, export subsidies, industrial policy, and the theft of intellectual property. some have even accused china of of seeking ression, economic and military domination by stealing u.s. technology and
property.ual the u.s. trade representative the u.s. erred in supporting china's entry into the wto under terms that have effective.e a final example of a foreign policy inspired trait pact efforts to stabilize mexico with trade. in the late 1980s, u.s. a icymakers worried that heavily indebted mexico with a stagnant economy and a might ing population implode. resident george h.w. bush invited the president to negotiate a free trade agreement. the first such agreement between low middle income country and an advanced one. was really an investment security agreement, with the agreement while the lowered mexican tariffs, it improved the mexican investment attracted large numbers of jobs in manufacturing. negotiators apparently did not perceive that the shift of otor vehicles assembly to
mexico would ignite a political backlash in the u.s. heartland. thoughts about recent tariffs on steel and aluminum products. to exaggerate their importance since tariffs are less disruptive to trade than quotas, probably the next step. while tariffs used to be the negotiations, tariffs are employed as levers to promote negotiations beyond border issue. one important difference in current trade negotiations is he president's personal involvement. one has to go back to presidents woodrow wilson and harding to find similar engagement and those examples involved only negotiations with congress. while presidents seldom have master the details of usually ts, they haven't experienced assistance --. as the current robert the real issue is whether we as
run huge an afford to external and domestic deficits future. at some point, we pay for our a ravagance, possibly, with financial crisis, or past the burdens of our follies on to another generation. efforts to restore balance to a financial trading relationships bring some temporary pain to .s. consumers and some exporters, and antagonize some trade partners and allies, but a rebalancing is long overdue. as you see, i'm more sanguin u.s. trade ture of policy than many in the media. time will tell whether the strategy pays off, or if the sky falls. in my view, it's time to turn marshall plan ra and bring our current obligations into better balance with our vital resources and interests. the views. and now we will open it up. thank you. [applause]
dane.nk you, we're going to take questions now. my role here this morning was to be a moderator, but, as you may know, i have some background in this area, and because the professor i may step in a with the to help out discussion. please. >> doctor, in your remarks lot of you said that a the trade agreements were due processes and paradigms. do you think in a world where from a is withdrawing lot of u.s. trade anments, and we see trade not dominated by the u.s. that we're going to same paradigms, or will we see a new set of standard procedures and paradigms governing how global
trade is conducted. that's a great question. thank you for it. but it's a couple of questions first question is, will these procedures that are in trade agreements, and they are in ftas, whether brazil or they are by china, or they are by canada, or the e.u., okay? i know that is because -- my beat between relationship and trade, i would say, the rule of law, and that an be trade in human rights, trade in good governance, trade in corruption, et cetera. the world think trading system is going to break but i don't know, right? and i'm optimistic, what i see nations that have not een so conciliatory in their behavior at the wto, now realize mistakes and are making some
concessions. so one might see in that perhaps bullying works. but i also feel like that might sometimes, you t know, that joanie mitchell song, you don't know what you've got gone?it's you know, they pay paradise, put up a parking lot, that one. starting to realize, a e, what it means to have rules-based system, and what i frightening about these times is the willingness to abandon the rule of law. look. we all break the rules, right? you're supposed to swim -- ou're supposed to run around the track in this direction, you know. you're supposed to do it lock right? some people, you -- clockwise, right? we all do that, right? system of rules gives people trust. it provides stability. people nk more and more realize the stake in that. did that answer your question?
too.e mark should comment, pass on that. [laughter] >> if you could comment on this, policytique of the trade that is in service of a foreign policy, the notion that we hould somehow retreat from the marshall plan era and have trade policy that is completely somehow from foreign olicy, as historians, i would like -- i would be curious about the three of you, is there any or place where trade policy has, in fact, been divorced from foreign policy? this is a , i think great question for dane, for those of you who don't know, he historical work on great britain, and the trade ngs of modern policy really go back to the
great britainwhen decided that it was of interest tariffs. >> i didn't imagine that i would be actually commenting in this session, but yes, i mean, my is is that trade policy inevitably and unavoidably connected with foreign policy that's engaged in it. i'm a mark said, historian of the british imperial world and one of the that's quite striking is that the british were the first system of e the mercantilists, protectionist been prevalentad across the western world and its colonial ip to those territories that it controlled in the 17th, 18th, and into the century. why did it do this? because it was in its foreign interest to do so. britain was the first to move
of free tradetion nd it did so because it was in its national interest to do so. it had industrialized. it had gone through an revolution. t was in a position to produce manufactured goods at a much cheaper rate than anyone else. borders, free trade benefitted british producers, it benefitted the british state. so what we saw in britain over from urse of certainly, the early 19th century until really the great depression of s, was a policy that was systematically determined to trade to britain's overseas policy interest. also don't think it's any those views, that position, were transferred and adopted by the united states second world war when it, in fact, became the dominant
economic power in the world. and as professor ekcy says, that policy was related to american foreign policy interests. i guess the real question now, consider,of us have to is the united states no longer the dominant power in world affairs? is it so threatened by other needs to retreat to a policy of protectionist measures? and clearly this is an issue that lies, my view, really, at heart of the debate that with right now. congress ceded authority to the president without ever the president would have personal financial conflict that might affect some of his decisions. is there any thought that perhaps the way that this is
changed now be that that's no longer the norm? separate we have to out three things here. first is, the strategy that trump has used to put into place many of these tariffs. it's about a national security threat and this gets to your trade n, too, if i may, policy can't be divorced from foreign policy, but the aspects that it's policy linked to are always very different, right? trump has made that decision, which is imports are a national security threat related to steel and administration is considering that for autos. that's very different from the tariffs inputting on general, okay, or the process of policy.trade the united states is a freak nation in that the authority for trade policy is shared and congress generally holds the
short leash.a it was very hard for president to a and for president bush get what's called trade promotion authority, which is to negotiate new way, agreements, by the congress approved -- never even voted on giving president trump authority, but this week, he got it because there wasn't a debate about it. we cou ress has been policy quiet on trade and that's extremely bizarre, quite frankly, giving the president's unwillingness to negotiate on anything other than bilateral trade agreements, and explain why in a second. -- members of congress are
now starting to change that, of congress sitting back. congress is now kind of waking implications, and business and farmers are making sure that they wake up because retaliation, i want to just explain one other thing. international, the internet is global, we can't have a bilateral rule of internet because the protocols governing the internet are universal and interoperable. president trump's strategy is to undermine the jewels of he economy, which is internet related, data related firms if this continues. curious on what you were talking about with historically, here have been, you know, congress has held the power and held the president on a short leash. of a pandora's box been opened now and is there a way to mechanisms create to ensure, you know, authority is not so centralized, that
be done from one figure? >> i actually think the process pretty accountable and balanced. this oblem has been that congress has been unwilling to do its duty. and ystem of checks balances, i guess i'm a naive big believer in that system, and in general, it would still hold. that doesn't mean that we can't approaches.h better believe one want -- i there are all sorts of ways to hold the president into account willing nstitution is to do that. i think i'm hearing you say that in ou need something else place when that doesn't work? and i don't have an answer to that. perhaps we do. general, it n should hold. >> i'll jump in here to say that
historical terms, a bit of a change here. for a good number of years now, has removed itself from trade policy discussions in ways.n precisely because congress able to that it was not ave trade policy when you had this extensive logrolling among members of congress as susan to earlier, so congress took this rule of moving more for trade negotiations to the president effectively veto.ct to a congressional you know this as trade promotion authority, where congress gets or no once the president has reached an agreement, but doesn't get to go into the details. at least not formally, given a yes or no choice. lately seen a number of members of congress talk again a more ving congress active role in formulating the details of trade policy, and
a s would be somewhat of change from the direction ongress has gone in, in the last few decades. ma'am? >> -- is there any impact policy itself? when i attack you with strong that affect how it essentially noise? >> do you want to take that? e.u. on their impact assessments of their also agreements, and i work for a think tank in canada a bit with t quite foreign government officials, and i would say until recently, of have been in a state shock, that the united states, their closest ally, and the world, would free treat them in the way that -- i believe it had a terrible effect it had a terrible effect on willingness to
negotiate. moving on ries are without us, and i just want to eiterate that that's extremely dangerous for you guys, young people, because if we're not a agreements, we're the rule takers, right? nd if you can't influence your destiny directly, that ain't a good thing. it's undemocratic, right? because sectors are basically global now. everything. okay, can be done online to some degree. hence, what president trump and his administration is doing, i'm find a diplomatic way to phrase this, is very for the future of the american economy, for you young people and for technological change, which, as i said before, requires a global approach it's internet-based. >> i'll answer that question in different way, and
-- one thing out you often see historically, is people coming to washington deal with trade policy issues, and expecting hat it's going to happen quickly. the international trade negotiating process is slow, okay. these international negotiations take years, in one recent case, we had a worldwide the doha round, which went on for a dozen years and ended up in failure. at e was not an agreement the end of it. that one can a come in and quickly transform negotiation is not really consistent with historical experience. particularly because you have to remember that the representatives of other countries are having their own negotiations just as we are, and so it's very difficult reconcile this reality with the desires of various people to
on things happen quickly the trade policy front. questions? >> yes. backlash against free trade and multilateral trade agreements it seems like throughout the united states, or least it's being appealed to by elected officials here. been ically, have there ways that countries have been able to mitigate the effects of tradekind of multilateral agreements while still being benefits, youtheir know, without, like germany, to participate heavily in the global economy while still being able to foster industries back home and still provide those kinds -- i have thought a lot about this question, and i actually historically, , support for freer trade, which, f we put it differently, is really saying, support for
new trade agreements, and for limiting protectionism, barely at really has changed. if you look at polling data over time, you know, it ebbs and flows but basically in general, public supports that. but if you ask them specific uestions, do you want to include labor and environment provisions in trade agreements, hose kinds of things, that's what changes over time and people perceive, when they perceive that their community is hurt by trade, and i would say the time that i saw the for est support protectionism was when nafta was negotiated, and i'm trying to think of his name, the running of the eds was for president, talking about -- sorry i ross perot, that's when thought the greatest but to me, this is not an issue of support or free trade versus protectionism. to me, this is an issue of
and it's about, do people understand that governance must be global, regional, bilateral as well as national, in order to effectively govern trade. again, on digital trade, trading ideas, disinformation, we're rules that prevent using bots to spread misinformation about things in the united states or anipulating the american public. that's a trade issue, believe it also a and it's governance issue, so unfortunately, we don't have a ational curriculum, but many people don't learn about trade agreements as part of learning governance. so to me, part of it is we need job. a better trade as a percentage of gmp, at maximum, 27%, which is essentially what healthcare is to the u.s. economy.
a huge chunk, but to most countries, pitance. students at their the high school level about institutions such as the wto know, regional trade agreements. they have a better understanding of the importance of these agreements. i think if we have a new approach to trade, it needs to trade agreements to people's daily lives so people can understand, simultaneously, winner and a loser from trade agreements. from trade it agreements as a taxpayer, for and maybe as a shareholder, saving for college, homeowner or whatever. but we s shares rise, might be a loser because it
oesn't do a good job of protecting the environment or whatever. -- [inaudible] >> i wonder who the sectors are, regions, and generally, who are the countries -- >> i can prove it to you, in fact, because i work on digital trade. a.i., l trade is trade in apps. google, facebook, they are their more and more of investments to vancouver, toronto, and those are all nearby but they are more stable. the united states looks pretty unstable. bullying could get you, you know, some investment, but, you know, lots of firms have nnounced that they are moving their investment out of the united states, letting people
go. i said lots, it's not lots but it's starting to happen. for industries that need immigrants, they are hostile message. sit happening with tons of disinvestment? not yet. to be misleading and say, but i see lots of vidence happening in the most competitive sectors, and that out.ks me >> there is -- >> if i could just jump in here, i was in london big week, and there was a anti-brexit demonstration at the time, and one of the things that quite striking is this is not just an american phenomena. he british are going through exactly the same thing, and are erhaps a bit ahead of us in facing the challenges of how you an ve yourself from international system of trade and replace it, and what's
increasingly clear in heir case is that, there are plenty of companies, rolls-royce, airbus and so on, their e moving a lot of activities from britain because and e instability uncertainty that's connected with it. mark's point, negotiations, trying to create negotiations are long and slow, so there is a great deal of uncertainty, in that i think se, sort of offers insights into the kinds of challenges that we're and will face in the future. >> and to the question, there been a global decline in foreign direct v. investment for the last couple of years. unique to the united states. it goes beyond just reasons of state of thend the u.s. economy. how do you respond to the
charge that the trade with china, for example, has fostered example, they r know that if they steal echnology in the process for adjudicating that case in the to takes seven years and then in seven years, when the technology in question is obsolete and not important would you respond to that, it seems as though every other country has a interest.national we just saw the china 2025 plan, characteristics, all these different countries, for example, they have -- they certainly don't think the is global considering they stamp out western countries all the time, what searches you how do we google, interact with somebody who has a different conception of the good and the rule of based order if simply won't followle the rules and if we try to make them follow them it won't even matter because the timeline is fast? >> do you want to talk about that. sure. i appreciate your question. i disagree with your premise.
this is a half full, half empty right?n, so president trump's strategy has been to become more like to be less transparent, to call for restrictions on in the unitedment states, related to china and countries. and i would say a confident country would say, this message, there is cybertheft, you create rules governing not exist, which do right? common there isn't yet a conception of how to regulate cybertheft, so, by the way, you president obama negotiated an agreement with the canadians, and the agreement with the chinese, that they would not do cybertheft, to point out,ight they still do it. right? it? know how they do hey use malware and all sorts
of strategies online to steal corporate information. the problem is that the united has done this, too. nd so, we don't steal from companies but we have spied on negotiatieors using malware, and of ou would like evidence this, we've often used malware. so the problem is, how do you regulate it? it, i think regulate s to ban like minded countries who are also victims of such as germany and the u.k.. to say, we need to come up with new approaches. that is a leadership role. an abdication role is to say, you are doing this, i don't like it, i will not let you
investigate the united states. promised to end on time. i would like to thank you all for coming here this morning. it has been an interesting discussion. [applause] >> as part of the 50 city capital tour, this weekend on c-span on book tv and american history tv, we will feature stops across alaska, showing you the states natural beauty and delve into the history and literary culture. history,n lectures in san diego state university professor teaches a class on the vietnam war, looking at the conflict, beginning with u.s. escalation in 1965, to the fall of saigon 10 years later. here is a preview. >> as far as johnson and his
team are concerned, it is important to do something about , so as to a minimum prove that the u.s. is not a ," as mao had been saying. and most importantly, to demonstrate american resilience in the cold war. if you don't take anything else out of this lecture, remember this, the vietnam war was never about vietnam for the united states. it is about the larger cold war. it is about the credibility of the presidency, the credibility of the united states, the credibility of the entire american system. announcer: watch the entire program on "lectures in history," tonight at eight p.m. and at midnight eastern, on the at c-span3. next on the civil war, william