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tv   Former Supreme Allied Commanders Europe Discuss NAT Os Defense Strategy  CSPAN  January 28, 2022 9:35am-10:38am EST

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america. and i would just add that there's -- again, i'm not denigrating your position, i understand it. i just have a different one, and america had very much your opinion before world war i and before world war ii of course those were incredibly costly to us, but i think they were incredibly important in shaping the world that you and i now enjoy. >> let's hear from mike in philadelphia. >> good morning. >> well, good morning, general. yeah, i'm trying to piggyback the previous comment. basically i want to make a comment and then ask a question. and the comment is that this seems to be a-- >> you can watch the rest this have at c-span.org. we'll take you back live to the atlantic council for nato's defense strategy. among the speakers, retired wesley clark former supreme allied commander in europe.
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live coverage on c-span2. >> ukraine was part of the-- with the west ally, i'll turn it over to transatlantic leah shinman, thank you for joining us. >> hello, good morning and good afternoon for those tuning in from around the world and i'm deputy director here at atlantic council. i'm pleased to be here with two supreme court commander generals, the united states european command reporting to the north atlantic council nato. and ask if you keep your hats on as much as possible to have the global viewers for nato not just for united states and helpful to the discussions in
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all capitols right now. the nato is challenged to the extent it hasn't seen since 2014 and the stressors of the last years, the russia buildup is happening in context of years of aggressive russian actions and violations and the current crisis is more than about ukraine and it's not a discussion among, elites. and more than 14,000 people have died. and war fighters on citizens and alike. and not the discussion for those who get to sit around and talk in think tanks. we hosted the nato secretary-general and you've watched a recording that on on-line and social media feeds as well and noted the commitment between nato allies on nato members which is strong, dedefending ukraine is a different matter. stress that nato a allies are
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ready to impose heavy political sanctions-- given that i want it start off with a pointed question, but i think it's too broad to answer in several hours let alone a short hour we have together. general clark, start with you and then general breedlove. is nato effectively deterring russia right now? >> we don't know that until we see the conclusion of the crisis, but it's clear that nato is demonstrating resolve. as long as nato stays unified and the allies pull together, it's more important than having the difference between 8500 troops and 10,000 troops or whatever. it's the fact of nato unity na is the power to deter conflict in europe. it may not deter putin. he may simply want a show of force to demonstrate his
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military capabilities or he may through subversion or something else, take over ukraine covertly and it could collapse. but the point is, that nato, his demand were directed at nato, not just ukraine. and nato stood up to those demands very firmly. so right now, i'd say nato is -- you can't say it has deterred. you can say it has overcome the challenge that putin has thrown at it thus far. and we're looking strong, and we can see a path outward from this in which nato is strengthened and more successful than ever as in its mission as a result of mr. puth's putin aggression against ukraine. >> thank you, and following questions i want to pick up on. general breedlove over to you.
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>> first of all, i'm in agreement with general clark especially in the context of this immediate problem to allow me then to expand the question a little bit. are we deterring russia? in many ways, we are not. if you look hat what some call the gray zone war or the hybrid war or what is called active measures, we're not deterring russia. russia is attacking us in these areas in america, in our capital, in every capital in europe and across europe in these gray zone areas. so, there are places we are absolutely not deterring russia. but i agree with general clark, in this immediate instance, i think that as several now have stated, the solidarity of the alliance in facing this challenge is critical and we're doing well at that so far, and the good news is, that the russians are still willing to come to the table and talk as they, i think, have been
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surprised by the solidarity in this response. so i think we need to work on the other deterrent factors as well. >> that's helpful to hear. thank you both for that opening salvo. i think, follow on the news that we've seen just as of yesterday. they've stated on the phone call between biden and zelensky, that the united states sees every indication that they're going to use military force into february. and beyond the gray zone tactics that we've already seen that as you've stated, general breedlove, using allies and partners for years now. we've been watching the public reports of various equipment flowing in and what many are pointing to as key enablers like medical support and logistical report and how
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seriously moscow is preparing for a conventional military attack, but their forces are disspersed right now. so i'm curious both of you, given your expertise on these matters. what would you demonstrate to the intent right now? >> yeah, you want me to start on this? so, first of all, you see the positioning of the forces. secondly, you see the sort of live fire, what we would call live fire training. the tanks are firing, artillery is firing. we move armored vehicles and they have weapons systems on them, in order to launch you have to be able to make sure those weapons systems are still calibrated or zeroed. so there would be these kind of exercises going on. so that's one indicator. and we know that there's active reconnaissance and subversion efforts coming across the border of ukraine. that's the second indicator.
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we know that there's been a false flag effort that's been exposed by the british that there have been big-- a wave of cyber attacks. two days ago, three days ago, we saw a relatively ineffective civil disbead-- disobedience effort at overrunning the parliament building in kiev. we don't know whether it was supposed to be 500,000 people in the street and reverse -- and ineffective or whether it was a rehearsal for something that might come later. but all of these are indicators. you can't expect that a russian attack is going to necessarily be like pearl harbor, where suddenly airplanes come over and missiles and everything floats up. i certainly wouldn't do it that way and i'm sure general
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breedlove would agree. you want to obfuscate and soften up, and -- then you'd rescue civil society. you have to look at the conversation between president zelensky and president biden. there has been disinformation already saying it wasn't a good conversation. now, i don't believe that. i think that's disinformation, but we have to understand that president zelensky can't be put in a position where he generates panic in his own country. so he's going to naturally play down the threat as long as possible. the worst thing that could happen is a million ukrainians are frightened and take to the highways and try to come out through hungary or slovakia or romania and that would be chaotic and serve putin's purpose. when you see this misinformation coming out, you
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know this is part of the strategy. it's not a bolt from the blue, it's already a strategy of attacking ukraine. those are the indicators. and the buildup of the forces just reinforces that. >> thank you for that, i think my pen ran out of ink trying to write that all down at the same time. so, thank you, general clark. general breedlove, i'm sure you have thoughts as well. >> agreement again, let me add what general clark said about the forces. several weeks ago at the beginning this have business we saw russian formations park administratively big totally nontactical formations, easy to see from space, easy to see by reporters and it was largely, i think, strategic messaging and what i'm worried about now, we see the forces dispersing into more tactical formations. we see exercising as general clark has mentioned, and even
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more telling, we begin to see the enablers that the rush shaun wouldn't see arriving hospital formation, fuel bladders, logistics trains, ammunition, all of those things now coming forward to marry to those fielded forces. so completely agree with what general clark has said and just in a very narrow view of what's actually happening with russian forces we're beginning to see the move from the administrative, possibly coercive force or a force that could be more tactically relevant. following up on that and there's been a lot of analysis in the last few weeks and especially the past few days. there's a really great report from the strategic studies-- here at the atlantic council we hosted an event on tuesday
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feels like eons and a few more options to consider on top of that. i'm curious from your perspective based on indicators that we were just speaking about, how do you think that the first 24 hours of a russian operation would go? and this is also wrapped up, obviously, in putin's political aims. what sort of operation do you think he would undertake right now to have the most political gain given as well the nato solidarity that we've seen including on our stage this morning? >> so, i think general clark made some really good points before. there are some individual who believe we're going to look at, as was described, this big blitzkrieg. first of all, i don't think he has enough force to mount a huge blitzkrieg and some are saying to try to take everything east of the river. i don't think that these are -- i'm not a -- sanguine if those
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options are out there. mr. putin has built a force that has given him multiple options. i'm sure general clark has more. but three big groupings and all three i discussed are embedded in almost everybody else's. he has a group of forces in the north and go due west and never encounter ukraine and going home that would be a huge force setting in the north near kiev in the belarus side and i believe that force might be aimed at opposing zelensky, as we've talked about, so he could put his cronies in there. there are forces in the center directly across that could go in and not cross the line of contact and make a big show out of armored formations, entering into ukraine and while that also is aimed at the zelensky
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government, i think it's personally aimed at the nato and the european union. a force that would say, we're here, we're in charge. you're not here, you're irrelevant. and then i see a force in the center and in the south that a, i believe, designed to have the capability to run along the coast, something we've long called the land bridge to crimea. but there's a couple of important points that that force would be after. first of all, the port. not my numbers, other people say these numbers, but some say that it represents 20% of the gdp of ukraine and if that force then carried forward to the northern part of crimea, it could seize the water supplies that russia needs so critically for crimea. and others, maybe goes on to odessa or whatever, but what i see in the southern force is sort of an economic crippling of ukraine, again, aimed at the government of ukraine and
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others, but i'm sure there are other idea, but i see that mr. putin has built options and i don't think he has enough force to could all the options at the same time, but it could certainly do a couple of them and cause serious, serious problems for the men and women, soldiers and citizens of ukraine. >> i agree with everything you're saying, phil, and those are certainly the options. but in response to the question, think of this, what mr. putin would like to do is come in as a peace maker or a peacekeeper. so, it may actually, the first 24 hours might involve major demonstrations in kiev. the traditional way something like this happens is the president, if he doesn't want to concede, is kidnap and disappear. somebody comes up and says, the
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president has had a heart attack, but i'm taking charge here to establish order and then the radio and television stations are seized. there's a big blackout of the internet, a cyber attack hits the power grid and people are confused. we know that there are russian agents all through the ukrainian government, probably inside their forces. these people suddenly start misdirecting traffic, changing the addressees on messages, sending confusion reports, this unit should move to that location and block. and that's the area that the real ukrainians come through. if he can create that confusion, then everything else is much easier. the one thing that we didn't mention thus far is the effective use of precision
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strikes. we know the russians have the same, maybe better, precision strikes that we do. the caliber cruise missiles, the ability with their sa-400's to completely eliminate any ukrainian air ak taft that comes against them. whether they can coordinate that and so forth, probably not very well. maybe only to the 70, 80% level. there will be maybe a couple of russian airplanes shot down by sa-400's, but they can mass combat power in a lightning strike take out much of the ukrainian assets especially in they're not mobilized and dispersed. and this is the dilemma that president zelensky will face. and then on the assembly, you can't say the attack might not happen and then you've got people going in every direction. and so, he'll be reluctant to do that until the last minute.
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and so therefore, they present targets. the russians have the ability with their long range missiles and reconnaissance and the same space reconnaissance and intelligence maybe better than we know. and boom, boom, boom, in a few minutes if it's well coordinated he will have achieved shock and awe. and i've always felt, as we were saying, none of us really know what mr. putin thinks, but we do know that he's watched for over 20 years as the united states air force has demonstrated shock and awe and general breedlove was part of that in many different iterations, so it generates a wave of intimidation. we know after we went into iraq in 2003 a period for several months, the iranian government said, they're going to turn on us and we need to make nice to the americans and unfortunately we didn't take advantage of it
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at the time. he expects if it comes to this, this will shake the governments in the neighboring countries, so that they will be more accommodating to russia. not to mention what happens in georgia. >> thank you. please, please. >> if i could just a short two minute pile-on because this brings up incredibly important things. one of the things that concerns me the most is, yes, the ukrainian ground forces have significantly improved since '13 and '14 in many ways, but i'm not so sanguine that the ukrainian navy and airs force can make the same adjustments. and as the general is outlining nicely, the ability to strike is going to be a really problem for ukraine. and frankly, they are not going
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to be able to defend their sovereign air space against a dedicated russian attack. the same goes for at sea. the ukrainian navy is not going to be able to stand in the event of a dedicated russian attack in the maritime spaces, they will not be able to defend their sovereign coast and other places and these are all big in the grand scheme of thing for the ukrainian presidency and the military. >> both of you have outlined some really multiple scenarios, what is striking to me, how much is available in the open source of internet and twitter and telegram and this information is everywhere and we're all getting so flooded with this information. and based on that and with your hat on a little bit, what accounts in your mind for the
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different views amongst nato allies in the crisis right now? the british and the u.s. are the only ones who have given the orders notably for our personnel, follow personnel at the embassy in kiev to evacuate. no other europeans have taken that step. there's obviously a lot of political advice on how to support ukraine right now, but focusing in on the threat assessment, you know, you're both reading very strongly into the threat assessment and i would definitely agree with you, but why are so many european nato allies who are in disagreement or at least not publicly in agreement with us? >> well, we have to bring up an example here real quick. so when russia first went into crimea, you remember the discussion of the little green men. for days and for some, for weeks, some of our allies said we don't see it the same way. these are, we think they're
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locals and et cetera, et cetera, and that was all happening because there were individual national interests that were playing out and they were really worried. one country was trying to sell billions of dollars of ships to russia and they can't want anything to mess with that. so every nation has got things playing out and then, you know, later when some of these things were resolved, the ships were being sold to other places and all kind of things across all of the nations, all of a sudden now we're in agreement about who the little green men were. we knew that these nations knew the truth. the nations knew that we knew the truth. the nations knew that we knew that they knew the truth. and working out the issues and similar things now. energy politics, nord stream two, the dependency of some of these nations on the european energy and other things in economical terms, these are
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things that nations have to play out as they look at their support for the larger picture. so i'm sorry for jumping in. history tend to repeat itself doesn't it. and now we see the same sort of drama as when russia first went to crime. >> you said it very well. these nations are democracy and we have to accept their opinions. and it sounds that they'll sell amphibious to russia. don't think that politics doesn't influence foreign policy, it influences it everywhere in democracies. if your foreign policy wasn't responsive to your public opinion and your interests at home, it wouldn't have any basis in legitimacy. it's a wonderful thing to have
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allies and we believe in democracy and so we have to understand sometimes it's inconvenient, but eventually, you know, they will come together and this is the way it's always been in nato. general eisenhower was the first supreme court allied commander. general breedlove and i sat at his desk when we were supreme allied to the commanderers. and the first, the british and others are not doing enough because they were involved in colonial wars in asia and this has been a longstanding problem with nato and yet, these nations rely on us. they can play their domestic politics out because they know we are strong. we have the intelligence, they will come around as required. we always believe that and so far, they have for us in nato.
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>> if i could just pile on to that we comment because i think that general clark and almost every that sat here would agree that at some time in their turn, it's our capital and our nation who have been a little bit difficult to work with. so, this is all about all of us. i couldn't agree more. .... there are many options still under consideration in the closed-door discussion is happening in brussels and beyond. don't envy the people or in those positions trying to make those decisions. from the outside wonder if you could comment on what you think the impact would be of the
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recently announced military posture moves from the united states, putting higher prepared us to deploy. france announcing they would send troops to romania, the netherlands, denmark, spain all ponying up assets of putting units on higher global readiness. what do you think the ship and the russian calculus is? is this a signal more than anything? maybe we will start with the general clark. >> i think it is a signal that nato is more rees all do, doesn't change the calculus and what they can do. if you want to change that calculus you have to go back to 1950, and the u.s. intervention in korea after the north koreans attacked. we had declared that north korea, that south korea was not an our defense perimeter. so the north koreans perhaps taking advantage of that went to stalin and mao and said want to
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overrun the south. and the chinese told them you better be careful because the americans are unpredictable and they still might intervene. sure enough, president truman ordered the intervention. now, those first airborne troops at might get deployed to poland with attack helicopters and so forth, they are not going to intervene but if you want to create ambiguity, if you want to really change the russian calculus, you deploy a a compe air wing with f-22s and f-35s and think i'm on your train. you have to talk more about this that you would deploy those two let's say romania. and then they're flying combat air patrols over romania out over the black sea. they are the backstop for nato. you see if the russians did come in with his massive era defensive you can be sure they wouldn't hesitate to buzz romania and slovakia.
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sort of deep their chests. the russian military is arrogant and full of itself because it's got new equipment. it's been successful in syria. it does have the u.s. air force operates. it works with the israeli air force, and so if you really want to change the russian calculus you have to create the ambiguity of having an error capability that's right there that is first rate -- air -- that they are not sure that they wouldn't have an encounter with nato and the better be careful. because if they do they are going to lose. and so that's the way you really change -- we haven't done this yet. it may be under consideration, don't know but we haven't done it yet. >> i'm sitting up straighter in my seat. let me take just a tiny different tack. i totally agree with what was
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just said but also if you read the two documents that were provided to us by russia, what is one of the complaints? what is one of the fears that mr. putin and lavrov and others have put in those papers? and that is they don't want more forces and equipment and weapons in the forward area. so maybe what we're doing is sending a message that your intransigence, this completely contrived crisis that you put forward is now going to cause the very thing you're trying to correct by us moving more force into the forward area. and so i think it's a good message in reply. >> i think building off of this come something we've been talking about a lot as you can expect in the scowcroft center for strategy and security is also looking at what the force layout currently is for nato,
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including specifically u.s. forces, the u.s. obviously is undergoing their own national security strategy review right now and the national defense strategy. maybe i can ask you to comment on that later that they have also undergone a global posture review that didn't have very huge conclusions for the european region besides pausing the moves out of germany. what can the united states do and other nato allies to the extent they have the capacity you are referencing? what they can do with what is already in theater, moving either eastwood? are the rotations that are going to places and rotating them through romania and bulgaria? sort of offense that does require right -- in the united states in massive to form second also take some time.
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>> i'll jump on this one first if you would like. so yes you kind of answered your own question a little bit. there are a lot of things that the u.s.-european command commander can do do in turn h his own forces. in 14, while the knack was debating whether we should take some actions on air policing and things around the country, we in the u.s. that a u.s. unilateral contribution to the three baltic states and moved f-15s to the baltic nations. party crowd. 18 hours ago to show, go 18 hours later we had on airplanes over the top of the nation's and a force that could regenerate and sustain those. so yes, there are things we can do and we can do things on the ground as well and our naval components that are there, though four four destroyere in the med going into the black
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sea to do freedom of navigation and other things. there are lots of things we could do. i think you saw the u.s. announced its moving fighters now forward so we not only have army units on alert but now we move fighters forward to the baltic nations to enhance air policing. let me make one last political -- not political, but personal plea. i've argued a long time against air policing. air policing is a peacetime function for renegade aircraft. we should be changing it into an air defense posture? give our aviators the rules of engagement in the special instructions that would allow them to respond to a bellicose action, which is not air policing. so sorry for stealing your time but i'm still an advocate for moving nato's air policing forces into an air defense posture. >> that's the next evolution.
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we went from -- maybe this is an easy change we can make to better signal our credibility but general clark, , please. >> so first of all i really appreciate what general breedlove just said, just underscores my point about putting the airpower in with the right mission. but the larger question you are referencing, the national defense strategy and so forth that's coming out. i will be very candid and tell you i've been concern from the beginning because although i think it would be wonderful if we could stabilize with russian focus on china, i never thought it was particularly feasible. the russians random built up in the spring and that was when it first started. resident biden met with president putin in geneva and said it's up to you, we would like stable relationship with you. mr. putin has had no.
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look, this is a consistent with everything mr. putin said since he was really since he was an intelligence chief and later the prime minister even before he became president. he's wanted ukraine back. he's wanted to restore the soviet union. you can't believe that he's going to sit by idly and say i really do like the americans, we will keep a small russia just to be good neighbors to everyone. he's probably not going to do that. so i think what we are at is an understanding emerging out of this that stabilizing europe is not as easy as we thought. it's going to require more force it. it's going to require more interdiction. you can't deal as nato or america with china unless you have a strong unified europe in support. -- [inaudible] that we need. europe today is the grand
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strategic prize. russia wants it so it can later face-off against china. china want to because it knows if it has it, that the united states won't be able to really challenge it economically. the united states more or less has a because of nato and 70 years of heritage and the result of world war ii. and when we started talking in 2011 about pivoting to asia come right away i became concerned because you can't turn your back on europe. they are our closest partners. they are going to get our closest partners and no matter how important the nation's their developing and growing in southeast asia are, vietnam, malaysia and all that, indonesia, it's still are based on lease for the next decade and have, to back decades. has to be europe. this is a wake-up call for american jew strategy, in my view. >> do think it's a wake-up call
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for european nato as well? >> i certainly hope it will be but again as general breedlove and i were saying the stations all have their internal politics. they do want to go against china. look, right now germany is pressuring lithuania because lithuania is trying to do deals with taiwan, china has come to germany is that you want to work with us? you better put your little neighbor in place. so there's all this internal dynamic. this is the stuff of diplomacy, politics and alliances that goes on behind all the time behind the scenes and we have to work it. it requires using every tool in the toolkit. economic policy, diplomacy, international law, trade policy and military deployments. and one of the problems we've had over the decades of the cold war is the united states more or
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less disconnected it's a national security policy from so many other tools in the tool basket including financial policy. during the cold war we actually thought if american business went abroad and built businesses they would create american values. some of these businesses today think they don't need american support. all of this has to be sort of worked, massaged, correlator, brought together to enable the united states to succeed and a multi polar world, the challenges of russia and china. >> thank you. i think i will turn to general breedlove next. it strikes me the u.s. administration is evidently trying to work through nato to find solutions to the crisis and to bolster any u.s. assets in the region. the announcement that the united states would put units on higher
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to deploy orders and would operate through the nato response force which is something that was bolstered lot during your time in the post crimea situation in nato. i wonder if you could comment on what are some of the options that nato the alliance can take beyond what the united states and some individual members have announced. after the russia attack in 2014 date of significant step was bolster the baltic states to the enhanced for presents. i met telling you something you already don't know but those forces are small, about 1500 each, maybe about 4000 in poland it also kept the other u.s. forces. these forces were not there before 2014. you're looking at the map that is europe. what would you as a sector now push for? you mentioned error policing to air defense. what would the equivalence look
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like? >> let's get her eyes off her feet and upon the rights of just the second of the never get to those. general clark hit the nail on had immediately right up front. the most important thing there needs to do right now is solidarity, is making sure that we present a united front in both policy and action to russia. russia. we need to work on that internal solidarity. second of all, we talked about it just a couple of minutes ago. nato writ large needs to look at those options that would tell mr. putin that he's going to get opposite of what he asked for. raising the alert status of forces, possibly moving elements of the very high readiness joint task force, other things to improve our positioning in the forward area where it will again send that message we talked
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about earlier that we're going to get exactly opposite of what you wanted if we continue this stance. and, frankly, this all sounds very hawkish, but along the track of both we need to keep dialogue moving. i congratulate the current administration that we are still in dialogue. and, in fact, i guess as result of the last day or two we may have actually found a few things that we can talk about. we don't want a a fight. i don't really think he wants to fight but this whole business means a lot more to him than some of us, and so we have to have that in our calculus. >> let me just say one thing that general clark just brought up which i think is really important. you talked about the toolbox. frank of this is something i teach a lot about at georgia tech sam nunn school. in america we tend to be sort of stove piped in our responses.
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to radical islam we use steel and treadmill, bombs and we try to eliminate those problems primarily via our military. when we deal with russia in the past it's almost all been in our economic cylinder of excellence. sanctions. additional sanctions, deeper sanctions, special sanctions, very special sanctions. but a nation has more in its toolkit, a very simple diagram i use for fighter college, we need simplicity and repetition is die. with diplomatic part, informational power, military power and economic power. anything we should be more balanced in our reply, all of nation, all of the government or all of alliance reply using all the tools rather than the stovepipes we have with radical islam, the stovepipes we have with russia, et cetera. sorry for -- >> if i could come in on what
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general breedlove said and give a a couple of examples. >> as long as you're not in violent agreement again. >> we are always in agreement i think on these things. look, 1999 1999 when i waso supreme allied commander, mr. putin went from being the intelligence minister and intelligence czar in becoming the prime minister. and there were some mysterious bonds that were attributed to the chechens in moscow, and it turned out that actually in one apartment building the residents who are so worried about this wave of bombings, they were checking their own building. they discovered yes, there were bombs and actually called the government agencies, government agency said oh, my goodness, these our own explosions. but thank you very much for detecting them. a whole book is been written, investigations on this. look, mr. putin with 99%
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assurance was in charge of setting the bombs, blaming it on the chechens to justify renewing the war against chechnya to make him a hero to become the president. this was done with the connivance of russian intelligence. now, this was discussed over the years but it's never really been made much of. and yet you know that there's a russian disinformation campaign against our country and our leadership. what are we telling the russian people about their president? have they forgotten about this? there's all kinds of information available that strongly suggests that he did this. so that's one sort of information, part of the information toolkit that can be used. i'll you another one. no one mentions kaliningrad, and yet kaliningrad is joining the territory, the suppression, seized by russia at the end of the second world war. it's a thumb sticking in nato's
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eyes that has two russian divisions, sa-400s, nuclear missiles and so forth. look, why don't we complain about that? i think it's really offensive and why don't we then say you don't pull some about our we are not going to do, we will not give you the technology trade you want. when not going to provide the loans from the banks that you want. this is taking right in denmark and finland and sweden and germany and poland, and it's very threatening to us, since you behaved the way you behave. in ukraine we don't know what you might do next. you can continue this. you don't have to be passive in this. we should start this kind of dialogue and use these kind of toolkits to restore some balance in this relationship. we are looking for a stable relationship with russia, but you can't overlook what they are doing and simply ask for their
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help while they do things that create the threat in the instability we are working against. >> be more proactive in our responses. it's not natural to a special in the information space for us, transparent and liberal democracies at least. we are nearing the end of our time so if you have questions drop them into zoo or tweet us @acscowcroft. i have a couple of audience questions already that i would like to post to both of you. first one want to address is from -- can russia sustain its high posture on the borders of ukraine for a long time and without pressure u.s. and it into negotiating on his terms? basically what time line i was looking at? is a something that by mid february if we haven't seen an invasion, is it -- >> the obvious timelines are well discussed. first of all, this costs a lot
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of money and russia doesn't have a lot of money to be throwing around. and so as long as those forces are there, the more it costs them in the more morale problems they have. the other timeline general clark had better discuss is the frozen ground issue that we talk so much about. yes, russian military can attack anytime of the year, but the frozen ground gives them a better time and capability for large armored formations. but as general clark talked about earlier, the way this war will start is not probably not going to start with large armed formations. those may, but there will be other actions happening. there are a couple of timelines that are well discussed that sort of say it's a use it or lose it. i'm not so sanguine with that but i understand the cost. >> navy general clark you were just speaking about options that the west could take to make
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noise and complained about actions that russia has taken. nato has responded back to russia's listed demands of their own. one of those is seen by many of the nonstarter to russia which would be for them to stop invading ukraine and georgia, et cetera. we have a question from victor what you think plays on this nicely. he says russia has taken the initiative and -- against the ropes for years. what has to change? like what would signal de-escalation to you, general clark? >> i think you have to do a better job of coordinating the toolkit. in other words, we don't want to go to russian tactics and try to use military threats against russia. general breedlove said we don't want a war, and no one wants a worth less than the generals who have been in them. but i can tell you that we have got lots of tools they can be
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used against russia, the financial tools of banking, the purchasing of the development of alternative energy strategy for europe that would strengthen u.s.-european relations based on liquefied natural gas shipments. it would be a fantastic program that could be put together, , my take a couple of years, but just announcing that program and starting to work on that program, that's a powerful warning to russia that is nothing to do with the military. and so if you want to take the initiative had to think strategically. the thing about democracies is we respond to our domestic problems that so presidents get elected. they don't get elected by promising some grand strategic design against russia. and so presidents and prime ministers and others are looking at the domestic situation. so we have to find a way better for nato as an alliance of
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democracies to harness the full toolkit to offset the military threat that comes from russia. they don't have the toolkit except as general breedlove mentioned, energy. that's their principal toolkit. we have multiple things that we can use. >> let me add one other slant. take a little longer for something you said. the word you used make it sound like because we are a liberal democracy we can't fight the information fight. i don't agree with that at all. we don't have to live. we simply have to tell the truth, tell it vigorously and went to tell it at threat speed, which is our biggest problem. we are not organized in our country to answer threat speed. i've had time to go to my spiel, but how long did it take the united states to answer the inmate 17 should then? it's a trick question. we never did. we threw it over the transom and allowed the dutch and the malaysians to answer it and that was two years later and rush was
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already on 29 more new lives in those two years. so i think that the tool that we're really missing is the opportunity to enter into information warfare spaces at threat speed. you've seen how that has gone but we need organize a way of the national security council meetings to address the information warfare at threat speed. i said it three times. >> point taken, thank you very much. do you see the british example of the lease of intelligence that they had on russia aims to overthrow leadership in kiev as an example of that. i think it's also politically though to europe against the u.s. and uk may be warmongering are too alarmist or speier you already commented on how ukraine leadership is in a tough spot right now meaning to message
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certainty and calm so as not to lead to even further crisis. but what else can they be nato as an organization be doing? is the more the institution can be doing to identify disinformation, et cetera? >> well, i will let my call lytic answer. i don't be dominating the conversation. >> no. what you said is exactly right. you don't have -- my colleague -- you don't have the right framework within nato or within our democracies to answer the information challenge at threat speed. remember, this is a challenge that really began in the 1920s when lenin put together the common term, the communist international that was designed to sew confusion and create subversion across all western
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nations. it was very powerful in germany. it's still very powerful through exchange programs. we have people who served in the u.s. armed forces, i'm not going to name them, who seem to have fallen prey to this kind of russian outreach. we can do a lot more in this area. but leah, i was just looking, we have got lots of these questions. how do we answer when people asking these questions? i'm sure we we're watching ts dialogue it's hard to follow the questions and -- >> don't worry about that. we have people behind the scenes filtering them to me on a fancy google doc over. we had a couple already. maybe just a few minutes left. i will also throw you one that i think, again come something that both of you could speak on for hours and hours but maybe if we can try to keep it as brief as
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possible. with china's huge military, can the kind of still afford to sustain and wield its influence on both fronts, europe versus russia and the indo-pacific versus china? >> the united states will do what it has to do with information is provided to the american public. one of the things the pulse both parties together is national security. and yes, there's always been a difference if democrats have always say why can't we negotiate? republicans have always said let's build up our power before we do so. but there's a common foundation year, and it is the security of the united states. so we have to have our own information policy. we have to talk about this. and i think this crisis on ukraine is an excellent opportunity for the american people to become more engaged in national security. when i grew up in the 1950s, the awareness of a soviet threat was everywhere. we had premiere khrushchev came
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to the united states and said we communist will bury you. went to united nations, took issue off and pounded on the podium in 1961. there was the berlin crisis, cuban crisis. young people today don't see it so it doesn't mobilize public opinion the same way, but this ukraine crisis, one of putin's big mistakes is the western democracies will mobilize their their publics against it. >> if i could just take a little different slant. again, agreeing with the general clark. this i think . the importance of alliances. we lived through it. where people in america were sort of looking down at alliances. i think nato is more important today and into the next 70 years than it was in the past 70 years. and the same goes in the pacific. no, we don't have structures like nato over there but friends
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and allies are going to be key to what america can do into the future. and some of our friends and allies in the pacific region are very strong, very capable not only militarily but financially and in economies. so this is the important thing. we cannot turn in so much that we lose contact with those who are going to help us in the future. alliances, allies, friends and partners around the world are going to become key to america being able to sustain that kind of peace that we believe it's important for our world. >> thank you so much, both. that was a great note i think it and don't especially at the atlantic council where everything we do is looking at u.s. global leadership in partnership with allies and critical to everything we do here. so i thank you both so much for joining us on our virtual stage here. this is much more conversation to follow and to be continued
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but i know i will be definitely looking for your analysis on these issues as we move forward with so much uncertainty surrounding the crisis. on behalf of the atlantic council and the skull cross center for strategy and security as well as the eurasia center, thank you, everyone for doing an online, and have a great day. ♪ ♪ ♪ >> former u.s. national security advisers from the last three administrations gather to reflect on their experiences and discuss insights and lessons on the nation's security process and the challenges facing the united states today. watch live at one p.m. eastern on c-span2, online c-span.org or watch full coverage on c-span now, our new video map. >> american history tv saturdays on c-span2, explain the people
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and events that tells the american story. at two p.m. eastern on the presidency, we will look back on the scandal the lead up to president richard nixon's resignation with jeff shepherd was at the time the youngest lawyer on president nixon's white house staff. he's also the author of the nixon conspiracy, watergate and the plot to remove the president. then at 8 p.m. eastern on lectures in history, a class on politics and culture in the united states from 1800 through the 1830s. she describes how the country changed during the time between the presidencies of thomas jefferson and andrew jackson. exploring the american story. watch american history tv saturdays on c-span2 and find aa full schedule on your program guide or watch online any time at c-span.org/history.
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>> look for c-span essentials that will keep you warm. go to c-spanshop.org, c-span's online store. save up to 20% on a latest collection of sweatshirts, hoodies, blankets and mugs. there's something for every c-span fan, and every purchase helps support our nonprofit operation. shop today through monday during the c-span shop keep warm sale at c-spanshop.org. >> now a senate hearing on the impact of corporate monopolies on competition and innovation. we will hear from consumer advocates, lawyers and entrepreneurs who say monopolies have hurt their businesses. minnesota senator amy klobuchar chairs the hearing. >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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>> okay. thank you, everyone. i called to order the hearing of the subcommittee on competition, antitrust and consumer rights entitled the impact of consolidation and monopoly power on american innovation. good afternoon. i want to welcome our witnesses and i think senator lee and the staff as well as my staff for planning this hearing. innovation is part of the american spirit. it is the core of the american spirit. innovation generates new opportunities and new hopes of businesses, workers and families. breakthroughs in science and technology have given us the vaccines that are getting us to the pandemic and driving the development of clean energy solutions to take on the climate crisis that we see every day, as
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my state is getting record heatwave and thunderstorms in the middle of december, today. emerging technologies like artificial intelligence are driving innovation across our economy. of course some of our economies largest companies began as startups with new innovations, and we continue to see innovations. but we also have to remember that innovation is all about competition and bringing in new players to innovate, that if we just simply have monopolies, over time we do not get the innovations that we need. i think history shows us with a straight at the breakup of at&t and the innovations that we saw after that in terms of everything from the cell phone industry on. looking back at our history, it's always been innovation that has fueled the american economies from the railroad and the telegraph to smart phones
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and the internet. america would not be where it is today without innovations and start competitive policy and boss on the book. but the innovation that a file to our american economy cannot thrive without open competitive markets because it's competition that precious manufactures to invest in research and development, to constantly innovate, to improve their products and introduce new products to compete. it's competition that provides opportunity for entrepreneurs to develop new ideas and start new businesses, and for young people to dream about new possibilities. but in recent years we've seen a growth of monopoly power across the american economy from cat food to caskets. dominant players are using their power to maintain monopoly positions and sort of partition. between the early 1980s and the last few years the rate of new business forms in the u.s. fell now data suggest as move out of this pandemic americans
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are starting new businesses at historic rates. that's great. remember we fell by 40% before. but businesses can start by can they really go to the point of being competitive? and that is something we want to talk about today. why spend on research any public and why start a new business if the markets are controlled by handful of dominant companies that control access to customers and have power to suppress new businesses? monopoly power threatens to choke off innovation. over the last several decades companies like google and amazon, apple, facebook and microsoft have created many great innovations we went from the wall street gordon gecko delis with cell phones affects a note as a brick that was two pounds and 13 inches long to cell phone to the size of the watch. while these tech copies were once grappling startups innovating to survive the now the largest companies the world has ever known.

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