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tv   Elbridge Colby The Strategy of Denial  CSPAN  December 31, 2021 5:35pm-6:31pm EST

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with translations in the title of the book all the troubles of our day and hence the title. it really summarizes it. >> i can't think of a better way to't and actually and what a terrific talk it was. i posted a link to the book in a chat and if you want to buy it you can go wherever fine books are sold. thank you very much for joining us. >> thank you. i enjoyed the conversation so much.
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and thank you for joining us today. i like to welcome you toou our event the best defense strategy for america mayo and subsixteen. how should u.s. forces be ready to fight wars quick these fundamental questions should form the center of any u.s.. as policy but it's often skipped over in favor of questions like how many ships should we have the navy's fleet and a more fundamental question answers to specific questions and the elusive question. the biden administration is presumably hard at work writing the national security strategy for the nexte national defense strategy. done correctly theseou strategis
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will provide security apparatus in the most prescient facing the nation. n specifically efforts to shape a clip train imposture the u.s. military. in 2018 strategy was important as it indicators sharp turn that would take us from terrorism to great power competition. the book came out three years ago and three years ago the u.s. military are still making that transition. there was no shortage of voices and opinions about america's next national defense strategy. there's no better -- then mayo. mayo is a longtime think tank scholar and a former secretary of defense and for the purposes of today's discussion served as the pentagon's official during
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the 22 national defense tragedies the author of the new book releases tuesday called subsixteen american defense in the age of great power conflict. there's a special discount in the chat paper -- chat feature of this webinar. we'll turn ite over to you and the audience for your questions and i will have a feature of the chat box. go there and submit your question and we will give those questions to subeighteen. thanks for joining us today. >> thanks thomas. it's an honor to be a blue talk about this. >> this book could not have been easy to write. there hundreds upon hundreds
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what you call it did that ever approach. you made the case explored the options and came to her conclusion below is your motivation in writing the book and who is your audience for it? >> the motivation is this mismatch that you mentioned earlier in your marks between the strategy we have been pursuing which is very high political aspirations. and the reality of the geopolitical and military ballots. i think as i try to live in the preface we are in a seriousor mismatch. we have begun this transmission.
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in this period of transition transition i think the strategy is critical because the strategy is especially important when you can't smother problems with resources and that's where we were in the last few years. we couldn't nation build in afghanistan and iraq. the serious bombs we might worry about weed take care of with their overabundance of power and resources and that's just not true. there are more threats inti the world than there are resources we have to deal with them. and this was driven home to me at the pentagon. you havehr a distinguished military career and many of your assignments was the head of the army strategy and resources division. w the old phrase a strategy worth the in there sees it's easy to come up with pamphlets that express a lot of aspirations that would strategy really is as connecting dollars and cents and efforts with a coherent framework and that's what i wanted to lay out here.
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the audience is the defense establishment. uniformed military officers and people who think about that. also they broader public. it's really important to me and it's reallyt important that our military strategy or defense strategy has to be explicit goal -- the great power rivals were fighting have to go nuclear war could be exceptionally costly so people need to buy into it and i was acutely conscious in the book of trying to explain that. i don't know whether i was successful. still is still very wide out into that respect. almost all americans should be interested. to make you and all the various options and narrowed it down to get to your conclusion. a lot of the these spokespeople just give your conclusions upfront so i love that part of it. i'm goings to jump to the part where i have some disagreements with you.
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i love to just run into conflict in your book you said in order to focus its scarce resources the united states should not size shape or foster its military to deal with any other scenario alongside a war with china or with taiwan and that raises two questions for me. one all federal resources especially when you speak about this at heritage are constraints others not a limitless supply of money. in the pastaio suspends six suspends 6% of its gdp on defense and now we are spending 3.4% so the decision to spend more or less is ultimately a political one. do we have to assume we are always going to have to haveth scarce resources where we can only choose one scenario? >> i think the spirit with which i wrote the book and hopefully you have taken it on the health others at taken as i try to lay outt a framework called supplyig
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logic that people can see and i don't claim to be omniscient or the expert on the decisions coming out of that. even such sensitive issues t of whether it tie one is worth defending. i think people have reasonable views and similarly based on the factors that i've laid out a framework you could recently make arguments in it different direction. thema surge differences among strategist is a good way of putting it because you are dealing with uncertainty. in the book what i said the argument is there her three primary functions and to focus onon. those are deny china regional hegemonyna hegemony. it's to sustain a nuclear deterrent that can deter
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multiple adversaries and that includes not only t russia. china and a lower cost way of doing counterterrorism. those are the basics in my view is that the american people think we should spend more defense than i think the next scenarioo would be russia helpig europe defend itself against russia. i'm not her suite at this point. first there's a threat from russia. russia will not be able to dominate all of your. might able to -- but it would not need the same league as china taking over hegemonic asia. the europeans moree than capable of the with some american assistance. they outweigh russia and gdp and military power and i think they
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should and hopefully we continue pushing them on that front. finally i think we need to moderate our spending. the paradox of military spending is you want to keep it low so private citizens can decide where to put their money and it could have a negative impact on economy. if you spend too little you may end up spending too much later. i think again my own view and certainly given the level of resources that are currently talked about being allocated by this administration we have to be laser focused on that one scenario and not get caught up in again about other scenarios. >> there is a common argument that you will find a defense strategies and i don't know how to describe it it's a shortcut.
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we intend to do less in this particular region and we are going to count on her allies so would not surprise me to hear that type of thinking in the european area. what we are finding is most of the european nations are not spending 2% of gdp on this despite what would be historic prodding during the trump administration. every tool in the toolbox public humiliationn you name it was attempted and he read about the germans and they can't agree to even arm their drones. it's just too politically difficult right now says it feasible in that context can you talk about late military powers it feasible to assume that europe can or do -- or will do more? >> thehe europeans many of them are spending more than some
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other are spending well over 2%. the scandinavian countries like finland and sweden are spending more in the brits despite being in a pandemic have increased spending so if we -- the heart of this problem is germany which is frankly the link went on its responsibilities which is not only damaging. morally wrong and it said this to them directly. that's one point and there has been progress with nato. the second thing is ultimately if this continues with the germans this will become a game of which is to say if we are faced with a choice for the american people at the decision of a regrowing to are -- preventing china from dominating fthe world market is the europeans are being themselves to link went about defense
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spending and if they are going to force a choice upon us we have to make the right choice anything back to world war ii we will make the best decision for our life interests and so forth. i think the europeans will bear the cost which is too bad that they will be the ones to do that. this is why think it's really critical that we not overreach to our allies. i think we can deconstruct event polite. also tough. that's a difficult balance and it's one of the great things we need to think about going forward. if we over reassure allies and tell them we will always be there we are not doing them or ourselves any service. japan for instance it's almost been s a sacred item of the japanese political system. if they want to spend more than 1% on defense they are talking
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about even doubling it. the question is can we do it quickly enough? >> me dive into this book and in the book you advise the u.s. should focus on china's best military strategy versus maybe the most start with are the most likely and there a lot of writings were your people say china doesn't want war town. you don't agree with that in this book. why should the u.s. focus on china's best military strategy and what do you think the best military strategy is for the? >> i was a fundamentally to put the case positively the reason is because the best military strategy is one that's most gainful for them. the most destructive ministry strategy, they could launch a nuclear attack that would be insane because we would do the same to them so doesn't make sense. that's a real issue because if we spend all the money on
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national defense we will lose in the primary data. similarly the likelihood of thing, there's an arrogance and that, a hubris because it presumes the chinese would never think they could beat the americans. if they think they can beat us why would they either precipitate in conflict or just threaten one and it would know how to resolve? people who say the chinese would start a war, to meet a wouldn't risk a major war remind the people who sit for 2008 there could never be another depression. that is the very statement and thinking along those lines that makes it more likely. that will lead us to be unprepared for high-end military conflict. the critical point is a highly military conflict, direct application military force, it sounds old-fashioned but there's a better way to coors somebody than to hold a gun to their head. all this gray zone stuff is like by definition is not that dangerous point take taiwan.
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the people in taiwan to want to be part of the prc. they don't want to be run by xi jinping and his police, security police apparatus, descendents, metaphorically. so china is likely to be able to calm them into giving up. if china is serious about it then they would think about the direct use of military force. >> and that is china's best military strategy? >> i think china's best, it's best overall strategy if it wants to become dominant in patients what i call the focus and sequential strategy which is taking off parts of this coalition that's going to try to balance can fake that only u.s. but japan, india, south korea hopefully, taiwan, , china will pick off those parts of that coalition so the rest of the coalition gets the idea this coalition is just a hollow shell and many minimal collapse n will be dominant. the truth in what you were saying earlier, alluding to is
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china does want to start a huge war allah world war ii. and once to do what bismarck did. bismarck took pressure from one state among many in europe in the space of about ten years to a war with denmark austria and france radical change that you political map of europe. in some ways we still live with it. that's what china is best strategy would be. best military strategy if you're thinking i would take down these vulnerable part of the coalition is fed a complete. which is again the don't want to start a huge war. they want a small focused war and then we and the rest of our partners and l is this a good side where going to limit it. i grant the version of what the russians did incarnate. it's possible we and others might decide to live with that. so there's more than just facebook post it sounds like. >> that's right. >> in your book you talk a lot
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about allies and really like the discussion because there's a lot more granular than we normally get about the norm the argument allies are someone pulls out a winston churchill come very handy i forget which it about allies many people say more allies you have the better, in the discussion could you ever advise a more nuanced approach talking about especially in the western pacific about how some alliances could carry on with them entanglements, potential costs. could you give us more of your thinking on how you think about alliances especially in that neck of the woods? >> i share your view. i look at alliances aware of the cut everything in this perspective. i think people like you and i, i look at my job as trying to work for the american people. i don't collect the federal paycheck but they should make sense. the strategy should make sense for the american people, in an enlightened way that can be positive but basically that's
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why there's a tendency especially in the beltway to talk about alliances as if they are like marriages were some kind of religious back to whatever. to me there more like business. more like the long term business partnership. it should make s there's a tendency that no way to talk about alliances asay it they are aired to his or her religious pact. it's more like a long-term. it makes sense for both sides. it should at least be in our interest. people talk about how her allies are so great in her allies of gotten a great deal for a long time and we were willing to go along with that. the only way we'd be able to balance china address the other problem the world as if we all lean and in the way we are best suited for doing. the issue ofof allies is criticl in the pacific in particular because as you said the paradox
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is we need anch anti-hegemonic coalition to stand up to china. if we bring in too many countries we risk an entanglement of war that's not going to go well. many people watching had family involved in vietnam and it was a tragedy for us and it's fair to say it was not worth the cost. with all due respect to those who serve their if we had been able to show that perimeter in a different way we could have still won the world were so innocent yet some covers over my thinking this book because we need to be tough and we needwo o be assertive. not go too far and that's a moral commitment to the american interest. after vietnam wett almost pulled out of europe entirely. the whole thing could have fallen apart. i think that's really critical to what i say is their defense program which is the states were really committed to basically if you trace along with all due
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respect to the distinguished retired general officers strong suit is aerospace maritime warfare and that's her wheelhouse in countries like japan and taiwan philippines australia maybe in the future china has to use maritime forces and air forces to get there and project sustained military power. the japanese have quite a good navy and air force as well so that's how i think. that's going to be dependent on how much other countries are willingea to do. japan's not willing to step up we may need others to carry us along. we may have to work with vietnam. then what happens if chinaha threatens us? the idea to put a finer point on this if we can develop a military strategy that allows us to bring those countries for it we don't have to do crazier
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things later that will be more cost to us. >> one of the central themes in your book and you talk about it to the point where you must have gotten tired of writing about the anti-hegemonic coalition and he suggested it is perhaps the key to defeating the chinese. can you talklk about the dynamis and how we manage such an anti-hegemonic coalition? >> is basically idea that china is too strong for us to bounce a loner any individually in china. if you use metrics economic size meant nothing. china will be them around. it are interests are in our ability to project power. the question is what does that look like? i don't have a fix to view of what it will look like and to be clear don't think weeg need it nato.
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nation nato may be counterproductive because it may involve too much commitment so this is o something looser that i'm talking about. a country like india a relationship is probably pretty good that were booked to do more. india pulls a lot of its own weight and isn't interested the being a tributary of the united states. my view is we should outsource asia and empower them. there'll be other places where we have to have a more formal relationship. speaking of churchill one of my favorite looks he said we can win the decisive battle in the primary we can set everything up again after. we can hold china at the first island chain or thereabouts and we can deal with africa south america south asia and will be in an advantageous position. if you lose that it will be
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weaker everywhere else. >> i would remind your audience to submit your questions. we areit taking questions and we will get to those in just ain moment. i'm going to plug the book again "the strategy of denial" and you can get a copy on the hand. on the webinar. how would they think aboutut taking that a par with a can opener? >> i think short-circuiting and to focus on the sequential strategy. don't want to have a coalition of fighters. the chairman and the japanese in world war ii would eventually get everyone to fight and that's not what you want to do want to have a series of short wars that can then everyone that a coalition is not going to work in particular because china goes after taiwan in the maybe the
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philippines. its import in a particular way. i think we can deal with the ramifications and catastrophic he -- catastrophically handle afghanistan and say taiwan. here in japan i think it's within eyesight and i think you can see it. this is a much different thing and if the americans basically say well he can't do well enough in taiwan because the chinese are just too strong how does that apply to japan? that's what china wants. instead of fighting everyone you take on a few of these guys the message goes around sometime you are going to be put under the hot microscope and they will talk a big game. they will let you go see better cut a deal. that's a very realat possibilit.
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they bend before the wind blows and the question applies to everybody which is see which way the wind is going and if they are going to be left out to dry they will cut a deal. >> as in the states put strategies together to turn that kind of attack will deterrence be and which i'm not a scholar be through punishment to get them p to deter and deterrence y denial and denying the objective of the enemy and your book especially the title "the strategy of denial" seems to comeo down toward the favor of a strategy of denial. stack denial is good if you can get away with it or make it work by denial basically takes a
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weapon out of the other side's hands were essentially gives it power and a third turned -- but it turned as you have a bone marrow. i have a perfect shield and you'll never think it's worth doing.s and of course these aren't mutually exclusive than in the book i do put punishment at the highest level. denial is much better and it's particularly important when you don't have an advantage in resolve. the problem we face is south korea's is 100 miles. vietnam is a neighbor. in a vacuum the chinese will probably care more than we do. we can manipulate data and we should so we do end up caring more. the word manipulate isn't right. we should plan away to bring it
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more to our favor. most americans have never been to taiwan and probably don't know anyone from, taiwan. denial is about taking the sword out of the other guys handed the punishment strategy usually they don't s work as well because thy may resist giving up something they reallyis care about. also because if you inflict punishment on somebody you'll have punishment inflicted back on you. they can launch conventional missile strikes on the homeland and as we have learned they are dramatically expanding their nuclearne forces. so if we start punishing them what are they going to do?
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they are going to punish us back. the best strategy is to use denial to block innovation if we can. china's best strategy is to invade taiwan and rinse and repeat for the philippines until the coalition falls apart so we ndcan block them for key the -- hold the key territory than then china has the decision. they can say well i'll give up to fight another day or it can try to escalate this. they could blow up some tankers in the middle east. they might build a stop them or they could launch nuclear strikes in america. we can impose costs back on them. in that context they will be the ones who are bearing -- they will seem like the aggressor and the bad guy and we talk about the righteous might or theou
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flashing sword of anger or a vengeance i should say and that's not going to go well for them either. that mixture shy. emphasizing denial is the best strategy. bonta militate -- fundamentally err relations there are important. we can't have a strategy that relies on risk. >> we are going to go to audience questions. i'm get hit you with one more plus talk about a binding strategy with this anti-hegemonic strategy. >> hopefully it's a more novel aspect in the book. the strategy is a the idea okay what do we do if we can't make focused and i'll work so they ideal here is if we could ship down the air among the and do it
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in a way that's relatively limited so the chinese bear the burden to that's why and so laser focused on that. what if we can't do that? are we knit quite ring tie one of the japanese or because they chinese will be too strong and that's a reality even if we make a good effort. in that case what happens if they are so strong we either have to wage a much larger war in order to defend taiwan or the philippines or we may have to recapture them à la a war in the pacific which would be the worst outcome. in that case the big questions going to be are we going to have the war power to do that and that's not obvious because the point i was just saying. in that sense what i alluded to earlier we have to figure out a way that our resolve would be
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catalyzed where it's worth their effort arista do it and also they are our allies. what b we should be doing our strategy should deliberately be postured in a way that if china wants to apply the best military strategy using fait accompli it will have to basically pick off everybody else and make us all angry so we'd be ready to do the things we need to do. the concrete concrete example use of this in december of 1941 i don't know. the polling data. then vast number of americans were completely engaged -- not engage in a war. they weren't interested in a war with japan and what happened. two months later after pearl harbor hong kong corregidor singapore the american people
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were angry and we were engaged. we want to put the chinese in a position where it order to try they would have to start a large war and this is where our posture is less brittle. i think even though they just want to start a fight with taiwan i think the bee deterred. in the later part of the cold war it think this is what it was about. well into the later part of the cold war we felt like we were having a conventional war in europe given the size of the soviet lock forces. i think our forces are strong and resilient and capable
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incredible enough that they knew they would start a war and they'd be willing to go the distance. in the end it was enough and i think that's what we should start with. stick your minds me of the nato battalions we have in the baltics right now in poland. if you look at their size they are almost meaningless with a mothousand people apiece. >> it's got to be in the problem i have with that is there's a tripwire. in a sense the russians continue to ignore them. there has to be enough resilience. they will have the fight in deep strike and blow up a lot of things.bl they can't just ignore them because the problem with the trip wire is the thing that is at issue is the result.
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otherwise force -- historically the army did suggest that they withdraw their troops from poland. like in the dry land or stood intelligently understood that it has to be the federal army. >> let's go to questions. >> thank you tom and elbridge. on iowa will need to group some things and i like to call out names. i just can't do that. b on taiwan what are the odds of trying to do this and what timeframe that was one of the first questions and rolling into taiwan a questioner asked it
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seems to be near holy obsession or a religious thing part of beijing to take taiwan so with that commitment in keep in mind timeframes can the west outlast that and another questioner said is in china just bluffing quick they have colleagues in taiwan that they talked to in the taiwanese say this is just a bunch of cluster so gripping that together the likelihood of the timeframe and is it a bluffing came a bluffing can be outlasted? i think i can answer them on what togetherve which is to say china really wants a unified tie one of lots of do so forcibly. it depends on the cost and risk of doing so so what are the costs and risks lacks mao tse knew he didn't have hope of doing it and he avoided it and the same with gin shouting.
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the calculus with the same. the calculus is critical and that's a way too effect. the problem is the chinese have been laser took us on this for 25 years may have a lot of money to put on it. what i like to say is china has a long-term problem. it's a near-term and long-term thproblem both. military modernization programs are coming in and they are in right now in this decade. meantime we have been slow to move. tom mentioned the national defense strategy and i think it's a precursor that started the focus. it's going frankly too slowly for my pace. not for my taste. the budget request is a long-term focus.
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long-term is a problem. so is short-term. this determination of factors make me think the chinese leadership mayth be something before 2027. maybe not tomorrow or next year. they will say we are looking good. who knows what the future holds economically. the americans are finally going to interact together. the forces won't be ready until 2030 or after. if you look at why the germans went to war in 2014 -- 1914 it was because of this window of opportunity for sanctions. it's critical we focus on the near-term as well as the long-term and speak to that. the good thing we have going is
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it's an island. the germans couldn't get across 26 miles which is the english channel and second at of the chinese fail after they try to invade they may. the region is going to say these guys are dangerous. they are resistible and that's the worst outcome for a country like china people think you're a bad t in nature but you are also resistant. that means the probability is pretty high. we shouldn't take solace from that. >> i will try to group together tofour. in the south china sea wasn't the case that china had a fait
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accompli during the obama administration and related to that is this loftier sort of thing. in your international arbitration the philippines have a case against china including intrusions and they did what they wanted to do anyway. they can do these things to achieve their attractive in this gray zone business without really going all military. related to that then are you focusing too narrowly on china in this military approach and it if it's not a power projection thing like that in the past and their implications to the u.s. military so we shift from active duty large standing work regard to serve sortve of thing? is it really about war or are you to focus militarily speaking on china and are there vocations
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to that and robert gates family said we have never gotten are forecasting our predictions right. the questioner is looking at is are we going down a path of making too many promises and you may have future consequences? >> there's a lot there. let me go in reverse order. i think he's wrong about that. forecast our contextual. we were in incredibly prepared for it and it never came to be. accuracy is not the right term. we were insuring against the -- the soviets spent a lot of money on the military.
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i thinkd the question is am i over the gray zone quakes that raise on -- the gray zone works well. these are things that come above the water and they put huge dredgers and then. an island. they didn't seize anybody's territory in the intuitive sense. they are operating almost beyond the edge of the country. it's difficult to project for. country like the philippines. it matters in these ungoverned marginal spaces.s. they are going to gray zone their way into coursing the philippine government in two
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seceding to their will. the reason i focus on much on the military is not because they think the military and war and peace are the most valuable part. quite the contrary. what we want is peace. it's a little bit like the police. if you have a neighborhood that doesn't have law and order forget about commercial development and people are whining to want to be there. first you take care the police and then it's on autopilot. you are only thinking about crime in the late 1980s. crime is down. similarly if you don't get the military balance in deterrence right china could have an offensive and this is paradoxically because the gray zone doesn't work and economic sanctions don't work and look at
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the astro into right now. the chinese herb blasting their economic sanctions are you kudos to our mates down under. paradoxically increases the lure against the military instrument for china. it gets back to that if we can't get to the chinese don't see an advantage in using military force like they did in europe than we can ship the competition. one thing i worry about with this evisceration is they have a tendency or to imply that this is going to t be political economic situation. the gateway to that is making sure the military balance is adequate. as my colleague puts it we have to get into the marathon. the last point i try to make a virtue of my about the specifics
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of reserve active guard which are very important by concentrating it in a way where i don't pretend to have any of i enthe answers by any stretch. i think you're better off over focusing because we aren't noticing a and the mac we are by far the most powerful country in the world trade if venezuela gets frisky a there's not much they can do and the mac we can use an act to force for the guard and reserve to handle these. they are going to develop a -- so we have the make realistic assessment on where the dangers thess most acute in its china ad asia. >> i appreciate in your look
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that the second to last chapter was not that during china. we need drones and realistically superior summary. sort of the last grouping and the coalitions whether its hegemonic or a binding strategy and if you are picking key allies are you in the group are out of the group and it really comes back to this are you assuring allies are over sharing themki with promises and you'd have a squad and not this new trilateral agreement between the uk the u.s. and australia with their submarines so if you could kind go back to this approach to picking and choosing allies and if somebody is not in the club does that present a problem or if you're in a club you must be
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really important so are you overcommitting and we could probably spend the rest of her time on that. >> it's a great question one of the harder aspects to think about. the differentiation between the anti-hegemonic coalition which was taken a little bit shifting. i think vietnam is part of the hegemonic coalition and i don't know they agree. its like are they behaving in a way where china effectively has to reckon them ased standing up are the men one way or another working with them. the alliances which is we put our credibility on the line to defend them. it's called a qualified allies basically. again the point is always to think back are we achieving the goal which is balancing china and are we strong enough
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together that if they did want to go to a big war we'd be able to went together. because war and violence are the ultimate form of coercion. if you really want to persuade someone as mao himself said it comes from the barrel of a gun. if they escalated its not going to work well for them they will be checked. they won't necessarily be contained and they won't do we want. they will have to respect a degree of our interests. this is going to be the statecraft which is where the creativity and intelligence are going to need to be going forward and began i don't promise to have the answers of what that looks like. i think the question about over reassuring is very on point. we have gotten into where a mode where we over sure allies and we talk about our allies in thisro romantic sense. what were you really need link about is they have a purpose for
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us which is to deny china hegemony or in a state like russia hegemony over the key regions. it's also in their interest. it's more like a business partnership. that's a sounder basis for an agreement. people talk about shared values and i love our country immensely. japan shares values in some ways and not in others. to different political culture in a lot of ways. nobody is stronger than china. that's the rationale.ge we know we need to spend more. we we are in it together whether we like itee or not. that's what we should think about it and we should submit assurance of pressure. their allies should note they don't step up there is a possibility we won't be able to do it.
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they are at real risk of being abandoned. there are a lot of people i respect of saying it's not worth it and not the argument. taiwan wants its waterway in its own hands to what they did get it is really important. the other thing is we can defend countrieshe in different ways. during the cold war we were going to defend west germany. not because we like west germany. because west germany was the strongest economy in europe and our plan depended on what the west chairman what the west germans did predict if that westermann sat around did nothingg we would drop nuclear weapons on them and we told them that and they didn't want that. they won defense of the border and not dropping nuclear weapons. they developed a -- in fact the germans to her earlier
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conversation at 12 active divisions. they can do better and they should do better. our relations are probably too good with germany. because we care about europe this is the way that it doesn't vacillate between overly confident and personalizing things on the one hand. then reassuring and saying everything hunky-dory. since the bidenan administration tripped up by its owndo approach onon this is a triumph than they deserve applause for it. the friendship had better diplomacy obviously. obviously it's a part in this kind of thing will happen. we are only going to get altogether and ways that are going to be suited for different partner relationships if we are
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candid. that's what i try to do this book is to provide a framework how are relationships with france germany and vietnam should evolve come i don't know. i have some thoughts. they are very fallible.e. i hope it will allow people to have a more focused discussion about how we do that. >> we are out of time. we have only scratched the surfacey of discussing eldridge colby's book. i want to bank the audience for joining us here today. if you work on the hill or not think tank or have questions you can contact us these information on your screen there. please submit a survey at the end of this. eldridge colby thank you so much into her audience members thank you so much for joining us and we look forward to seeing you again at another heritage
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