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tv   Professors Discuss North Korea Society Ideology  CSPAN  November 29, 2021 8:01pm-10:01pm EST

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booster vaccine because there is low risk for hospitalization so for the 12 to 17 group it may not actually be something that you need with the regiment that they're getting and there is such a low risk that may not be anything more than a marginal benefit at least in the near term. >> host: center for health security johns hopkins bloomberg school of public health, thank you for being with us . >> thanks for having me. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government funded by these companies including charter communications . >> broadband is a force for empowerment. that's why charter has invested billions in building infrastructure, upgrading technology, empowering opportunity in business is big and small. charter is connecting us. >> charter communications supports c-span as a public service along with these television providers giving you a front row seat to
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democracy . >> next a discussion about north korea and its relationship with the us and china hosted by the center for international studies . >> good morning everyone, good morning to our audience in the united states. goodevening to our audience in korea . welcome to our program today . at the csi s chair, we hope everyone in the us had a good long weekend, giving thanks as we head into the holiday season. i am senior vice president and korea chair at csi s and professor at georgetown university and also director of the washington research consortium on korea at csi which you will learn a lot about in the next couple of hours.r today we will discuss issues related to north korea in the
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context of our washington research consortium on korea . for those of you are not familiar with this this consortium is a five year process conducted by csi s. with the support of a grant from the academy of korean studies . the consortium's research involved nine scholars in the us and korea i will introduce in a moment . consortium's research is focused on deciphering the so-called black box that is north sekorea. our scholars use multidisciplinary research methods to gain new andunique insights about thecountry , regime and its people . the fields of study include social history, diplomatic history, strategy and national security . data collection and analysis, postmodern concepts of statehood and methods of state control.evolving concepts of citizenship and identity, domestic politics, and the impact of markets transnational networks and new sources of information on society .th
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these areas of study constitute new approaches to adjusting the issue of north korea. the work that has been and will continue to be produced in this consortium which is an astounding five books and 15 journal articles constituting a corpus of scholarly literature that looks at north korea not as a static whole is a highly complicated and interrelated set of challenges that pose problems for regional stakeholders and the globalized world . this multilayered research project started in 2016 and concludes at the end of this year . the consortium was made possible by csi ask the support of the korean studies promotional service of the academy of korean studies. the scholars want to thank ats for its support allows us to work on this project. as i mentioned a minute ago nine scholars compose were composed of the last project. i personally have been very happy to work with such a wonderful group of dollars
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and friends. we've definitely had our challenges. most notably the pandemic limited our ability toconvene as a group to review each other's work . we were unable to gather as a group and a panel that we had featured at the isp in hawaii but we may do with several sessions by zoom instead. so now allow me to introduce some members of the consortium are the stars of today's show. joining us from panel one is bridget hodgins, an associate professor of political science at the university of california santa barbara. bridget is also senior advisor to our csi s next gen scholars programwith usc . john guillory is professor of chinese studies at the beyoncc universitygraduate school of international studies . where he served as chair of the program on international
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cooperation and also chair of the undergraduate program in international studies at yun say's international i'm sorry, underwood international college and founding director of the center on oceana studies. i did not know the last one. and then joining us as the third panelist is some motion, professor of international security and east asia and the former dean of the office of international affairs . in addition to his role as professor he is advised. government organizations including the south korean ministry of national defense, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of unification and committee on their ownaffairs and unification in south korean national assembly . i will introduce our guests for panel 2 later but let me also say that members of the
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consortium who are unable to join us today due to various scheduling violinist include michael green who is senior vice president for asia and japan chair at csi ask the director of asian studies at georgetown. sam jackson was a senior lecturer in international relations at the victoria university of wellington. and catherine moon is professor of political science and blossoming chair of asian studies at wellesley. normally we would have brought all of these scholars for a wrap-up conference featuring the research that has been done by the last but we are resigned to doingthis by zoom . so that's just a short introduction as you can see we brought together scholars from korea, from the united states, from as far as new zealand. to work on various aspects related to the black box of
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north korea. so in our first session for ththe first hour we are going to speak with bridget and john and i would like to start by first asking you each to give a brief summary of one piece of work. a number of you have written multiple works for this consortium but if you could give a summary of one piece s of work you are doing related to the project . it could besomething you are continuing to work on . just a short summary so that our audience can get some sense of constantly some of the work that you all have been doing. when we start with bridget? >> thank you victor and thank you for having us all to discuss this work. one of my favorite parts of an academic is convening to talk about work and share ideas so this has been incredibly frustrating not to
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be with everyone and i very much hope to be in seoul tright now so i'm jealous of my co-panelists . so just a quick five minutes. my way of opening the black box that is north korea or appearing into that black box is to look at innovative methods of finding out about north korea for fundamentally important questions. and especially regarding instability and stability in north korea.i have two different piecesof that . the first is how is north korea and weapons flow restoration affected by its state ability or instability? or regime stability or insecurity? the second i'm going to talk about more in depth is how will north korean civilians respond to dramatic
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instability or regime a,insecurity in north korea if that is to occur? specifically what with the scale, i'm interested in what the scale or pace and nature of human flight might be for instabilities in civilians that are facing dire effects as a result of instability within north korea. so who will cross borders il into south korea and under what kinds of instability scenarios? as you might all know and you probably certainly all know answering this question is critical to understanding how conflict dynamics might unfold on the korean peninsula, anticipating them and it's also i think something that is less paid attention to aihis governmental and nongovernmental security
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conditions. if it's necessary to get a lot of aid to border zones, one of the things we're finding with migration right now is in and across europe and near the soviet space, how do you get that kind of critical infrastructure and planning in place so that you can anticipate humanitarian needs? those are the two things that are critical for answering this question. and in north korea we don't expect to have access to one of the most critical drivers of these kinds of human flight and that is its internal politics. so the research results and estimates of today have been very superficial or vague or based on very scant for limited evidence.
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so in my research, my team and i have taken on the wealth of information we do know about north korea. population demographics, geography, topography. its roads and rail systems. wealth, health and well-being. mobility, family size. borders natural or other soft otherwise and with that information we built a dynamic computer model, what's called an agent-based model that can simulate using a number of different measures of stability and instability scenarios. what human flight might result, might be likely to result in those situations and we built that model using special north korean characteristics, but using what we do know from other cases of instability and civil war and the kinds of things that date human flight
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in those situations. where theycreate refugees . where they create internally displaced people. and we also leverage past instances of instability. and notably the arduous period in the mid-1990s in north korea to help us get a better grasp on population dynamics as well. what do we find , what are the topline findings? we find two different important things at the first is the scale and pace of a potential refugee problem on the korean border with china is much smaller than many of the point estimates today that have been made. we expect that china could very successfully and capably deal with any refugee problem that might result on its side of the border. the scale and the pace of north korean refugees should
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not be so dramatic and t fast that it would be incapable. the second thing we find is that internal displacement would be a far larger problem than existing estimates and especially prominent research by american think tanks might have anticipated. that's because we have incorporated the internal dynamic and we know a bit more about how countries and populations like the north korean population that has been endured to very difficult and precarious socioeconomic circumstances for a very long time might react to regime instability. so that's larger than is typically estimated. if it is discussed at all when it comes to these kinds of refugee scenario planning. thanks. >> thanks bridget for that very interesting work and i'm
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sure that we will have some questions about that. what we go now to professor ho who is joining us from south korea. they are joining us from south korea so thank you for joining us . >> good morning in dc were in washington and good evening here at the moment. first of all, it's good to be with you again and i'm very sorry that you couldn't make it to seoul as we were planning just a couple of months ago. but at the moment here the situation is with a new kind of violence over the war. it's maybe not so safe to be here on this event.
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i've been walking working on this project for how to deal with north korea's nuclear weapons and how to negotiate with north korea. as a kind of security specialty. so i have two project that i have finished already published a korean journal. and my second project at the moment currently i'm working on. speaking of my first one, that was tried to compare the us diplomacy dealing with north korea's king junk food during theobama ministration and trumpet ministration . and as you can see, these two present ministrations maybe
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give us some kind of best example of two very different approaches. in dealing with these same problems under the very different presidents. and in doing so i tried to apply kind of very traditional theories of diplomacy but under on alexander george and more recently what was done by the libyan case and try to combine those two analytical frameworks. of these two scholars into comparing how the obama strategy and mister trump's strategy did or didn't work in dealing with north korea. and to sum it up, in the case of obama we all know that his
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approach was based upon strategic patience. whereas mister trump is kind of vindictive approach in dealing with north korea and also we had very different kinds of dynamics in outcomes between these two american presidents and in dealing with kim jong un so what was the difference when it comes to strategic patience we all know that the states were eight years over obama, basically nothing happened . tween the us and north korea and north korea continued with its nuclear output where as in the case of mister trump, interestingly he had two summits if you will including the last meeting with kim jong un and they had certain kinds of agreements or lists of the nuclear rising of the plants find kim
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jong un so why were there different outcomes under those regimes? and in that sense, i say first of all that some of this is different approach and i use for example using the frame of proportionality, of acknowledging. [inaudible]. and both in obama and trump had a similar condition when they said they didn't try to at least send the signal that they are up for regime change which was a kind of something hallmark of the george bush administration . the second criteria of when it comes to credibility that when the united states said
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that there would be a price to pay if you don't accept my demand. and obama's strategy of patients which was a kind of a turning the screw strategy. it didn't create a sense of urgency to the north korean regime where as trumps completely destroying north korea's nuclear weapons ngand all kinds of things created enough urgency for the kim jong un regime which. [inaudible] when it came to its own threat of punishment. the third criteria of policy which wastalk about is not only the pressure . you also have to provide certain kinds of reserve. in other words a carrot and stick approach. president obama essentially
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had enough incentive for kim jong un to come to the negotiation table with a serious incentive and intention whereas mister trump sets such a huge reward for kim jong un that it forced him almost to accept us recognition of kim jong un as a party worthy of the most powerful nation, that the leader of the united states would be meeting with him in person. that provided a huge incentive for kim jong un. that's in combination of all this is created enough urgency and at the same time incentive for kim jong un to come out and meet with mister trump which was not the case with president obama. these are my conclusions but
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at the end of the day all those approaches didn't work out. it didn't eventually accomplish the nuclei station objectives from the us perspective but anyway, those are the kinds of lessons and comparisons that i tried to apply and in analyzing maybe we could have some future application for the biden administration's approach to north korea as they tried to also endure another round of negotiations with kim jong un . let me stop here. >> thank you very much for telling us about some of the projects you've been working on the next one we will go to is john guillory. >> thanks victor and to echo everyone else this has been a
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great project . i've really treasured being part of this group. and we shift now from political science and international relations to history which i guess was part of your purpose in gathering us together as you said as sort of a multidisciplinary approach. i did a few pieces for the project but the one maybe i'd start with victor was it's actually not out yet so this is a juicer here. everyone can race off to the website of the journal of cold war studies and keep updating until the article drops but i was really intrigued. obviously my background isin china . sort of i've come to north korea via china i use this as an opportunity to deeper into that relationship in a way it's kind of putting the black box next to the gray box. and see what happens. and so it's a sort of classic diplomatic history piece
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where the anchor of it is a moment really in 1980 where there's this interesting contradiction that i saw between what was happening in china which is going through the post now transition into the dung era that summer of 1980, then jumping in unleashes this fall campaign against feudalism and so that becomes one of the buzzwords of the year of combating feudalism. this came up recently because as part of that campaign there was a constitutional revision that set the term limits on the chinese presidency which of course teaching thing got rid of in 2018. that was an interesting point to look more deeply into. particularly because of the contradiction forms with later in october 6 korean workers party congress where
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essentially can feel some coordinates his son kim jong-il, sort of the ultimate act of feudalism so it was that ideological contradiction that i wanted to look at and sort of throw the tensions between china and north korea and i think what i was trying to do although it's a straight history approach i think part of my motivation was having observed as we all did the pretty extraordinary open tensions of 2017 between kim jong un adhesion thing. i want to take a historical baseline measure and look at an earlier moment of intense tensions and to just in my own mind get a better onunderstanding of how that to contextualize what we see more recently. and in terms of methodology, what i ended up doing again,
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this is sort of the black box for 2 black box approach. i relied primarily on the state media reports coming up of simultaneously pyongyang and beijing and obviously these are tightlycontrolled in a topic like this . media outlets and that actually gave me the opportunity etto look for discrepancies in terms of the reporting on the chinese versus north korean side so any delays or differences, things mentioned in not mentioned in the people's daily and vice versa started i sort of jumped on those and try to develop an interpretation, basically all of the gaps in the reporting. and lastly i would say as an historian you don't really have to prove anything. there's no end.
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things just happen and you try to figure out what happened so that really wasn't the end of the day what it was about.da that research. but i guess i would say i tried to draw a broader conclusion what i saw which i do think is a pattern in that very particular relationship is that you could see the tensions. if you know especially how to read the state media, idon't think i was inventing it , they were not asked out in the open as 2017 so i think it shows how bad the relationship was in 2017 but the other thing is when i couldn't find and it's possible it's hidden in the archives. i couldn't find evidence of kind of resolving the tension . instead was more like deng xiaoping and the leadership in china and he was really his successors and can also the north korean leadership just sort of absorbed these tensions. and grit their teeth moved on
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to sort of the next set of tensions to what i could see was resolution work kind of learning , growing and to me, that speaks to the way in which that alliance i do think it's alliance relationship is a very tense one. and one without a lot of growth but also in a way as this strange resilience. it can absorb the tension that maybe we would expect would break apart other alliance relationships. so for me was to take away if there's any. >> terrific summary and i know all of you are doing different and the number of works for the project but thanks for summarizing some of them. in all of you in some respects with your projects are dealing with questions of north korean resilience whether it's domestically or whether it's resilience with
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regards to therelationship with china . historically or currently, so i wanted to shift the conversation to looking and questions of north korean stability in 2021 and how you assess that these days. i know that john and some of your conditions to the general cold war history ur project you've also written some for asian surveys, the year and or or the beginning of the year asian survey pieces on north korea and north korea in 2020 north korea in 2021. i don't know if you're doing north korea in 2022. but if you were to write something now or maybe you've already about this. what do you think would be the main story if we talk about north korea in 2021. >> that's a great question and your very briefly on those i did do 2.
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but 2 was enough. i retired but it's a great exercise . those are wonderful. i used those before, those are very useful . that asian survey does for many countries in the region and so i enjoy doing this as kind of practice. what was important in 2019 and in 2020? those were relatively quiet years, i'm glad it didn't have to do 2017 and 2018. it was easier although by 2020 and this gets to your question, it was getting hard to figure out what to say because it was getting so quiet . and our sources of information which are again to the black box the title of our project, our sources are always course highly constrained and limited but even that limited pool was drying up.
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things like diplomatic community, ngo community groups who certainly i think we all took opportunities to chat with folks off the record or read things written up and you do get some sense ofhow things are going on the ground . obviously there's been so much interest from the outside to understand where north korea is with covid which of course i'm waiting for the expert who knows. we have a lot of educated guesswork and that kind of thing. by the end of 2020 and i think this is probably what i'd be writing about and grappling with now is almost a meta- about this issue of the black box and how under these conditions, you actually learn to appreciate the sources you do have in quote unquote normal times before covid when there were more defectors coming out and going back in or you have
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more of an information flow with groups here . you have the diplomatic ngo community and essentially that's all gone. i have a feeling that title of the piece would be something similar whereas the other one in previous years, i feel like i could draw some straight descriptions of obviously in 2020 and the focus i called it a place in search of health and power because of the all-consuming focus on battling covid. there was no pretense that it doesn't exist north korea was one of the maybe the first countries even arguably before china seal its border and treat it with extreme seriousness. so that was the central issue really in 2020 and i think it would be much harder to try and do justice to this year. >> iq.
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next we go now to doctor coggins and ask you very interesting research. this project that you've done trying to map and predict what movements would look like in north korea. in the event of some sort of instability. i would, if you take that question more and stuck it out even more broadly, what would be the indicators based on your research with regards to whether there was actual instability in the regime? you said we wouldn't see the sorts of flows outside of the country into china but where we where there would be a lot of movement would be inside the country and so would that be like the primary indicator or how would you look at this whole question of instability based on the research you've done . >> thanks victor. i think one of the things
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that has come to me maybe too gradually but one of the things that has come to me and we're doing work on north korea is something that you and your team at csi has using satellite imagery and doctor wright and some of the work that she's doing on kind of what kind of signals are there that the north korean regime does not control. what can we look at is data that is not produced by north korea itself. cost there are so many ways in which things are controlled within n the north korean space. and when it comes to international relief and data , we're almost always relying on the state. and in cases where we are not relying on the state to give
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us data where relying on nongovernmental organizations and third-party institutions that in the north korean case i'm not active or in this most recent couple of years have been specifically pushed out of the country or barred from reentering the country. and so i think that one of the things that we want to look at to know whether or not there is a significant amount of regime stability is really is there are we starting to see uncontrolled population movements within the country in a way that we had before. as you know, movements within the country is also very closely restricted. and regulated. so if we did start to see population movement that was unanticipated and in a more or less systematic way than what we might expect where some policy of the regime itself and i would say that would be a good external
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indicator is not controlled by the kim regime itself that we can look to. >> interesting. in terms of internal movement what did your models show in terms of where it was the movement moving, was it moving to the big cities for what sort of movement did you see. what did you guys find? >> one of the nice things s about a computer simulation model is that you can run 100,000 different scenarios. what we have started doing and we will retain the model and we can use it to make it as complex as we like or change it as time goes on one of the things that we thought was very important is if there was conflict that was tendered in pyongyang what would happen to much of the population is concentrated
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there and the wealthy and powerful are also concentrated there. so what we looked at was a small conflict there. and compare arthat to something that was longer-term and larger. and what we saw in a small conflict in the concentrated conflict is people disperse then they return. pretty much as soon as it's done. because it's the violence that drives people away and that's what we see in other conflict scenarios and other places to wear theirs for example a coup or some other kind of intrigued. in longer-term conflicts, what we saw was much much longer-term displacement. and movement at least from pyongyang towards places like young bank and the border
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with south korea, the dmz. >> interesting. very interesting. let's go to you. in your work on coercive diplomacy i wonder the extent to which you look to this question is increasingly looking like we're going to be living with a nuclear north korea for the foreseeable future. despite the stated policy of complete and universal denuclearization. first one, what do you think about that and two, what are the implications of this for diplomacy . >> that's a kind of one of my second parcels of the project that i'm working on. because i ended my first project and despite all of this, these two different approaches of twhat they have is yes, north korea's nuclear
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program is going on. kim jong un is going for a nuclear weapon and this is the new thinking about this. there is a course kind of a wide agreement, consensus among obviously washington and you saw in other parts of the world that no matter what for him to give up his nuclear weapons that is one of the most important guarantees of his regime survival is not going to be immediate so we all know. that's why you just raised the question and how we view it or live with it is some kind of semi-nuclear power of north korea. then we need to again engage in the what is the nuclear intention. at the same time those capabilities. and obviously over the past year and decades, not decades
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there has been lots of research around those careers . or accessibility as a test so many nuclear weapons at the same time missiles and all those things and i found there are kinds of too much of a wide variety of assessments. from very much kinds of north korea has all kinds of nuclear weapon capabilities and they can threaten the united states. taking washington dc and all those major cities with its icbm capability. anwhat you have to always think about the e worst case scenario but that's the kind of too much of confrontation of north korea's nuclear capabilities yet at the same time we should let we should not underestimate their weapon capabilities for intentions so we need to find a kind of a lasting ability.
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what can a connection be between western capability including all those missile capabilities. and try to have them all a realistic assessment first and then we can come up with how to deter or deal with those north korea's weapons capabilities. and there's i know lots of debate going on about this is really a for different purposes for this is also very for a very quantitative purpose and based on those assessments, we need, there is also a different kind of response of suggestion about how to deal with those. what is the best deterrent for north korea's nuclear weapons capability but in recent especially in getting south korea's ongoing private campaign there's an
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interesting debate coming out within south korea saying that. [inaudible] against increasing north korea's nuclear capability and one of the kind of the worst-case scenario among some of those orient politicians for example is that maybe south korea needs to develop our own nuclear capability. i think that's a kind of very big kind of area that we could fall into if we emphasize too much about some kind of capability of we overestimate north korea's nuclear capability or intention so this is the kind n of second of trying to process how to strike a balance between north korea's metrics and their nuclear intention and their real capabilities . that's kind of what i've been working on what i guess going back to your first question,
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i guess biden administration came up with kind of the pragmatic and calibrated approach to north korea. how to deal with north korea and i think eventually they have to find some way between obama and trump's approach. the bottom line is they need to talk to kim jong un. >> thanks. you mentioned the south korean elections and politicians being among the people where we've heard this talk about questions about us extended deterrence given the unlikely possibility north korea will d nuclear i's anytime soon. is there any data under which that view, where that sits on rthe political spectrum and has that changed over time
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because i know there's certain people that you have been associated with but i guess the question is as it's moved? is it still isolate to that particular pocket of the south korean political spectrum or has that changed? >> one thing is that along these two presidential candidates for camps it traditionally is four more years out of carolina and these are the camps that there is a voice for south korea's nuclear armament. but as to the governing party candidate for current progress approval of the political spectrum, they tend to say no, we shouldn't go to that dangerous path. we should just go through nuclear negotiation.
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but at the same time i guess even among those conservatives i think those of us that are standing about south korea's nuclear development capabilities managed to be mindful. but at the same time, with this nuclear negotiation between the us and north korea it's not going anywhere. and it's at a complete impasse and at the same time there's a kind of public awareness about killing north korea's nuclear capabilities. there's a at least one of the recent polls done by the institute which is a think tank in korea that 70 percent of south korean publics say maybe we should do our own nuclear weapon capabilities. course it's structured when there's a better north korean relationship or better dialogue or conversation between the us and europe, those talks about nuclear
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armament breaks down 50 percent or 40 percent but at the same time, if really nothing happens in this nuclear negotiation comes, obviously a pressure for kind of korean public and politicians to do something about this will get it done and who knows, someday you may have a very serious debate about south korea but the same time those people also i've talked to you about redeployment of most us tactical nuclear weapons enough south korea. so it's a very different debate at the moment but that debate is happening in korea right now. >> let me go to john and step back from the question of extended deterrence and discussions of nuclear
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position in south korea to more broadly, the moon governments record. you live in seoul, your one of the leading public commentators. on this. how would you possess the moon governments as now. during december. got a few months left in office. five years of really ivintense efforts with north korea. arguably the most important priority. some might say even more important than domesticissues . at least with some in south korea. our due process the overall record given that the effort that's been put in when accomplishments are made and you know, how would you as professor gave the policy. >> now that everything is online, my whole theory of creating has changed so i may not get a grade. it's very hard when you're still in the middle of.
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i do think about that and think about how our historians and in 10, 20 years look back on the moon years. i mean, living through it now my guess is it's going to be about covid but not moon himself in terms of having an administrative state can handle it and a society that makes good decisions. i sort of think that's probably actually going to be what it's mostly about even though that's not really what we talk about . it's sort of assumed and he's doing a good job of that but on north korea i think if we all lived through 2017, moon played his part and i think he will get credit. for helping i think with kim jong-il and more but moon clearly played in my view a catalyst role in turning things, using pyongyang
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olympics, giving trump the space to do what you wanted to do which was directly engage with what in my view was the right move. v so moon was instrumental in kind of that whole shift. and things were getting pretty scary as we all know like 2017 . i think the story will be charitable there. 2018 obviously false got really high and the process then fell apart after basically a year. not even a full calendar year. and since then moon has tried to claw some way back to it. i think at this point he's hoping the moonshot is one last summit. and actually i would not at all that off. you know, discount the possibility of that. but that of course won't achieve anything in substance so i think the answer is how
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history often works. a lot of the answer to how moon is judged will depend on who wins the election in march where things go from there. that's a whole black box. you can barely, i can't follow what the two main candidates are saying. and so that's very hard to predict. i think it's fine if either of the candidates build on the legacy period of 2018, of the good work they did with the cna, the confidence building. this sort of in the weeds pragmatic stuff, then i think it will rebound to moons credit. that's if things go in a different way than it's gets harder to assess. i think that the path may depend on thefuture . >> spoken like a true historian. not answering the question. now, that's actually quite
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insightful. we've got some questions from the audience that i'd like to see if we can get to. and first of all i'd like to go to one that's for doctor coggins and is from bangladesh. what's so great about zoom. the question for rigid is thank you for your insightful presentationdo you think that in the event of an exodus of north korean refugees into china , that the government will likely to treat the displaced people harshly?>> i think yes. and the reason why i think so is there is demonstrated treatment of so-called north korean defectors harshly. i think that unless they are
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the regime is convinced that treating them in some other way is more successful way of managing both the kind of real problem of, real humanitarian and security problems that would come along the border but also the alliance relationship with its most problematic ally. unless it's convinced there are other ways more successfully dealing with those two issues . i think that the result is likely to be more of the same. and i think that's tragic and horrible for the north korean population is you know, number one already very much struggling in terms of health and society and politics as a result of the regime that many if not a vast majority of them did not choose. and also, given a conflict environment, those needs and
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requirements would be all the more acute for that population. so i think that for all of us in the international community that talk about human rights in north korea and talk about the well-being of north koreans when we're talking about why more sanctions are important for example or holding fast on sanctions is important, we should also at least at the very least simultaneously be making real and concrete humanitarian capacity plans for these populations and trying to very ardently to reach these people who are at the most moment beyond their help. >> just a quick follow-up, you mentioned that you can in this model that you don't you can run different scenarios and you address one of them
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earlier which was some sort of conflict inside of pyongyang.is there a number that you can give us an example of that you have interesting finding. some other type of scenario you ran in the model? >> the biggest change i think the biggest thing and interesting shift that we saw in refugee and displacement movement came with whether or not the dmz was open or closed. so it has been the case that china has been heartening somewhat its border with north korea over the past decade and a half. and that will remain kind of closed but only relatively closed depending upon whether or not it's at the river crossing or that sort of thing. there are more porous and less porous situations.
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but the dmz is a very very hard border and it's very militarized border. and it's not just on land. it's even out in to see as we well know. but there are three crossing points that are at least potential crossing points where people could cross and pass into south korea. where there is the capacity and political will to access people crossing the borders in large numbers. the population of south korea is concentrated in the north and the population of north korea is populated towardsthe south . and so that makes it a very interesting political question also humanitarian capacity planning for seoul. do you attempt to open the borders in order to allow refugees or really koreans to
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pass into the cities in the north? or not? we see that the population quickly figured out over time in this scenario that there border crossings are open and especially long journey from the east coast maybe to the west coast becomes much more possible to move to south korea just to cross the dmz for those people so we do see larger numbers in that direction. >> .interesting stuff. next question if we have time for one more question. this one is directed at not anybody in particular but i think it should go to
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seong-ho. the question is how would you discuss the high degree of attention the trump administration assigned to summit meetings with north korea and the lack of public attention to north korean relations by the biden administration? what conclusions do you draw regarding theappropriate us policy towards the north ? >> i think that was a very important point. in dealing with north korea, kim jong un forced a check whether the situation is good or bad , he's the one in trump's position makes all the decisions s the us needs to recognize that and as mister trump did.at the same time i know the american dilemma as how can we trust his word and all kinds of stuff but we need to have a concrete discussion about all the terms and conditions about meeting certain nuclear negotiations but that's kind of approach alone will not work. somehow us needs to find a
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way to connect with kim jong un starting with sending more positive signals. try to recover some of the trust that kim jong un had between donald trump. and i think in that sense still mister biden is acknowledging the summit agreement between kim jong un and trump about not only the nuclear ice age and also normalizing relations along with the korean peninsula was the right thing to do. and i guess going back to maybe john tillery! of maybe president moon at the moment, they are discussing these last-minute kinds of efforts to connect with north korea. maybe europe needs to talk to south korea about how to
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connect with kim jong un in closecoordination between the us and south korea . >> thanks. i'm going to sneak in just one more question for professor coggins which came from eli university and that is that bridget, you mentioned it's important to look at information or data that snorth korea does not control such as ngo reports or weresearch. however as we currently don't have many eyes and ears on the ground due to the pandemic what would you consider to be the most reliable or current research on north korea? >> this is a tough one. and i think that there are a number of different limitations to how much or maybe the depth and texture of the information or ability to gather given the current conditions.
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but what i do think is ti important is a couple of things. the first is paying attention to things that we can see at a distance. patterns and movement and external policies or the result of external policies. sort of the ripple effect of things that we can see. and there are also creative strategies for data app's that different researchers are using. >> ..
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limited utility telling us the economic situation within the country. i think that i personally think it's important to look for what's not there, what's missing there's data that's regularly produced. for particular reason with a particular event in mind to show that maybe people are healthy and doing very well. we can see the specific relation if we can think about a known bias that might be in those numbers what is attempting to be communicated or downplayed versus up played politically
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such. to look at these data and what is hidden underneath the numbers that we do have. >> did you want to get in on this? >> i was struck by the comment lookingg for the data that they don't control and one thing that strikes me i tend to stick more to the traditional sources of the text of the state like in my research i guess you could say northue korea doesn't control te chinese state media finding discrepancies is one way to try to get out of something that's going on but another example that came to my mind listening is even in the speeches, which i found i think it was particularly in 2019 when i did
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the survey piece, we it's quite interesting to sit through and listen to the speeches over basically the full year. did you hear him talking about things he can't control and is frustrated by. there's a lot of anger and frustration at the meetings and his site visits. what can't be controlled can i think be found, fragments of it in authoritative documents of the state that are basically underr the complete control but it's i'm grateful there is a wonderful way toon think about w again we crack open the black box a little bit.
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>> one thing we can't control his time and unfortunately we are out of it. this is a fantastic our discussion so i want to thank you all for joining us this morning thank you for joining us this morning and participating. we wish you the best of luck with your research so again, thank you for boston. to the next panel joining us is the two other members of the washingtonon consortium. let me introduce them properly if that's okay so associate
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professor at the lbj school of international public affairs at the university of texas austin as well as the centerow for national security and distinguished scholar with of the strauss center for international security and law. assistant professor of political science at the university of missouri and i have here the codirector for the institute but i think you also founded the institute for the studies which is arguably more important of the encoder acting. also joining us actually from manella, if i'm correct, the professor of politics and director of the studies center at the catholic university iwashington, d.c. currently in
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the philippines and many of you may know he may also take that as the new foundation chair at the brookings institution center for east asia policy studies. people t were working on and it asked the previous scoop if they could give us five to seven minutes about the projects that you've been workings on underground if that's okay so people have some idea.ot i know in both of your cases you wrote more than one.
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thank you for your leadership on this to see if you have any korean studies. i think some interesting tie-ins to the things today. i did a couple of projects from the lab, one is looking at the changes to the north korean political economy and basically what we call market leninism maybe we can get to the discussion when we talk about the work on the market and state society relations on the east asian society and politics we
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are in the process of finalizing. the title is the politics of the northt korean diaspora and it looks at what has happened to north korea and have now become globally distributed and having interesting conversations the largest population of north korean refugees is obviously but there are now the communities of north korean centers in the uk and germany and france and japan as well.
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we are thinking of it in ethnic terms but also one of the interesting things is this group of north koreans has pretty distinctive migration patterns and incorporating in the western democracies and a lot of that is shaped first of all the division of the korean peninsula which has affected those that want to lead north korea can go and the availability of south korean
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citizenship so the uk has a position now that it is a unavailable durable solution that theyt must go there rather than cleaning the asylum or the refugee status in the uk. it permits north korea to resettle in the united states and actually just about a month ago canada passed and made a decision that it would allow achild a program that is somewht similar if not gonens to south korea to be sponsored for private resettlement in canada so small-scale child programs that could be expanded in the future. the first fact shapes where this
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north korean diaspora has gone is the division in the contested nature of citizenship on the korean peninsula. but the second factor that affects members of the diaspora diasporaand how they think abouh korea is the fact that it's one of the world's most closed authoritarian regimes and so the books manuscript goes through b not only where people do go and how the incorporate in the western democracies largely concentrated outside of north korea and japan, but it also then looks at the north korean regime and how it attempted to manage the emergence of the defective diaspora. during the cold war, north korea was basically able to project a diaspora that was organized and sponsored and largely controlled by the state. it was a state affiliated overseas presence and what's happened since the 1990s is that increasing the minimum number of north koreans abroad
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and don't remain there in order to achieve the goals with the purposes of the regime they are either dissidents or people who've escaped for economic and political reasons. ultimately met the north korean regime has changed how it relates to north koreans abroad with a lot more surveillance and attempts to discredit those that lead those that are outspoken on human rights advocacy whether that's at o the un or before the united states congress and civil society and activism with things like balloon launches and attempts to provide information to the people in north korea. in some cases that's extended to
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state sponsored orat state directed assassinations and attempts to decapitate and detour people who remain abroad from engaging in advocacy and sort of trying to change the situation on the ground, so the chapter outlines three different approaches the regime has taken. one is to deter people from leavingg at all and at the secod is to discredit those that have left who are critical of the regime and to decapitate opposition for the migration about when and how the diaspora is an effective way abroad or internal political change in the
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authoritarian regime. the numbers did play a really important role, but in many cases the role in advocating for political change in the homeland depended on social media and internetnt connectivity that doesn't exist in the north korean case. the regime is so tightly controlled at the information and ability of external actors to get information into north korea and my guess is that was in part motivated by watching what happened and the catalyst of some of these overseas actors played in the regime mobilization. we know that north korea is actively thinking about and there was a report that they were getting training from the ministry of public security on how to handle unrest so this looks like something that they are actively seeking and monitoring and the behavior towards the diaspora becomes increasingly sort of activist and its patterns of the
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surveillance and trying to control what the members of the north korean diaspora view as political advocates and activists. so the book is first of all trying to document this phenomenon and the t experiences of these thousands of people that have chosen to leave north korea and resettle in the peninsula where there's been a lot of great research already but also now the more far-flung community about which there's been relatively little scholarship and the first goal was to lay out that this was happening and then to think the project wants to think about how this could affect the future of north korea and what then global and international policies towards the dvr case should be. i will stop there and i'm happy to answer any follow-up questions. the book should be coming out sometime early nextti year and depending on how the productions
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process goes, there is a little bit of uncertainty on that end of the book would be out by now, but it's been a little slow going so i look forward to sharing it with everybody in its actual electronic copy in the next year. >> thanks so much. that sounds like a really fascinatingle -- i lost my headset. that sounds like a really fascinating book and like you said there isn't much literature on this at all. there's quite a bit of testimony in sato's south korea and books avwritten on that but it's very interesting. can u i ask you one quick follow-up question you mentioned that canada is experimenting a little bitin with a resettlement effort. is that something that is, how
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is that being done is that being done by ngo groups, is there actual legislation like in the united states? >> it's a great question. previously one of the largest community was in the greater toronto area in canada, and it turned out that most of those were on word of migrants from south korea, so the large number of the community has gone first andon decided to move to canada and that was the canadian government initially said it was goingg to permit people that hadn't been to north korea first to come but not people, that have been to south korea first but not any other. then it actually tightened the decision. ironically, around the time when it was increasing its refugee for migrants and refugees in syria and elsewhere, the canadian immigration authorities
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determined that because there was an option of going to south korea, north koreans couldn'tf come to canada at all, they just were not going to be considered. maybe because they had an alternate citizenship available to them. there's some tension in the book tries to explain between that and the government position over time, but the result was at the time ironically when it had the most pro- immigrant, pro- refugee registration they were issuing notices to north koreans in canada and that's one of the things that sparked my interest because it seems like such a decision to me so it took about six years for civil society advocates in canada to work with
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the immigration authority to get a special measure under the canadian law was a minister of a immigration to say okay these people don't meet the standards for refugees under standard t canadian law but we are going to make an exception and the exception they used twice before in the history to allow small-scale resettlement programs, so the civil society organization that is sponsoring requires private sponsorship and and ngo to do much of the heavy lifting and at the pilot program in the next two years and they are really hoping the program will be successful and then can be named either permanent or institutionalized foren a longer period of time so it works under basically a special pre-existing
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measure in canadian law, but it requires a group based determination, and that'snd happened recently. it was just announced last month. the other interesting part of it is that it is in canada's case explicitly focused on women and children, which both meets the priorities of the government that has a very feminist emphasis in its foreign policy and its human rights advocacy but it's also a good match for the north koreans refugee community, they are often people that have been subject to trafficking and it is a policy that is a good fit between the priorities and the needs of the refugee population so i think this was a case that was pretty
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smart advocacy. it took six years and it was a long process. i commend them for their patients and determinations in getting this through, because they know it wasn't easy but it's a potential model now that could be used in some other countries to have immigration systems a bit more like canada and less like the united states. but the private sponsorship model is quite different and potentially provides a different model forpo other countries.
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would you like to sort of give our audience what you have been working on? for yourself, victor and all and also the academy of korean studies for the logistical and financial support. so again, my gratitude goes out there. in terms of the project though, this project led to the academic articles for people to people engagement with north korea. sadly none of which exists today because of the pandemic and then the other article in the review
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which i think evaluated how we assessan domestic change in norh korea. but i think i will talk about the project that was a short book published by cambridge university press earlier this year with the elements on the society of the politics series so that is now available. in line with the theme of understanding, the book was a way forea me to organize my ownz thinking about the prospects of domestic change in north korea and more specifically the potential development and civil society. the early stages of the book now i was much more focused on the the civil society was going to be a pretty short book so i shifted the direction looking more at how the markets can shape the states relations but back to this question about whether there's a change or not
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in north korea on the one hand it seems to be little change still one of the poorest countries in the world and ranks near the bottom of any index on political freedoms and civil liberties and political liberties. on the other hand, the emergence of the generation that creates more information so it sounds like they haven't changed at all the past two decades but on the other hand, we do hear these anecdotes about things that are changing on the ground. both narratives may be true and depend on what aspect of north korea or which region of the country one is examining. from the macro level perspective it may appear that little has
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changed, but at a a micro levelf we look at this from the bottom up there is some consensus among the experts about the significant role that markets play and the importance to stay with private actors. the formal and informal market has become a fixture in what is supposed to be a socialist state. now, what is up for debate is to swhat degree markets and things like trade networks have offered. it's whether expanding markets weaken the authoritarian rule. and what is key to my argument is the question of authoritarian legitimacy and how well they managed to successfully co-opt the markets into the regime's ideology so it implements the controlled economic measures, extracts the market economy into
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ideology and the state will likely maintain strong authoritarian control. markets will be beholden to the states providing the regime the much-needed revenue and thereby empowering weakening the state. in a i different hypothesis were in contrast to that view where the state is the master of the society, the regime if they fail to incorporate the markets into the legitimate message as private actors build informal trust networks and share information and collude the state bureaucrats more fundamental changes are made. and they become further dependent for the survival and the regime may weaken as they emerge into the ideology for the experiences of north korea markets continue too shift power
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we be begin to see the signs. if we talk more about the pandemic, for the most part i think the markets are very difficult to control and we see the states try to walk back the markets and regulate. but we are in the period where it's because of a the pandemic there's not a lot across the border so it looks pretty grim right now but in the longer term i am optimistic the markets may return and we may seee these dynamics play out again. we don't know how longai it will be before north korea can shake off the effects of the pandemic, but i am more hopeful at least as we think about the longer
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term. >> we will talk about the pandemic and its impact. as you know, we've collected a bunch of data with regards to the formal market, 436 markets at least as of 2016 that exist in north korea. in the study that you've done and the research that you've done, have you come across any good data about informal markets in north korea? i know it's hard to come by but anything you've learned about the markets in north korea. >> it comes from the centers and it's hard to. the project that you are referring to i remember seeing the coordinates on the studies
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that have looked at that but unfortunately because of the informal markets they can be anything from people selling things within those neighborhoods. i haven't seen anything as systematic but informal markets operating in certain cities or regions along the border regions is more prevalent. so we have seen more anecdotal information rather than systematic but we know they've grown and taken upa a larger share of the economy. >> the other question quickly, we know the government taxes the markets. >> someone mentioned north korea can't tax the markets because
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the informal markets would be a recognition of the prices. when they make vendors pay a percentage of what they make in the profitsr and we refer to tht as a tax but it's more of a fee. if you think of bribery if you do these we have to pay off a security official to sell your goods and do some feel you might refer to that as anna tax but to say that the state a can impose but at least nothing systematic.
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>> to the question that we have had lots of conversations about what is going on in these relations in the north korean regime tries to regulate markets i want to pick up on this distinction between the formal and informal market is a lot of the stories that we have seen about the market activities are directed at these grasshopper markets and part of our thinking very much builds on the work to argue that part of what the regime strategy is looking at the perspective of the state of society, civil society,
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civilians are trying to navigate these constraints inside c of te regime. if you look at the regime policies it looks a bit like what the regime is trying to do to shut down all of the market activity which is more free market activity and force it into these regime markets where it can be regulated so that that's an effective way of siphoning upwards to the regime but it also lends close or control of their own agents that are the people that have been engaged in bribery, coercion and sometimes abuse of the system markets so we see some of this is an effort to shift the market activity and outside regime controls where they can be
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regulated. that hasll a pretty different affect on the relations of the markets are formalns versus informal and the potential forer the markets to be liberating to get smaller if the regime is able to shift people into these regime markets so it is a part of the work that is interesting and we are seeing that distinction especially under covid play out in real time. >> first is the theme of the rustic needs in the last panel as well. it's identifying the things the government can't control, but they cannot control, and how they tried to get control over
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things they can't. this is one of the areas. the other that we have not talked about in the context of this project but that all of you know well is that the content that's taking place on the technology side between the north korean citizens that are gaining more access to cell phones and texting and then the government seizes the technology to try to control t more and monitor more. both of you have sort of skirted around it. let's talk about the impact of the pandemic and what it's done and how it's impacted society. who would like to go first?
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>> i can take that first. there is much greater optimism made 2010 when money was flowing and there was the heavy sanctions era. i said i was more optimistic in the longer term but there's also less optimism now about things like societal change, economic change and it stems from almost two years of heavy border lock down and we have seen the regime cracked down on the spirit of capitalistcr seem to be outside cultural influence and the tightening of the indoctrination. what that means for the market is that there's less money flowing and circulating in north
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korea, and even things like food production like fertilizer. right now there is a humanitarian crisis that's ongoing in north korea. when you talk about markets, the pandemic itself is the people are suffering but as i think john has mentioned in the first panel, he doesn't have control over it it must be frustrating for the leadership as well and they are doing the best they can to control the situation. the state trying to centralize economic authority once again and really clamp down and rain in the market this is going on even before the pandemic but since the pandemic it really tightens the grip on the markets trying to take
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control of the economy again and so even though it's shrunk because the pandemic the state has become less open to it and we see the period of the market opening and the regime clamping down and the state is really trying to clamp down on the sand whether that's because of the pandemic or whether the state is using the pandemic as an excuse to tighten its authority is up for debate, but it is a grim situation right now in north korea. >> a great question. i would say i think we see a couple different affects on the pandemic that has made research on the global politics in general pretty challenging in
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the last couple of years but in terms of the effect on the north migration and refugees and diaspora, i think what we have seen is that north korea is may be an extreme case, but he brought a global pattern of what some of my colleagues in the paper of international security called opportunistic. in the pandemic they found a reason in the pretext to do some things that they might have already wanted to do strengthening control come but the pandemic provided a reason to assume emergency powers and executive meaning the core leadership and then to crackdown on society as including targeting political opponents tsunder the guides of the public health emergency measures and in
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north korea's case, that meant internal mobility which is one of the thingsne that made the market activity possible and allowing the information to circulate freely and to take it bordermo control. so the affect has been to decimate the number in the literal sense down to 10% or less of what it was and who were able to leave north korea. north koreaa was already one of the authoritarian regimes in the system that limited immigration the most and there are some democracies that allow a fair amount and it's still politically controlled and calibrated, but there's a lot more mobility.
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-- north korea has never been one of those and at the pandemic has really tanked the number of people that have been able to escape, i think in the last quarter the number of north koreans arriving in south korea for the resettlement was in single digit which is tragic when it couples with a humanitarian crisis mentioned with the food shortages, the loss of the cross-border trade in the economic lifeline for so many people particularly in the northern parts. so i think the affect of the pandemic has been not only through the internal t humanitarian crisis but to limit the ability to leave ino search of not only political freedom but in some cases literal physical survival and to me that
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is hugely concerning and is a potential for human tragedy it's really troubling and concerning. we do see that in the case of the north korean diaspora, part of this book involved the survey in the united states, which we tried to mirror some of the work and we saw people were in touch with family or friends, some sort of contact we had been able toe send something, but the cost of using the broker to get across the border has gone way, way up and has gotten much harder to communicate or send information and it's also attenuated the relationship between those that have the family members that they still have inside north korea, which
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again i think is a tragic consequence of the pandemic politics. >> you mentioned the number of north koreans that are making their way into south korea has dwindled quite a bit and that certainly has to do with opportunistic repression but if you could comment on whether and if so how the south korean government policies in this regard to north korean human rights has or has not affected that flow of people and then for andrew, i'm curious to know your thoughts on the extent to which this border lock panel with china which is now going on to
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like 23 months now has impacted, how that has impacted the markets. i've heard different stories anecdotally about how it's impacted the markets, and it looks like we had some imagery last week that was featured in the financial times that showed that they look like they were going to try to start to open up the border by the airbase into a storage facility, storage quarantine facility but that looked like it may be on hold now because of this new variant. but ifor you could come in your estimation, how has this affected the market? maybe i will go to andrew first. >> 95% of trade comes from
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china, so when you have a border lockdown, you can imagine what sort of affect that would have for north korea and the north korean markets. the majority of goods m that you get or coming from one country, then there is a hard lockdown. that should say something about the marketsts themselves. there are signals and reports where the trade has gone up and now maybe we see that they need markets. i remember they looked like they were getting ready to open one segment of the border for shipments but the following month it doesn't materialize. it's one of these questions going back to understanding how much longer can the country
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persist without borders opening up to a certain extent so that's when you get the questions into things about is the regime going to be stable in another year, is it going to have to make some kind of changes or will that change the calculus of the regime to maybe try to negotiate with the u.s. or engage in south korea. your guess is as good as mine because you would think they would be at the point that they would want certainly the sanctions relief but they are still holding on to these questionsio of what is driving e calculus you would think that would then be in answer to trying to ease the border lock lockdown but that hasn't been the case. the flipside of this some say the regime is still able to
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survive. the things that are still getting into the country illegally there may be ways to smuggle things through but those stories are also anecdotal. they tend to thrive through the illicit economy. i don't know to what extent that holds true but it may be possible that it's because of markets the regime is able to stay afloat.
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>> i think the regime shifts towards the cyberon revenue-generating opposition because it was in place prior to the pandemic and so i think the leadership has a potential source of revenue that we were a little bit slow to catch on to but overall there was a shift towards the regime to earn revenue which i don't necessarily required a lot of physical border crossing a and travel. there is still constraints the border control has had ordinary
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people harder because they were more dependent on the border crossings intont goods and peope so it's important to bracket that point. on the policy and how it shaped the diaspora, i think it is a greatf question. one of the papers that i did for the lab looked at north korean migration experiences and what happened. 200 members that have written in english or north korean. we looked att what happened to different people during stages of the migration journey and one of the things we found is the
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first encounter was not when they got to the territory. it was going to a consulate, going to the embassy, asking a korean citizen who happened to be in canada and a lot of them reported that they were not successful, there were cases where they thought of themselves as korean and that they would treat them as citizens which the law claims they treat north koreans as citizens but when they approached, they often were not given the same rights were status someone already holding the passport would have been.
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with the experience, they didn't feel fully equal members and affect extended all the way throughh the process and the three-month period so what was interesting about that process of not necessarily knowing whether youer could count on ths date to include you if you are not already in south korea had an important affect because we sold the consistent themes. why did you choose to come to the u.s. t some came to study or work or for temporary purposes and to
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some of them were refugees who've gone through the process so we looked at both groups but consistently people said there was the greater economic and social opportunity in the united states, but the secondary theme was the decider to avoid what they saw the potential for discrimination and the lack of the socioeconomic mobility and i know that is something that the policies try to grapple with, but it seems to be an ongoing issue at least from the survey results and it's why people seeh other countries as resettlement destinations. the final point is that we also try to disentangle what is it that to somebody that comes from an authoritarian system liketh north korea thinks it's important if that democratic citizenship? this is a fascinating question right now as we grapple with questions about what w american democracy should look like and
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global democracy, but one of the things that came up very strongly is that people that left north korea prioritized what we would call a civil libertarian notion of the democratic citizenship so overwhelmingly off the charts, peopley will say it's to provide people their individualir rights and freedom so a very strong emphasis and that is kind of at odds with the approach taken at least in some cases by the government where it's those kind of activities, freedom of speech, freedom to defend information that have been constricted by some of the policies this administration has taken. i know there was d some discussn earlier but i would note we have some evidence that there's a
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structure of the citizenship of those that left prioritized where the civil liberty is a really important so to the extent that there is any hint by any government that is going to run into or be at odds, what's important about the freedom and democracy end of the book began to explore that in a little more detail. >> interesting stuff. with women dominating market trade in north korea, how does the participation interact with pre-existing gender norms and what is the impact on the reshaping of the relations with civil society within the
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country? >> i just unmute it myself so, it's absolutely correct that women are dominating the markets especially when it comes to the informal markets because men have to work in their state jobs that they are required to work and there is recognition of women becoming the breadwinners or making money and there is a great podcast directing the database that just came out with a report on the household and affects that the markets are having on women and she talks about some of the dynamics between husbands and wives and
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there is a recognition that women are becoming breadwinners but there is still the patriarchal society that leads to tension and in terms of the society, if you think about women working in markets, i've ithought about this a lot and talked with a couple of colleagues i wrote a report about markets and civil society we try to explore whether these women are forming internal justt markets. you have to have information and prices of goods and who is selling what and that means you have to talk to one another. we have to wonder if that would lead to conversations among women, the rise of the public sphere as women interact.
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we wonder if you are required to meet twowo times a week and this association, but what purpose does it serve for women order on the sidelines are they going to be chatting about the market activities, so we do think that there is a lot of potential into things like entrepreneurship, if women want to know how do i start a business, you're not going to ask how do i begin my own business, you're going to ask someone that has had that experience before. so this is women speaking and talkinghi informally and they ae not being regulated by the state, so again we are seeing this is what we mean by the building blocks of the civil society and the trust networks as women are having conversations with one another may be about the weather or gossip, who knows of course may be that is getting more dangerous, but of course that is
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the early trappings of the society need to get people to begin talking and have discourse and if not, it isn't intervened by the state. just some thoughts about the women and markets in the civil society.y. >> tina, i will give you the lasthe word. >> i would echo a lot about what has been said with migration obviously this gives north korean women more opportunity to cross the border as a part of economic activity but then also places them at increasedim risk forr trafficking and gender-basd violence and one of the interesting things that i don't think we have a great handle on is i don't think that there has been a diaspora where predominantly women and children and so many single mothers so i think that it raises all sorts
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of interesting questions about the resettlement policies and also about sort of having some political engagement and part of why we see them become the advocates focus on the women's rights and so lots of interesting questions that i think we are now just starting to explore and that would be great areas for people to keep researching in and looking into because they are fascinating and we do not have the full understanding yet. >> this is a terrific discussion and i feel like we have only hit the tip of the iceberg. there's a lot more we could talk about but we are at the end of our w time, so i want to thank andrew and tina for the very interesting discussion about the north korean market society, the diaspora and things that we don't in the national security based discussion around washington, d.c. we don't talk enough about because that is
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probably where there is the most change that will come in north korea. again there is more wee can talk about, but that's why the audience can look at the research on the website, which we set up all the work that you've done. they can certainly learn more from that. i want to thank andrew and john for joining us today. wasn't on-screen but the personn leading us all in the state lab effort, thank her for all her work in keeping us all together. thanks again to csis for the study for their support of the work of the scholars and best wishes to the scholars for the rester of your research. i know some of you are all still very deeply involved in different stages off the work,
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and we wish you the best of luck. finally, to the audience, thank you for tuning in. bestn. wishes for the holiday season. we will see you all soon. thank you. >> ..

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