Skip to main content

tv   Rep. French Hil Others Discuss U.S.- China Economic Competition  CSPAN  October 22, 2021 9:00am-10:36am EDT

9:00 am
that came out of the pandemic was an understanding of the importance of telehealth. when regulations were waived to allow telehealth to be more widely used, we saw usages of telehealth during a time of great need where we had limited the spread of the disease but still had access to medical care. before those rules -- i live in northwest washington, d.c. my physician is five or six miles away in bethesda. prior to the waiver of some of the regulations, i would not have been able to do it telehealth call five miles away >> fr and so much of the regulations that pertain to telehealth is divided between states, medicare, medicaid. we need to have --. >> and we'll leave this program
9:01 am
here, you can finish watching at c-span.org. we'll take you live to a discussion about u.s.-chinese discussions. >> it's great to have-- while we're constrained by the virtual world, but it's great to pull in people from not only washington, but around the country and around the world. so we're delighted to have you with us. an important topic. we're really here to roll out -- the reason we initially came was to roll out a report that one of my colleagues, stephanie segal, called the degrees of separation, the title is targeted approach to u.s.-china decoupling. i'll introduce stephanie in a moment and she'll introduce the
9:02 am
report. she's been working on it the past 18 months and i think it's an important contribution to the conversation about this charged topic of u.s.-china economic cooperation. i want to thank before we start the smith richardson foundation, a generous supporter of csis and the economics program specifically for many years and we really appreciate it. without that support we couldn't do what we do. so thank you very much. so, i'm going to just turn to stephanie-- sorry, before we get to stephanie and the terrific panel that we have, i just want to say that this report you will see provides a thoughtful methodology for thinking about our economic engagement with china. it has a historical piece and then a way of looking at u.s. objectives and how to test whether we, you know, are better off being engaged or
9:03 am
disengaged from china, and so you'll-- she'll go through some of that and the panel will help her dissect that. before we get to that, we're just delighted to have congressman french hill, republican from arkansas, join us to provide keynote remarks not just that, but to help frame the conversations about the u.s.-china relationship and particularly the financial relationship. congressman hill sits on the financial services, senior member of the financial services committee and the house of representatives and he's ranking member of the housing community development and insurance subcommittee and especially important for this conversation, he's also on the subcommittee on investor protection and capital markets and subcommittee on international security and monetary policy, also, in addition to that service, he serves as one of two
9:04 am
congressional representatives to the 76th u.n. general assembly so it's hard to think of somebody better. i just throw in one other personal comment about congressman hill. he and i worked at the u.s. treasury department 30 years agoment he was the deputy assistant secretary for domestic finance and i was on the international side of the career civil servant and we intersected. actually, that was kind of rare because the domestic and international sides of treasury don't come together very often, but we came together and this was relevant because we were working on a big initiative with japan, the structural impediments initiative and a lot of that was helping to improve the u.s.-japan relationship and encourage reform of particularly capital markets in japan and that was the piece that brought congressman hill and me together back then and so, his experience, in my-- from my perspective goes way back to that time and i think is relevant to the china
9:05 am
conversation today. with that, i'm delighted to turn the floor to congressman hill. >> well, matt, thank you, and csis for this invitation and thank you for the three decade friendship, for your service to our nation and the great introduction and great to see you, even if by teams. and let me also congratulate stephanie segal for her extensive work for her february overview as well as this report, designing a possible frame work for policy decisions related to the u.s.-china relationship. and a current member of the house of representatives, but also certainly are informed by my four decades of private sector engagement, my service on the banking committee staff and my work i enjoyed so much with matt in the administration of bush 41. this morning's discussion on
9:06 am
stephanie's framework was needed and in my view long overdue, i appreciated her february 2021 historic perspective as a prequel to the frame work. as a students of economics and history i've always recommended a thorough historical perspective in any public policy deliberation and preferably from multiple points of view and she got that done. in many moments in our short history in the united states, in comparison to the long lineage of china as a nation, our country has been there as a friend, providing military advice during the opium wars, arguing for the open door policy, setting up scholarships for chinese students from the settlement, and as we know coming to the aid of china in the face of japanese aggression. today, five deck kids after
9:07 am
richard nixon's visit, leaders in beijing and washington sea world events through different prisms, to some agree both nations wonder what's next? and president trump at the post tiananmen square environment. and in the post world war ii monetary and trading system and is now headed squarely in conflict with the global order, balance of power in east asia, and the continued open market-based trading system. there's no argument that the united states and her allies were slow to recognize this pivot or at least exceed in implications, and today we're not on the same page as to how best to respond. and in our private sector, motivated principally by the siren song of a growing population and middle class, in
9:08 am
my view was complacent about having its supply chains and critical prospects, too reliant on china. in my view the financial and legal long-term risks were not sufficient, not to mention the business risk associated with china's surveillance culture and gross human rights violations. thus, president trump's policy review and status quo of the words and actions has prompted a much more thoughtful allied response and awakened the private sector's risk assessment. but what president trump did not achieve, the covid-19 global pandemic, combined with china's abrogation of its treaty with the united kingdom over hong kong finished the work. now it's essential that the united states leadership be committed on a bipartisan basis to doing the hard work of hammering out the proper military, diplomatic and economic frame work for
9:09 am
u.s.-china relations. this effort must also reflect a concensus that's supported by america's private sector, principally its multinational firms. secondly, u.s. leadership as initiated ablebly by secretaries pompeo and mnuchin, an allied view or concensus as to the same framework and make sure it's shared by our long time friends and allies in europe, north asia and the indo-pacific. secretary blinken got it about right as he describe the u.s. posture to china, commanding when it must be and adversarial when it must be. participation in this csis will look at how to balance the many conflicts when one's chief military and political and economic rival is at once an authoritarian closed communist
9:10 am
dictatorship, yet a nation state fully integrated into much of the global trading and economic system. now, as matt mentioned, he and i date our friendship and our early policy lives to those debates in the late 1980's. when the united states was attempting to curtail china's foreign investment in the united states, the flooding into the u.s. of japanese automobiles and semiconductors, while japan at the same time was dramatically limiting foreign market access to goods and services. with much of the rhetoric we see today related to china, one could simply substitute the word japan and substitute china and you'd find the sunday morning top show topics of 1989 and 1990, but of course, there's one extraordinary distinction. democratic japan was, is, and continues to be our ally and partner, and china, while a
9:11 am
collaborator in many things, description as a partner and an ally would not be accurate. could it be in the future? only time and the years ahead will tell. about you this speaks to that balance as outlined in today's discussion of degrees of separation. your framework is of assistance to the legislative branch in that it provides a rubic whereby there as' a possible achieving to our objective. in the context of this frame work, let me look at legislative initiatives. first, as the geostrategy framework, congress passed the 2018 reassurance act which generally provides a broad statement on u.s. policy in the indo-pacific region and important provisions specifically related to our support for taiwan. it also included new reporting requirements, as well as authorizations of new spending and policies in the areas of
9:12 am
security, economics and u.s. value. three important factors that your report also considers in the assessments of the case studies. as to the economic objectives, some may disagree with the previous administration's tactics, but pursuing sustainableable equitable and fairness, math as i can recall, jim bakker and other secretaries of treasury nick brady when we weren't debating around the issue of japan in the late 80's and 1990's. speaking of the 1990's, as a theft of intellectual property by china and chinese companies is one we're still fighting, blatant theft in the 1990's despite president clinton and his team. they were focused on software and movies, but that seems quaint today given today's battle about artificial
9:13 am
intelligence, biotechnology and dual use technologies. safeguarding global financial stability is critical. here again reading today's wall street journal you see the property market in china in meltdown. does it have financial implications not only in china, but in financial institutions outside of china? that's a key point in the public markets, but china as a large creditor has a policy of predatory and neo colonial lending in the emerging world. in my view, that is not a constructive way to achieve financial stability. hence, my firm and continued objection to the biden treasury massive approval of special drawing rights imf in the name of poor countries building reserves in the face of the pandemic. and this untargeted, ill-conceived approach is a massive subsidy to china and china's objectives across the third world.
9:14 am
my bill hr-1658 th sbr act would have much more targeted approaches for america and advocacy and sets congressional approval in the sbr allocations and does not allow recommends of the imf to vote for allocation to countries that committed genocide in the last 10 years or repeatedly supporting international terrorism. likewise with china, now as the largest creditor in the world they're not a member of the paris club, that's no longer an acceptable reality. with china's belt and road initiative that beijing would be into priced debt traps and this may be rescue by financial institutions complicating their ability to underwrite loans for new projects. these nontransparent predatory
9:15 am
lending terms should not be acceptable to the im-- when you're looking at financial needs, this is in the way. i initiate add directive to the multilateral institutions to insist on transparency for sovereign borrowers to china. and my bill, the china transparency act was included in the 2021 national defense authorization act signed into law, this will help develop a global multilateral effort to assure more scrutiny of china has a nation. and the same standards as used by the financial institutions. bringing china up to the same standards within the ifi's and out of a developing country status is important to helping them move to playing by our same global rules and norms. their economic area also argues
9:16 am
for supply chain resilience. the pandemic has certainly exposed the fragility of the three decade owed management effort just in time inventory and a single source lowest cost supply. when the pandemic swept across the globe last march, i suggested that america's preparation for ppe, medical devices like ventilators and critical compounds necessary for pharmaceutical development were too dependent on a single source supplier, and much of that, i must say, were in china. my bill, hr-3146, the securing america's vaccines for emergencies or save act, which amends the production act to spur critical production in the midst of a global national health emergency. these provisions are included in this year's ndaa that's passed the house. i also believe the previous administration missed an opportunity to begin a process of working to diversify our
9:17 am
supply chain out of china. during the trump administration's u.s.-china trade disputes i'd ask business leaders visiting my office how they're doing, making money? are the chinese rules easy to navigate and many of answered my questions in the negative so there's work to be done. building america's supply chain capacity outside of china will take years, maybe decades, but american businesses have experienced now two major disruptions in business in a short period of time between the trade disputes with china and the proliferation of china. this is one way we can slowly and in small increments separate from china while building in resit tense in central and out south america and it's a key component. let me look at the challenges that stephanie put so much
9:18 am
effort in capital flows between the u.s. and china. it outlines the infrastructures of two countries. capital flow where it's wanted and capital flows where it has certainty, as to the long-term potential of earning a profitable return on equity. opportunity alone is insufficient. one must have a pro investor mindset and a rule of law that governs not only the issuance of the capital, but labor, and protection of intellectual property to adjudicate disputes in a fair and transparent court of law. keeping this in mind, china has a low prospect for achieving the apex center piece of the global financial system and at the end of the day, while size of market is critical, other conditions must exist for nontransparent, nondollar authoritarian dictatorship without the rule of law to somehow dominate the global
9:19 am
economy. the framework describes how the u.s. can prohibit financial dealings with individuals or companies. my colleague, anddy barr of kentucky, proposes a similar bill hr-5326 which directs the president to sanction chinese military or surveillance companies, identified by treasuries, office of control, or the defense of defense. critically, this takes a broader approach than noted in the framework, because the inclusion of a foreign entity on the specialty designated nationals list deters third party persons from transacting with that designated entity while providing restrictions on public securities are only restricted to u.s. persons. further, mr. barr's approach in my view covers debt and equity securities and public and private companies. so this is a way for those companies that the president of the united states and they have
9:20 am
concerns about dealt in the market. i agree wholeheartedly with the point it's important for the major capital markets to share a view about potential chinese market access, and increasing institutional investors about the risks in china, regulators on the same is critical. in the short-term, while these issued related to market access for those companies actively engage in the technology sphere continue to be debated. and manile see it's a risk should we separate in quote, global fragmenttation, i'd argue that we can survive this. fragmenttations have occurred as countries have grown, integrated and populations expanded as new ideas have been brought for the. we've survived the metric system, beta versus vhs.
9:21 am
apple versus microsoft and certainly ac versus dc. not the band, the power. so look, we can get through the fragmenttation. i appreciate the report including a section on u.s. objectives on values. as i mentioned before, my sbr bill has a specific section not going to country recently committing genocide and the treatment of the uighurs and out of the shen zheng province where the polysilicone is produced and 80% of china's cotton is cultivated. it's my hope that u.s. companies who have properties in shen zheng, will not continue to stick their heads in the sand over the uighurs.
9:22 am
csis can't lose the momentum in looking at our relationship with china. it doesn't have to be an all or nothing approach. in the thoughtful message that csis outlines today can help build that concensus within the u.s. government, the american business community, and with our allies and partners around the world. and matt, thank you, and stephanie, for the invitation and it was delightful to be with you this morning. >> thank you so much, representative hill. that was a tour deforce and you covered this was a set of issues and a clear point of view, which is great and you've given us a great sort of touchstone to work from when we get this of our panel in a second. and let me bring stephanie into the conversation if you're
9:23 am
willing, french, to take a couple of questions. let me ask the first one, you harkened back a couple of times to our experience working on japan 30-plus years ago and you know, in that case, in that, especially that structural impediments initiative we were entruce seively going into japan and trying to help promote reform there that was in the interest of the united states and japan, we thought, i think, and i still believe that by the way, not everybody in japan loves it, but it was a -- there was actually surprising support for some of the things we were proposing, including capital market reform. i guess my question is today when you think about china there feels like there's a little bit of a tension because we clearly want china to reform. we want them to have, you know, financial openness, financial stability and for one or more of those reasons, why it's for access for our companies or
9:24 am
for, you know, the growth that it survived, the stability it survived, or just to avoid some kind of real problem which we seem to be possibly on the brink of right now in china potentially, it feels like we ought to engage more on one hand, but on the other hand, some of the things you're suggesting would be suggesting disengagement. so, i guess that's a fundamental question is, you know, should we be trying to, you know, engage and reform china and improve some things or should we step back and let them figure it out? >> welcome, it's a key question, one i thought a lot about. s because as i noted in my remarks, japan and the united states were tied together by an economic partnership and a military partnership and a deep friendship, following world 2, and so two friends came together in the structural impediment talks and they were, but both sides learned a lot about the domestic economies and both sides came together
9:25 am
and resulted, i think, in a concensus document and it took a lot of work and you were at the forefront of that work. and here we have that rival cop text that really wasn't present in the japan-u.s. context. i think japan was a manufacturing center. they were proud of their extraordinary growth between 1960 and 1990, no doubt and their markets reflected it and exports reflected it. the heart both sides could learn from each other. that's true in the chinese context and we tried engagement centered around, as you know, the secretaries of treasures in the '90s and the bush administration, and recently secretaries of state and bilateral dialog, has it proved concrete results when we're moving the ball? that's why i raised intellectual property from the 1990's. i think president clinton thought he made progress and
9:26 am
yet, i think that they've doubled down and become much more sophisticated. so, this is the challenge. for two sides to come together and work on things they have to have a recognition and respect for each side and that these global trading system is worthy of joining and participating in. and that's why i argue that the pivot that leader xi has made in 2013 is essential will i to create a parallel system, one that attempts to run alongside of the dollar-based monetary system. i don't think that's realistic for china. i think their capital markets today are realizing that, as people can't come up with the money to make debt payments. so i don't think it's the right strategy for china. so in my view, the bilateral conversation is pressing them that the future, the best future for the people of china is to continue to move forward in the global trading system,
9:27 am
the global diplomatic system, the multilateral system and not try to create a parallel separate universe that's rimbey, and one of the treasure sdr support that we've seen in this administration. >> terrific, again, a lot this to unpack and i'd like to follow up on, but i'd like to give stephanie is chance to jump in here. so over to you. >> thanks, matt. first, let me thank the congressman for coming and speaking today on this really critical topic. you covered a tremendous amount of grounds and as matt mentioned, you've been engaged in east asia, engaged in economic issues from the perspective of the executive branch, from the private sector, and now on capitol hill so we really could not have had a better perspective and a better kickoff in this event this morning, so let me just
9:28 am
thank you for joining us. because you covered so much ground, i have a lot of questions, but let me stick with the issue that you raised of the importance of a concensus approach. whether we're talking about a bilateral concensus politically, but you mentioned the importance of having the private sector on board as well as allies and partners on board. so there's kind of three different constitueies that need a common approach. how would you assess the prospects in those three areas, the bipartisan approach, the collaborative with the private sector and a common approach with allies and partners? >> and this is linked to matt's question because the booil trade between japan and the u.s. was important to both countries. and here, that's true with china, but china's trade with europe is very, very important.
9:29 am
china's trade in the indo-pacific area is important and therefore, that's why i think this allied approach is critical now and we're 30 years past japan-u.s. discussions and that's why this has to be a multilateral approach. and the democracies have to take the lead and that's why i believe it will be stronger. you asked for assessment where we are. i think that progress was made. i credited steve mnuchin and mike pompeo in my remarks for really making progress in some areas on telling this story. technology being probably the top and you deal with that greatly in your report. this is the concern of the military leaders in our free countries as well as the private sector use and you touched on ai and biotechnology, for example, in the trump administration you certainly saw this allied
9:30 am
concensus centered around what? telecommunications. as i've said on the house floor one day, there's a right way and a huawei to handle telecommunications policy. you've seen japan, u.s., now the u.k. understand the risk of integration of huawei components in their systems. so b to c. c to c and b to b. and more money transferred by individual by electronic means. i think we've made progress and the huawei discussions by the g7 are a good example of it and i think we need to carry through and continue that and you noted that in your report. you're going to talk about it today with the canadian and indo-pacific partnerships on ai, for example, and biotechnology. that's the way we build, not only an allied concensus, but a
9:31 am
private sector concensus and technology. when we get out of technology we've got to recognize to do this for trade generally and for diplomacy generally. >> i wonder, i know we're at 9:30 and i know you have other pressing business to attend to, i want to maybe take advantage of just two more minutes of your time, if i could. you commented on bilateral conversations, what the u.s. should be pushing for. i just want to make sure that i understood that correctly. are you in favor of the u.s. engaging with china on these economic issues? >> absolutely. the question, and this is something that i'm not had the information to know the answer to and it's possibly a good topic for a future csis event. tell me the successes of the
9:32 am
'90s treasury secretary and by laterals and secretary of state bilaterals with china, you tell me what they've accomplished and we'll go from herement i'm a big believer for sharing with each other why we feel the way we feel. it's important for america to lead there along with g7 allies and make sure our talking points, are all in the same vein because i believe xi is taking china down the wrong path and that's got to be a voice not just from the united states, but from our allies around the world so i think that dialog is very important. >> thank you for that. matt, i don't know if you want
9:33 am
to have any kind of concluding comments for this portion of the program? >> i just want to thank congressman hill again. i know you have other things you've got to do, but this has been terrific and appreciate, by the way, the homework you and your team did in reading the report and obviously obviously absorbing some things that stephanie was commenting on and that's unusual and we appreciate that attention to it in addition to your comments and thoughts. thank you so much. and-- thank you for having me. >> and not another 30 years before we get to do this again. [laughter] >> thanks so much. stephanie, back to you. >> great. well, let me just add my thanks again to congressman hill for really illuminating comments, i think, kind of bringing to us the perspectives on this very complicated issue of u.s.-china engagement. i think having that sort of insight from how this issue looks from capitol hill and in
9:34 am
particular, from someone who is sitting at one of the key committees that's looking at this issue in house financial services, really valuable and a perfect segway for us now into the panel discussion and a bit more granularity as far as what is in the report, we have a great set of panelists that can help us kind of dissect a little bit more our detailed research. if i could just take five minutes or so and give you kind of the headline messages from the report itself, and then we'll dig into the details with our panelists. as matt mentioned, this report, degrees of separation, is an effort that was launched in the spring of 2020. we divided the project up into two distinct pieces. the first piece was a historical piece, resulted in a report that we issued in
9:35 am
february of this year, and that really looked back to the late 1970's, and the normalization of relations between the u.s. and china. and followed the evolution of that engagement up through the present and basically, the goal there was to understand the rational for engagement. so the u.s. wasn't engaging with china as pure benevolence, but a way of u.s. objectives and we see an evolution over time of how those objectives were geo strategic initially, but how the economic objectives really became more prominent as that relationship evolved and then began to include things like global public goods and global norms as china became a much more important player on the global stage.
9:36 am
so we took that historical framing and that historical understanding of how u.s. objectives are impacted by u.s.-china engagements and we brought it forward to the present and have used it in our frame work to evaluate both u.s. objectives and whether or not u.s.-china engagement in specific activities advances or hinders achievements of those objectives. so that's the core of the frame work. there are four distinct pieces to it. the first piece is a risk assessment, and that risk assessment should be common across all participants that are evaluating inactivity. so that's the starting point in the frame work is what is the specific risk that we're concerned with in looking at a given activity. part two, i mentioned
9:37 am
objectives, really being the core of the frame work. which u.s. objectives are impacted by a particular activity. and does that activity advance or hinder u.s. objectives? step two. if the answer to that question is that activity hinders achievement of u.s. activities or maybe ambiguous, costs and benefits to it, we propose that the framework does affect the effectiveness of restrictions, so at that point one should evaluate restrictions for their possible effectiveness and that means what is the leadership position in that particular activity and what's the likelihood that you could get others to go along should the united states move in the direction of restricting an activity? that's step three. and then step four that really
9:38 am
gets at what the congressman was also referencing, is rule of law. so any activity should be consistent with rules of law, consistent with u.s. laws and u.s. obligations internationally, and any efforts to restrict an activity should also be consistent with rule of law. and we underscore these because it really is critical, as far as differentiating the united states and china. and the adherence of rule of law and the transparency of rule of law is something that we can't lose sight of in looking to either endorse or restrict certain activities. so those are the four basic components to the framework. the report itself has key findings that are general across all sectors and a few that are specific to the case studies that we looked at. let me just go through a few of
9:39 am
the high level take aways, and then i'm going to get to our experts here to get to come more granularity in the sectors. on the high level takeaways. i mentioned the first two components of the framework, the risk assessments and then, u.s. objectives and whether or not they're advanced by a particular activity. one take away is that these assessments are incredibly subjective. they can be educated, but they are very subjective and i think there needs to be an appreciation of that going in, that there are different perspectives on an activity and that influences how people see the activity and whether or not engagement is good or bad for the united states. that high degree of subjectivity is also the reason why we need a common risk assessment when we start to process. it should be a risk assessment that is common across all u.s.
9:40 am
government agencies that are looking at activities, so at a minimum, every participant that has a voice in a debate understands what is the specific risk that we're looking at. so, that's lesson number one. i would say lesson number two that emerged in the course of writing up our case studies, and that is a discussion of when we assess a particular activity, and we talk about whether or not u.s. objectives are advanced, there's a debate ongoing whether we should be looking at overall benefits or at net benefits to the united states. and this sound kind of weedy, but if we think really big picture, the rational for engaging with china historically and in economic areas has been that that
9:41 am
engagement is actually very efficient and objectively benefits everyone and it's that overall benefit that has been the rational for economic engagements since normalization of relations. that has shifted a bit in the last few years where we're not really looking so much at overall benefits, but we're thinking about net benefits, so, yes, the united states might benefit from a particular activity, but is china benefitting more? that's not an approach that economists tend to take. it's not the approach that the united states historically has taken, but increasingly, you're hearing that exact point, that yes, the u.s. might benefit from activity x, but china is benefitting more, therefore, it's something that should be restricted. we don't answer the question as far as whether overall or net benefit is the right way to
9:42 am
look at the issue, but similar to meeting a common risk assessment, we need to be on the same page as to what is it that we're looking at. overall benefits or net benefit. a third take away, and now i'm going to shift to our panelist after the third takeaway, is this push toward fragmenttation in certain areas. when we started the project, again, going back nearly 18 months, i think our prior was that the united states was looking for global concensus, global rules and norms, and that an objective of engagements was to have those global standards. we have row considered that as a u.s. objective and we've actually concluded that the current u.s. objective is accepting some fragmenttation. i think if you talk to the u.s. officials they would say we are
9:43 am
accepting frag mentation because china has forced that fragmentation and we are now having to respond. i think we need to maybe not consider so much the history, but where we are right now at a particular point in time. and it is a change, i think, in u.s. policy if we are accepting fragmentation in certain technological and data-driven areas, it seems to us a change in u.s. policy and i lied, one last key takeaway. we're talking here about defensive measures for the most part, restricting activities potentially, but our big takeaway from this project is we do need to play off defense, but the most important thing is for the united states to be playing offense. we will not win by defending areas where we're already good. we need to get even better and
9:44 am
so, while so much of the report and so much of the our discussion will be on the defensive side, we can't lose sight of what really is critical and that is competing and kind of augmenting our defensive capabilities. so i hope everyone will take a look both at the february report and the report that's issued today. there's much more details contained there-in. but as i mentioned, the deliverable here really is the framework and then we tested the framework in three sectors and that's why i like to pull in our experts here. the three sectors that we chose to look at were artificial intelligence and specifically research collaboration in ai. we looked at biotechnology and specifically data sharing, sharing of human genomic data in biotechnology, and then the third issue was on the capital market side and looking at
9:45 am
cross-portfolio flows. to apply the framework, we needed to pull in experts and the three experts that we have with us today participated in at least one of each of these round tables. i'd like to do just a brief introduction and then turn the microphone over to them. first we're going to hear from dave rank, senior advisor with the cowan group. he has a long and distinguished career in the u.s. foreign service, including postings in beijing, shanghai and taiwan. his last posting was in 2017 with final assignment was that of deputy chief of mission at the u.s. embassy in beijing. we will then hear from remco, research fellow at security and emerging technology better
9:46 am
known as c-set at georgetown university and he's a prolific writer, not just on ai, but also on immigration policy and research security which are very relevant for today's conversation. we'll hear from ann stevenson yang, co-founder and research director at day capital research. she lived in china for a number of years and covered sectors ranging from finance, but also on the technology side. i did note as i was doing a bit of research for that this ann actually authored a book called "china alone", potential return back to isolation back in 2013, so, if we can say that someone was definitely ahead of her time and appreciating where things are now, i think it's ann. so, let me just thank all three of you for joining us today. i want to pose the same
9:47 am
question to all of you, actually, to kick us off and start with dave and that is your reaction to what you heard from representative hill. he covered a lot of ground in his comments. he had a lot to say about the current status of u.s.-china relations. i'm wondering if you could respond to the comments and also give us your assessment where things stand on u.s.-china engagement? >> thank you. tough act to follow between representative hill, stephanie, and you, and matt as well. thank you for inviting me. and i thought representative hill was terrific. i thought he was really refreshing and really well-informed both historically, historical background of the united states relationship in asia and the current state of play in washington. so congratulations for getting
9:48 am
such a great, keynote speaker. >> and i thought it was particularly-- i was particularly impressed by the way he started by noting that, you know, that the current state of tensions between the united states and china aren't the norm. they have not been the norm. if you look at the 20th century, roughly what, 80 of the 100 years of the 20th century, the u.s. and china were allies, either formal allies or defacto allies, so, you know, the current state of tension in an abberation from the-- what prevailed in the 20th century. with that as background, a couple of comments on what the representative had to say. first of all, and this gets back to something you said, stephanie, you can't beat something with nothing. and you know, the concerns we
9:49 am
have about chinese, whether chinese subsidies for support and national champion and commercial behavior at home and externally and huawei, i think are all legitimate concerns. the united states is right to be concerned about those and exactly what you were saying that complaining or pointing out problems is not sufficient. i think that it will be important as the united states thinks what we should do to think in terms, okay, how do we respond. what do we put on the table, rather than what do we take off the table and that comes to, i guess, my second general comments on representative hill's remarks and your report more generally. which is that the conversation in washington to date, i will quibble with your language, you talked about offense and defense. i would phrase it more in terms of subtracted or additive. my concern is that a lot of what the conversation in
9:50 am
washington has been has been focused on similar to the representative brought up, with subtractive, tariffs, do less of things and my preference would be, and your report highlights, additive things. how do we add to what the united states has and how do we recognize our shortcomings and address some of those which brings me, i guess, to my next general point, which is, as we think about the u.s.-china relationship was it the u.s. role in the world, i think it's important to remember the country over which we should have the most influence and it's not the people's public of china and representative hill is right that engagement has not been a-- we did not move from success to success in the course of
9:51 am
engagement with a country where we don't share-- where we have many interests that aren't in common, we don't share common values. the country we have most influence over is the united states. as we think how do we address the problems that your report highlights, how do we best address it, i think that engagement is important and i think that simply having channels to communicate are important, but as we try to address the problems we see, i think our first stop is to, one, get our own house in order and take the steps we need to take domestically. and finally, one final comment, for a while i spent six month as the head of the embassy in china and met with a lot of business people during that time and i would say that people don't come to the american embassy-- american businessmen don't come to the american embassy and i suspect they don't come to
9:52 am
capitol hill to talk about successes, about the good news, they come from problems and headaches. in my current position, i deal with a lot of companies that have headaches and problems. they're in china, not out of the milk of human kindness, but because they're making money there, because china is an attractive place to do business. the comments about decoupling and supply chains, in my current career, you know, again anecdotal and hard to -- i don't think there has been comprehensive study of supply chains, whether they have shifted because of the pandemic. there's some anecdotal evidence that people, companies were moving to places like vietnam and having gotten to vietnam and a tougher place to do business in china and have shifted supply chains back into prc. so, the thread to pick up from what the representative talked about, but are really a strong
9:53 am
way to start. so thank you. i'll stop there. >> thanks, dave. yeah, i actually kind of made a point that i should have made upfront. i should note that the report is a targeted approach to decoupling, which means the wholesale disentanglement of the u.s. and chinese economies is rejected and we should be focusing on the narrow areas where there is a risk, that's what is proposed in the report and how one identifies that, and that's informed by exactly what you just said, that the two economies are so closely integrated and private sector participants and also our allies and partners, i think, the congressman referred to the silent song of the chinese market, but the reality is that those entanglements are so
9:54 am
entrenched and that it is a very tough argument in my anecdotal experience suggests that there are not-- there is not kind of an across the board agreement on the need to separate that, but really have a more narrow and targeted approach. colleagues of ours at csis and the asia programs had done a survey that looked at thought leaders and private sector-- not just in the u.s., but also looking at key u.s. allies, and they similarly rejected in notion of decoupling, so it's an important thing for all of us to keep in mind, i think, in this discussion. let me turn to remco and the introduction, it will be clear to people that you participated in our ai research collaboration round table. i would ask you the same question that i asked to dave, as far as your reaction to what
9:55 am
you heard from the congressman, but also, your observations on what u.s.-china, those collaboration and competition looks like in artificial intelligence. go ahead. >> thanks, it's great to be her. i have very little to add beyond what dave said. i think it was-- the remarks were great and dave's responses were great. i can talk a little about what some of that nuance looks like in the ai space. i think it's a really complicated eco system and so i think it's helpful to break it down a little bit. we in the sort of ai world send to talk about, kind of four parts of the ai system and framework, what they all ai triad consists of data, algorithms and hardware. the data use today train and the algorithms, and the algorithms, run on very, very
9:56 am
intensive computer systems and tens of millions of dollars to training, and an important tool, too. and did data, it's kind of hard to control data. i think the report going into this and u.s.-china competition in data is a really complex topic in and of itself in the context of ai. a lot of data that's use today train cutting edge ai models and algorithms, as well as the second part are open source and it's a big part of the culture of the ai field to be open to share, both to be able to replicate and to be able to innovate. it encourages adoption into businesses. if you have your code open source, open source framework, people can adopt more quickly and has benefits to the united states, but also means, now, china can access technology developed in the u.s. much more quickly on the data and
9:57 am
algorithm side. on the hardware side, the third part, you know, we've seen a lot of talk about semiconductors in d.c. they're important for lots and lots of sectors, not just ai, but because of the nature of ai systems, hardware is a key part of the ai conversation and ai competition between u.s. and china. i think that's an area where people still see the u.s. as having a fairly large lead. but at the same time we also see china really investing, you know, billions and billions of dollars in building up the eco system in contrast to data and algorithms, so much is open and even if you try to restrict is it, cyber security systems are hard to lock anything up that lives in the digital world, and in hardware, it's a little bit easier to control. you can actually apply controls to certain items, especially in semiconductors, we've seen this on the manufacturing equipment
9:58 am
side so not necessarily the chips, but the machines use today make the chips. it's complicated industry and mostly in the united states, netherlands and japan and so far we've seen relatively expert controls in those areas, so on the hardware side i think you see a little more control being possible and a little more competition there as well. and the fourth part, which i think underlies that ai triad of data algorithms and hardware is talent. the people who work on all of these parts of the eco system and that's the scientists and engineers who are training the ai models, innovating on the algorithmic side are pushing forward the cutting edge of semiconductor r & d. and there, that's, you know, i work on it, so i have an incentive to say this, i think it's almost the trickiest or most interesting part of the
9:59 am
eco system. it's upon like hardware to control talent flows, we have mechanism, unlike data and algorithms, you can pick it out of cloud so to speak, there is the benefits of having open desirability and controls there, that's a really tricky issue, so, i think there we've seen the u.s. be open. we've seen the u.s. historically benefit from international talents, if you look at the ai work force in the united states today, roughly two-thirds of people that graduate degrees from the u.s. universities in ai related fields are in fact international students and so, you know, the work force today, that's a slightly lower proportion, around half maybe and it's still, that's a really, really big part of the u.s. eco system. there was a steady done in 2019 or i think in early 2020 by
10:00 am
polo looking at the top presenters in machine learning, in the very prominent ai conference and she found there were twice as many chinese nationals working on ai. presenting at that conference who lived in the united states that lived in china. ... can you control ai in the context of this conversation also looks a little bit different. >> thanks, remco.
10:01 am
your answer actually got at another one of the kind of key takeaways and something we heard consistently from the roundtables, was we really need to be specific in describing what is the activity. folks are no ai will know that it's kind of comical to think about controlling ai, what are you talking about exactly. you kind of broke down the specific components and then kind of within that narrowly what is the area that when is concerned about and, therefore, would be thinking to control, that that kind of take away for us at needing to be very tailored and specific in the activity that you are concerned about was a lesson that we can learn from all the roundtables that we convene. i'm glad you got to the net benefit because that was a question i wanted to post to the three of you as well. let me shift over now to anne who participated in the capital
10:02 am
markets and cross-border flows roundtable, the representative spent a good portion of his time can a talking about this and we know there's a tremendous amount of activity on this front, both in terms of announcements coming out of the united states, also policy actions in china that are impacting her foliar investment in particular. but anne if i could turn this over to you i've been kind of same question. what did you hear in the comments and what are kind of your observations about the nature of cross-border portfolios between the u.s. and china right now? and what sort of risks, or not, do they present to the united states? >> thanks, thanks, stepha. i really like the comments on talent. pretty much agreed with everything that the congressman said and was very impressed with
10:03 am
the depth of misunderstanding on china. i think the background on japan provides a whole lot of value. the one thing where i question the lube it was the questions about the value of engagement policy through the 1990s and arguably the early 2000s. i think that the benefits of cost reduction and efficiencies that we gained through engagement were, and, of course, to the benefits of the chinese people were enormous. the problem was more in the allocation of those cash flows throughout the united states economy, and i do think that we need to really focus on building our domestic infrastructure now and a lot of the infrastructure is talent infrastructure. that's a very complicated issue. i think that it's important to remember that china throughout this period of expansion and engagement with the world has really not changed its domestic
10:04 am
institutions hardly at all, but instead has coupled with international institutions kind of the way you would couple of train. a very thin interface between, for example, the domestic trade ministry and the international wto, the ppo see and the imf and so on and so forth. that doesn't mean that we shouldn't protect our own interest in the united states. i think it's not realistic to expect china to move farther towards a rule of law. i think that the united states made a lot of, players and the united states made the mistake of thinking that xi jinping when he took over his party role in 2012 was going to continue the reforms of the past, and that's turned out to be very much not the case. it doesn't mean that we shouldn't protect our own interests and i think the way we do that is through a lot of the
10:05 am
financial measures that the congressman mentioned. i think that the sherman bill, law is very important there. i think it needs to be tightened and i think ultimately auditors need to be paid by some central fund rather than by the company so they stop seeing their interest with the companies. i think the fdr bill is a good idea. many measures particularly that the congressman mentioned to manage financial flows between the united states and china i think will be very helpful. why don't i i paused there ant us go to questions? >> thanks, anne. let me just remind the audience were scheduled to go until 10:3e time for audience questions. we're getting a few in the please go ahead and submit them
10:06 am
if you have questions. i'm going to take just one more question to the panelist. it will be a common question again to save time for audience questions. and that's on the issue of allies and partners. the congressman highlighted the importance of cooperation with allies and partners. in his comments we have in our framework one of the ways to assess effectiveness of any restrictions is likely that allies and partners would go along with any decision to restrict. but i don't like to ask all three of you again, dave, maybe more in general, how you see allies and partners and their assessment of the risk coming from china, how like-minded are we in that assessment? and then i will ask remco and anne may be more tailored to
10:07 am
your sectors, but they, let me go to you first with that question. >> sure. if i can go back come not to beat up on the congressman a little bit. i thought he perhaps undersold the extent to which the ship we saw in the trump administration was already in the works at the end of the obama come in the second obama term. and i think where hillary clinton had one or donald trump that we would have seen a much sharper focus on china then had been under obama. i also think he may have oversold the extent to which policies, what pompeo implement it, cemented the alliance on china. i think using some of the tools, tariffs, that sort of thing on china certainly got the attention of beijing but the fact that top administration also use similar tools on canada and japan and the eu undermined
10:08 am
the extent to which the trump administration was able to rally allies and partners. i think her sing a little bit of an effort now to take a more sort of our life centric approach to trade issues. and i think bringing up the challenges that that will bring along. i mean, tpc at think it's an encouraging. one thing, and not become in different languages, you know, that trade and technology council, if i got that right, u.s.-eu meeting that took place in pittsburgh the first of many, i hope is more than a long drawn out talk shop that a quickly goes from discussion of issues to implementation of the joint approaches. the challenge is, and remco maybe you can talk about this
10:09 am
better than i can, is that on a lot of things the u.s. and u.s. and european interests are really different. that we have a much more of our technology sector is much more advanced than the eu's and a lot of areas. and so our concerns are not there are concerns, and it will be a challenge to get alignment on things because we don't fundamentally share the same interests in areas. and then finally allies and partners. i think sometimes we overly securitize, the department of defense kind of security, our life partner relationships. i think the aukus agreement is a good thing. the fact that very quickly a french ox was gored by cementing that partnership though shows how hard it's going to be to
10:10 am
cobble together different groups of relationships into a united sort of posture towards china. i'll stop there entered a back to you, stephanie. >> thanks, david. you mentioned kind of the ttc, the eu-u.s. trade and technology council, which from the outside looks like it was quite a heavy lift, ten working groups i think came out of that. so clearly a lot of work and a lot of ambition, but as you pointed out, now comes the deliverable stage and that's really where we start to see some of the tension. i should mention we had a biotech expert that was unable to join our panel at the last minute, but the take away in the biotech case study revolve a lot
10:11 am
around data, symmetric approaches to date when looking at the u.s. and china, and data come we could have another 18 month project on just the topic of data and what that means. but that's an issue when we do not have a common approach with our allies and partners in any strategic key sector. beverly could be a big sticking point so we have an asymmetric approach when it comes to u.s. vis-à-vis china but also u.s. vis-à-vis europe, and that come we are over and over again that that really should be kind of prioritize as a top issue to forge greater consensus among allies and partners. let me go to you, remco, and kind as to that same question. data obvious is a big chunk of what is implicated in
10:12 am
discussions on ai, but how do you see kind of the allies cooperation in artificial intelligence? >> yeah, i think it's a big topic. the cooperation side i think you mentioned ttc and ai working group there. i think they focus on responsible and trustworthy ai. so trying to get ai systems which learn in ways we don't fully understand from data and interacting with the world, trying to get them to be aligned with human values and to do what we intend them to do think that's an area of a common interest and so a lot of the working groups and looks like we'll be focus on that in the area of ai but a lot of the working groups activities i should say. values, making sure we can reap the benefits of ai systems without needing to violate privacy so there's a subfield called privacy preserving ai or privacy preserving methods.
10:13 am
you don't have to centralize all your data in one place. you can train models, send a model to your phone and a trance and local data and since the model back so you don't have to rip up all your personal data to a company under to get the benefits of ai. those are areas of common interest and also that gets into framing a democratic alternative to china's authoritarian model as technology. that's the scenario where there is cooperation. areas where there's competition or where there's disagreement. semiconductors is another ttc working group. u.s. is now investing i think the chips act money is not an appropriate but if it is i think the u.s. is going to invest around 50 billion in domestic manufacturing in semiconductor r&d. europe has now said we want in on that come to so we also want to invest tens of billions. those companies find the same market so there's competitive element therefore sure as the u.s., or the eu doesn't want to be dependent on the u.s. for its
10:14 am
semiconductor manufacturers supply chains. that's an area of competition, talent of area, too. we have canada advertising with big billboards in silicon valley saint if you have h-1b problems, visa problems, come to canada. we are very open, low taxes. that campaign is been running for many years and having a lot of success. the u.s. says want to cooperate on talent , with other cot that often means getting their people to come work in the u.s. which is obviously a little bit of a competitive element. that's an area where there is competition. on the china side there is a little bit of collaboration on so on the talent side about after the points that there's a lot of countries similarly concerned to just china trying to figure out what to do about china's attempts to use overseas talent to transfer technology. canada, the uk, australia has been working on this for a few years, the netherlands, they've all had parliamentary inquiries
10:15 am
of what we do about these concerns and we want to be open to chinese researchers, students, workers but we are struggling to strike the right balance and that's an area where you've also seen a lot of dialogue, not very publicly but an area where there's common interest. it's a real messy mix of cooperation and competition i think. >> yeah, and on that, the last point i think, part of it is a question of risk tolerance. so while welcoming researchers may entail certain risks, can those risks being managed? and are we really trying to live in a world of accepting zero risk or managing the risk that we have to maximize the benefit? and that's, you know, clearly evident in your sector but i think it applies across many sectors as well. anne come on this question of
10:16 am
kind of allied cooperation. i think you picked up on in your comments. it was a theme that came across in the roundtable on cross-border portfolio flows, which was at the effectiveness of restrictions is really dependent on others, other centers of wealth, basically kind of going along with some of those restrictions. and so the point of getting cooperation from allies and partners is every bit as relevant and a context low context as it is in a technology transfer context. what do you see there as far as the prospect for collaboration, cooperation among allies and partners? this is pretty unchartered territory in some respects. we don't have an understanding of financial flow restrictions
10:17 am
that's on the same level of export controls where you have multilateral control of regime. so where do you see things going when we're talking about capital flows? >> i'm not sure i completely agree with the premise. i think that china has put itself forth under xi jinping as a financial capital, one where the renminbi is internationally lysing and the marks of becoming a partner at think it's not too. i think you see progress in the other direction in china, and as long as the renminbi is non-convertible the idea its markets are going to be challengers to the united states, public markets or the renminbi itself will be important internationally is simply just not a nonstarter. so i think that, and also think the united states needs to protect its own market and its own investors regardless of what
10:18 am
the consequences might be. so someone else wants to list chinese company set a fraudulent and the united states and deal with the fragrance or issues then my feeling is be my guest. i do think that there are areas for important cooperation because i think that china has very much established a set of parallel institutions, as the congressman mentioned, particularly in finance. and that signing onto this institution instead using the more transparent and better government international institutions is a mistake. it was a mistake not to join the ttc when we made that decision, and pushing china to use the world bank in the asian fashion what's it called? the asian infrastructure bank, is that what it's called?
10:19 am
rather than its own separate institutions for the bri, i think is the right idea. i think the legislation on sdr is right idea. there's been this siren song of china's capital which are also saw in japan in the late 1980s where localities internationally and in the united states and international institutions like the imf have felt like oh, they are just so important and so powerful, and they have so much influence. we have to accept their sort of different rules and order to have them participate. and china's inclusion in the sdr basket back and can what was a, 2016, 2015 i think i think was one of those mistakes, as is been china's inclusion in the msc i index and things like that. i think rationally that sort of thing will fade away. >> all right. i want to come back actually to
10:20 am
some of those financial, we've got a few questions and related to capital market issues. let me go to some of the ideas questions that we have been receiving, and the first one, remco, is to you and ask ac, picks up on some of your points of the different components of the ai and what can be controlled. the question is, until we have wrapped up our domestic tip capacity hash it would be think about partnerships with taiwan and korea? sweettalk the allies and partners. here we have two kind of key relationships can also very tense, a lot of tensions around these relationships right now. but how would you respond to the question, how should we be think about partnership with taiwan and korea? >> i think is very important partnerships and i think there is a kind trade-off between often resiliency and efficiency
10:21 am
especially in a sort of really intense market like semiconductors. i i think from a resiliency perspective you mostly want supply chain that distributes across a bunch of different places. right now it's very concentrated in taiwan and south korea also. and so i think that's a thing the united states -- there's cost advantages, all these advantages from partnering there. there. i think taking a longview also thinking about where else, if something is wrong a special in taiwan, obviously it is a hik context of their due to the risk of military conflict. if you want to be fully dependent on that pics i think they're truly complex questions that are on the one hand, the real efficiency, taiwan is an important ally can what the double down. on the other and you don't put all your eggs in that basket because a basket might break. the are water shortage in taiwan
10:22 am
at some point that effect semiconductor manufacturer as well. that even goes from within the united states for how much manufacturing capacity want to cultivate within the united states. it's a natural disaster in some part of the country cannot count part of your supply chain you don't want all your eggs in the basket either. this is complicated on an international stage but even complicated domestically. >> and we haven't really emphasized much supply chain security and can of the effort the previous administration, , w the current administration focusing on supply chain security, but one of the themes emerging from that is that yes, u.s.-china is a central theme in those discussions but i think even beyond that the question of diversification of supplies is really a critical theme that has been emerging from those discussions. dave, let me go to you with a question that we have received
10:23 am
that -- that gets to ethics. i mentioned in the framework we have a category of objective as being value-based objectives. we have observed that value-based objectives are actually when we think about prioritization of objectives, really seems to be very high on the list in this administration. the question we got is whether or not you foresee a necessary revolution in the ethical boundaries to operationalizing emerging come in this case to refer to biotech but let's call emerging technologies. what does it mean if you have the u.s. and lets the u.s. and allies and partners and china or another country kind of operating off of different ethical norms and standards?
10:24 am
what does that mean for development in those sectors? how should the u.s. be responding if you look like we're fragmenting in the area of ethics? >> wow. what a a great question. i'm going to reveal my ethical shortcomings just because i mean that seems so incredibly thorny. and again i would say not just in a bilateral sense for a multilateral sense, but sort of in a national and individual level. i guess i will fall back on where i started in my sort of initial comments, that we have to get her house in order here on questions like that. that i think went to think through those as a society. what are the ethical implications of things like genetic modification? where are the limits that we
10:25 am
will not cross? i think that is to me anyway and has to be informed by conversation in society, but eventually there is a role for government there to draw the bright line. if you needed -- to individuals or organizations, they would get pulled in different directions. and i think there's a role for a state to say within these confines, let's have these discussions. this you shall not cross. so it's clear where the discussion ends. and once we have done that at a national level, i think, and this is based on conversation in other areas with european and japanese, our traditional allies, partners, that i think there's a prospect for probably not perfect alignment but an alignment at that level.
10:26 am
and then sort up just as excited to global standards setting and other areas, , can we bring chia into that conversation. may be the conversation of this is where we are, if you want to join, if you want to have access to our system, our markets, these are the ethical limits that we have set for ourselves. the remco and anne, don't know, i turn to you if you have thoughts. >> go ahead, , remco. >> i said, i am glad i don't have to solve ethics overseas. >> i mean look, i have looked quite a bit at the chinese information regime and the credit records and so on and so forth, and i would say we've all been living with such ethical fragmentation for quite some time. i think the eu has a much better
10:27 am
regime for management of personal data and privacy than the united states has. it still has a long way to go and china of course is antagonistic to all that because for china personal data is for the use of the government, not for any commercial uses are just kind of a bonus in china. so i do think that we need to think across these issues in a a more democratic and public way. i think my own hunch is it's going to take some breakup of the huge monopoly companies like facebook and google, but you know, that's not my area. i just think, i would agree with what dave says but say that we are already deep into that issu issue. >> let me actually note that we are just a few minutes from the end of our program, so if our panelists what to think of a few
10:28 am
key takeaways you want to leave with the audience, i'll just add on that kind of question of values. one of the things that emerged in particular in the biotech roundtable was, well first, that the stakes are very high, that the are asymmetries in dealing with china where the u.s. needs to think about how it once to respond to those asymmetries. but there was also a very kind of clear voice that there are certain issues like biosafety and bioethics where we really need kind of a whole of world approach, and that world includes china. so while there were certainly voices and issues can push in the direction of fragmentation is, there were also voices on certain issues, biosafety being one of them, the said the only
10:29 am
way you can achieve your goals in that area is to a whole of world approach. and that's the tension, , right, and why the topic itself particularly challenging. so with that, at the two minute mark i would like to just here your kind concluding thoughts on such a complex issue if you were to leave the audience with a few kind of key takeaways from your perspective. what might those be, dave? i'm going to go to you first hear again and then remco and anne. >> thanks, stephanie. i think they will be areas where either ethical or commercial or national security reasons we have to decouple but generally i think and talk about this earlier, we will not be successful by being more chinese than the chinese. we will be successful by being better americans come by being more open, more transparent, by
10:30 am
establishing organizations and leading them and being additive to what his work rather than subtractive to the global system i'll leave it at that. >> remco? >> very much agree with the date on that. i would echo also the point on bio that you may, stephanie, was sort of, yeah, there's really areas where we need a whole world effort i think in the case of ai. that's really assuring the safety and security of ai systems but especially as they get increasingly powerful and implement it in high-stakes domain. so things like nuclear command and control, offensive cyber operations or even defensive cyber operations producing ai systems get into these high-stakes. a single accident could set off very dangerous vitals. i go needs to be where the systems don't always act in a
10:31 am
way that we think and there's real risk of their and i think that's an area where if one country or one company even does it wrong there could be real risk that of everyone. there will be competition inevitably in a lot of that parts of ai ecosystem but that's an area i would emphasize we need real cooperation as well. >> i would agree with what both dave van remco said. i would only add that i think the united states needs to at every level needs to park our heirs to the siren song of chinese capital, and just enforcing implement our own laws and regulations and protect her own investors and not worry so much about whether we're getting chinese capital flows. >> all right. well, let me thank the three of you certainly for your time this morning but actually leading up to this event. we greatly benefited from your
10:32 am
expertise in putting together a the report, developed a framework but then also trying to be practical about it, and you kind of help us with that practical peace and that would actually apply in different sectors. we are not naïve about kind of the size of this challenge and how complicated it is, but we're are grateful that folks like you are spending time thinking about it. we hope that the report and the framework therein is of some assistant to policymakers. we kind of underscore this common approach to risk assessment is probably the thing that actually helped clarify u.s. objectives and probably stands the greatest chance of getting consensus among the various actors, whether they are government, private sector or
10:33 am
nongovernment actors. so with that let me just thank all of you. i don't think this will be our last conversation on the topic of u.s.-china economic engagement and competition, but hopefully more conversations to come, thanks to everybody for tuning in and taking part in the conversation. thanks so much. >> thank you. ♪ ♪ ♪ >> officials test of that muscle is a supply chain issues before a house subcommittee. watch tonight at eight eastern on c-span2, online at c-span.org or on our new video rap, c-span now. >> sunday not on q&a retired california superior court judge takes a critical look at our legal system and offers suggestions on how to improve it. her latest book, for honor,
10:34 am
aggressive judicial independence, mandatory minimum sensing, racial bias in jury selection and police reform. >> particularly in urban settings, not exclusively please also not interested in the fact you have your traffic signal on. they're not interested in that topic with what is have reason to stop you today and engage in a conversation and they may be searched your. the u.s. supreme court has said police officers that's just fine. you can make these kind of the stops and it doesn't matter that that's not really what you're really interested in. and i think what has to change is the very nature of policing has to change and we need to take that role out of policing. please should be used to investigate crimes and to prevent crimes but a think traffic stops are major problems because they disproportionally focus on people of color. >> ladoris cordell sunday night
10:35 am
at eight eastern on c-span's q&a. you can listen to q&a and all of our podcast on a new c-span now app. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government that we are funded these television companies and more including cox. >> cox is committed to providing eligible families access to affordable internet through that connected program. bridging the digital divide. cox, bringing us closer. >> cox supports c-span as a public service along with these other television providers giving you a front-row seat to democracy. >> host: david michaels is with us. he served as the director of the occupational safety and health administration from 2009-17 as assistant secretary off labor te es

13 Views

info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on