tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN March 14, 2014 4:00pm-6:01pm EDT
useful but not critical. and the oversight board said that quote we have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the united states in which the program a concrete difference in the outcome of the counterterrorism investigation. you have an assessment of how -- first of all, the utility of the program and how that utility compares to the level of concern that the american people have about its perceived impact on privacy? >> first as a nominee i'm not in position to really yet be able
to comment on the valley of 215. but if confirmed i certainly intend to be able to do so. i believe one of the most important functions of the director of the national security agency is to be able to articulate just that. what is the value of our effort so that we could make well informed and smart decisions. >> do you have an opinion as to whether, yeah, and opinion, as to whether or not there has been an instance involving a threat to the united states in which the 215 program made a concrete difference? do you have an opinion going in on that subject? >> nothing specific. i've not had a chance to sit down and red review the events. if my memory is correct, general alexander outlined a number of instances in which he thought 215 generated value. >> all right.
and this is also for you, admiral or do you think the department of defense is doing enough to provide capabilities for our defense of cyber units by exploiting commercial technology? >> i would use my own experience right now as the navy component to u.s. cyber command, where we have a continual outreach to the broader commercial industry sector in an attempt identify just what technologies are available that we could use in the missions. there is an aggressive effort to do so. >> thank you both. >> senator inhofe. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we expressed many times our concern about iran and the threat that they pose to us, and that our intelligence and classified intelligence as far back as 2007 indicated that they
would have a capability of a weapon, or delivery system by 2015, then it was even more forcefully expressed in an report that was unclassified by our intelligence in 2010, reaffirming their suspicions are earlier. so i have been concerned about that for a long period of time, i'm concerned that a president that some of thinks there's an opportunity to get them to join the global community and reform their ways. in a recent "wall street journal" article, suggesting the iranians were able to successfully infiltrate the navy network. the federally 17th article racist series questions suggesting iran was able to access the bloodstream of the navy network. i'm going to quote from that report. iran's infiltration of a navy computer network was far more extensive than previously
thought. it took the navy about four months to finally purge the hackers from its biggest unclassified computer network. if it's true, geopolitical consequences of such an attack should really be found. however, it remains unclear what, if anything, this administration would do in response to such behavior. with a similar penetration by the iranians were planes into american airspace be treated with such ambivalence? i would hope not. admiral rogers come in your current job as commander of the fleet cyber command means you whayouare the one responsible fr defending navy networks. this happen on your watch, correct? >> yes, sir commented. >> what are the consequences of iranian action in cyberspace? >> first, it is a matter of policy and for operational security reasons would never categorize who exactly publicly
penetrated the network to i would be glad to discuss this week in a classified session. >> no. has been discussed in an unclassified session for quite some time. that we are talking about iran in this case, but go ahead. >> not to my knowledge but i apologize. specifically, a segment of our unclassified network was compromised. they were able to gain access to the system. in response to that i generated an operational requirement for not just to push them out of the network by wanted to use this opportunity to do a much more foundational review of the entire network to use this as an opportunity to drive change within my own service. >> what is the administration doing now in response to this attack speak was i'm sorry, i apologize but i'm not in a position to comment. >> my opening statement i quoted general fraser. he testified last year that a number of cyber attacks against transcom have doubled from
45,000 in 2011 to nearly 100,000 in 2012. now, that's not very good, is it? does that concern you? into what level -- >> in my current position is, i'm aware of statistics and we taken pretty aggressive action to secure our networks as i discussed before. the nature of our network that ties us commercial providers of transportation requires us to have access to the information from their networks as well. we have been working diligently with those contractors and commercial providers to secure those networks. is a number of attacks doesn't actually quite to the number of actual intrusions and data exfiltrated, but to the number of probes and attempt to get into the network. so if confirmed for the position of transcom command i will continue to work the issue hard with jenna rogers team at cyber, as well as with our 24th air force team which is the
designated unit that essentially provides the extra security for our networks. >> all right. when we had a hearing in february, general alexander, and general alexander and i become good friends over the years and we've a chance to have a lot of conversations, personal conversations. what he was asked when a cyberattack, an act is actually an act of war. to explain what sort of actions and ambition might take in crossing that threshold, he answered that he believed that if an attack destroyed military or government networks or impacts our ability to operate, you've crossed that line. do you think, admiral rogers, that the you agree with that characterization? >> i would a great. >> do you agree they have have crossed that line? >> i'm sorry? >> they crossed that line in the actions they've taken. >> that day, they are referring
to? >> i'm talking about what, when general alexander was asked when a cyberattack does cross that line and becomes an act of war, and he said that networks -- that affects are built to operate them you've crossed that line. do you agree with that characterization? do you believe we have crossed that line? >> no, i did not believe we have crossed that line. >> d. agree with the statement that was made by general selva that the number of cyber attacks against transcom doubling from 4,502,011 to nearly 100,000 in 2012 dozen properly express our deterrent against these attacks? does this concern you that we have doubled in that are periodf time and the number of cyber attacks on us?
>> i apologize big is your question the general or myself a? >> the question is for you. i'm saying that general fraser testified that the number of cyber attacks on transcom -- lets a cyberattack spirit, is increased from 45,000 to 100,000 any period of the year. isn't that concerned? does that mean perhaps we're not doing the job we should be doing? >> it is concerned but i think it's reflected in a level of investment the department is making in the cyber missions that. even as we face challenging budget times, cyber remains one of the errors in which the department remains committed to actual growth and capability. >> my only concern here is that, first of all i believe a lot of the things i've gotten from the unclassified media and classified that iran is very active in this area. i think i've been concerned about their capability and i've expressed that concern. and it appears to me that quite a statement such as we have from the administration quote if iran seizes this opportunity and
chooses to join the global community, we can chip away at the mistrust that exists. i just think that we need to be talking about the fact that we have an enemy out there and he's demonstrated that very clear. and now this new capability, a few years ago nobody knew what he cyberattack was. i think we all understand that it can be just it's critical, just as damaging to our country as an attack with weapons on this country. i think you all agree with that, don't you? >> yes, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator udall. >> thank you, mr. chairman. good morning gentlemen. thank you for your distinguished service to our nation. admiral rogers, want to turn to you. your written testimony advance policy responses. in those i noted that you stated that if the government could continue to access phone records through foreign service providers or repositories, that could serve as a viable alternative to the current phone records collection program.
i was glad to read that. he also wrote that the business records 215 program quote grew out of a desire to address the gap identified after 9/11. since one of the hijackers cleat on it hard to make a phone call from san diego to a known al-qaeda sake -- safe house in human. you know that the nsa saw that call but you could not see those coming from an individual already in the united states. i'm concerned by the invitation that somehow section 215 program could have prevented 9/11. and i want to set the record state. from my point of view. as the 9/11 commission one of the set a new about him made our but did not tell the fbi to the argument that this is record data could been the key to identifying doesn't stand up in my view. also i don't know why the nsa couldn't gain the authorization on an individualized basis to determine whether this inning and was in contact with anyone
in the united states and i don't see why able collection of it would've been necessary. and doesn't you agreed the constitution is not an abatement to our security. it's the source of our security. we can into the collection and focus on terrorists and spies without infringing on the constitutional rights of law-abiding americans. last year the president acknowledged what i've been saying, the status quo must change. i look fo forward to working wih you to make those changes. if i might be looking ahead i want to turn to the 702 program and ask a policy question about the authorities under section 702 am written in to the fisa amendment act. the committee asked or anything of the legal rationale for nasa to search their data required under section 70 using you as person identifiers without probable cause. you replied the nsa's court approved procedures only permit searches of the lawfully acquire data using you as person identifiers for valid foreign
intelligence purposes. and under the oversight of the justice department and the dni. the statues written to anticipate the incidental collection of americans communications in the course of collecting the communications of foreigners reason -- reasoned to be located overseas but the bulk is intended be foreigners communications, not americans. but declassified court documents show that in 2011 the nsa sought and obtained the authority to go through communications collected under section 702 and conduct toward -- what was searches of specific americans. my question is simple. have many of the searches ever been conducted? >> i apologize. i'm not in a position to be able to answer that as a nominee. >> you -- yes. >> but if you'd like me to come back to you in the future if confirmed to be up to specifically address the question i would be glad to do so. >> you may recall that director clapper was asked this question
in a hearing earlier this year. he didn't believe that an open forum was the appropriate setting in which to discuss these issues. the problem that i have, senator wyden, and others, is we've tried various ways to get an unclassified answer, simple answer yes or no to the question. we want to have an answer because it relates, the answer does, to americans privacy. can you commit to answering the question before the committee votes on your nomination? >> i believe one of my challenges is as director, if confirmed is how do we engage with the american people, and by extension their representatives come in a dialogue in which they have a level of comfort as to what we're doing and why. it is a challenge for those of us from an intelligence background, to be honest. but i believe one of the takeaways from the situation over the last few months has been as an intelligence professional, as a senior
intelligence leader, i have to be capable of communicating in a way that highlights what we are doing and why to the greatest extent possible. and perhaps a compromise is, if it comes to the how we do things in the specifics, those are best addressed perhaps in a classified session. but when my challenges is i have to be a blue speak in broad terms in a way that most people can understand the i look forward to that challenge. >> i will continue asking a question and also look for to working with you to rebuild the confidence as you pointed out the public as in the very final mission that you held. let's turn to cyber for the last half of my time. before i ask a specific question i want, and i don't want to send her -- steel senator mccain stand up and think he is a very creative idea of setting up a special committee on cybersecurity so that we can cut through some of the jurisdictional tension that existed but anymore specific
context, you noted in your comments that we've got to really work to develop and train a significant number of highly capable cyber personnel to meet the nation's needs. there's no doubt if are going to achieve dominance, that we have to have those personnel. we've done in a physical world, in the kinetic world, and we can do it in cyberspace. do you believe we're doing enough to cultivate cyber professionals in the early stages of their career? the air force academy which is located in my state has given us the opportunity to fly small aircraft in their college years. they enter pilot training and are familiar with the fundamentals in the field of flying an airplane. or a helicopter. and i'm afraid we're not getting the same level of attention to cyber training programs. should we be investing more hands on real-world training opportunities at our academies for the next generation of cyber warriors? >> yes, sir. as a naval officer, i have
worked with her own naval academy on doing just that. in fact, right now the requirement of the naval academy is there's a baseline cyber course requirement for every mission. that's a new requirement laid out in the last couple of years. >> i look for to working with you in that area as well, because we will achieve dominance. we've got to make this investment up front. i think you and i both agree. thank you again, both of you, for your willingness to serve in these important positions. thank you. >> senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the witnesses for the outstanding service. just to follow up, admiral rogers, general alexander when asked, he said because of the overlapping jurisdictions of many committees of congress that he thought that a select committee to investigate this entire issue which covers a wide spectrum, as you know, would be
a good idea. do you have a few? >> steps which would try to bring together those speeds i would ask if you have a view on whether we should have a select committee or not. i'm not used to -- let's not start out that way. would you or would you not agree that the select committee would be a good idea? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. general, are you on track to remove all the necessary equipment and armaments from afghanistan by the end of 2014 that you're tasked to do? you are confident speak was yes, sir. >> you are on track right now? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. admiral, i want to bring up this issue again of the iranian hack of navy computers. according to "the wall street journal" article, iranian hack into the navy's largest
unclassified computer network, took more than four months to resolve, raising concern among some lawmakers about security gaps exposed by the attack. the paper reported the hackers were able to remain in the network until this past november. that contradicts what officials told the journal wit when the ak was first public reported this past september. at the time, officials told the paper that the intruders had been removed, quote, it was a real big deal, a senior u.s. official told the journal quote is a significant penetration that showed a weakness in the system. can you help out the committee on that whole scenario here? >> yes, sir. it was a significant penetration which is one of the reasons why over the last few months multiple updates of the staffers on this committee, one of things i wanted to do is how do we learn from this, how do we work hard to make sure it doesn't happen again. as a result i directed a rather
comprehensive operational response to that. that response was much broader than just be able to come back and say they are not there anymore. i want to use this as an opportunity to try to drive change i put a much more, much longer-term effort in place and i want to immediately remove them. i wanted to do more than that. >> and the damage done, in your view was significant? >> i'm not sure that he would agree with significant but it is of concern. because in this case they did not opt to engage in any disruptive behavior. my concern from the beginning was what if they decided that was their intent? >> i thank you. admiral, we've got a real problem here, at least from the standpoint those of us who feel that our ability to monitor the behavior of possible attackers
of the united states of america is vital. and mr. snowden has done some really significant damage. and i quote from the polls and the genuine can it be x. survey, 57% of americans branded mr. snowden as a quote whistleblower -- quinnipiac. 34% called him a traitor. a fox news poll taking the same month found 68% of americans were glad to know about the nsa program snowed and revealed, while cbs survey found of those disapproving of snowden's conduct, numbers of those approving 54-31. still, very significant number of americans that view mr. snowden as a whistleblower. and many significant portion of americans as a patriot and a
proof of his conduct. what do you think we need to do to counter that impression the american people have when i'm sure that you and i are in total agreement that this individual violated a solemn oath that he made enough to reveal this information and has damaged our ability to defend this nation speak was yes, sir. i would agree with your assessment. i think in general there's a couple of things. the first is this idea of transparency as senator udall mention. this idea we've got to have a dialogue that talks about what are we doing and the wind. in addition we have to ensure strict account build on the part of the national security agency. we have to make sure we do in fact follow those processes are probably and when we make a mistake, if we fail to meet those requirements that we are very up front about how and the why. >> do you have any thoughts about the allegations that the
fisa courts are just a rubber stamp for the administration? >> i don't believe that to be the case. >> do you believe that they are exercising sufficient oversight? >> yes, sir. >> so you do appreciate the fact that we have at least with a large number of americans and people around the world a significant problem with the pr aspect of the work that you and your organization will be doing? >> yes, sir. which is why, for example, my personal opinion is the fisa structures worked well but i'm open to the idea that with a view of instilling greater confidence we should look at a range of potential options to improve that transparency. >> if i had a recommendation for you, it would be as much as possible given the aspects of
national security that you may be give some speeches in various venues where you could explain better to the american people exactly what you're doing, and perhaps not exactly what you're doing, but why you're doing it. and these threats, including this one that hacked into the navy on your watch, which i doubt if hardly any americans are unaware of. i don't think americans are aware the extent of the penetration that is not only accomplished by being attempted by our adversaries and potential adversaries around the world. do you agree speak with you ask >> yes, sir. i think you're correct. >> senator blumenthal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your service to our nation in the past and for what you're going to be doing in the future and very
demanding and critical job. thank you for your family as well. admiral, as you know, the white house recently announced the creation of a voluntary framework to establish a cybersecurity organization involved in running the nation's vertical infrastructure. and this effort and framework standardizes the cybersecurity defensive measures to assist in identifying, protecting, detecting and responding to and recovering from potential intrusion. how effective do you think that this voluntary framework will be in protecting us from cyber attack? and what additional measures should the senate or the nsa take? >> i think it's a step in the right direction, but i do believe that in the end of some form of legislation which addresses both the requirement
in need to share information as well as trying to address the issue of setting standards for critical infrastructure for the nation in the long run is publicly the right answer but if confirmed i look forward to working along with a host of other people who would be a party to that. >> i agree with you very strongly that legislation will be necessary. there have been efforts to achieve it, bipartisan effort i should emphasize common some of them have been opposed by representatives of the business community on the ground that either there's no need for it, no urgency, or other reasons that i think -- sigh thank you for your offer of cooperation i look for to working with you. how working to think it is that we have this kind of legislation? >> the sooner the better. it's only a matter of time i believe before we start to see more destructive activity and then perhaps the greatest concern of all to me. >> are there areas of our
private defense industrial base, or even financial utilities and so forth that you regard as most of our global? >> there are certainly core infrastructure that's critical for us as a nation, in an unclassified form i would be leery of providing specific insights as to where think the greatest moment of is but i would be glad to discuss that. >> if the chairman at some point does have a briefing in another setting more classified setting up that may be in a i would like to explore with you. thank you. let me shift to the role of the national guard in cybersecurity. the the cybercom, commander general alexander wrigley talked about the national guard as a resource and the role that it could play in expanding our military cyber warfare and defense capabilities. do you agree with him and how
has he defined a value of the national guard can bring to this effort? >> yes, sir, i do agree. at the present, the department is is in the process during the initial analysis right now to address that very question. if confirmed i will be a part of that process. i intend to dig deeper into because one of my takeaways after 30 months right now as a naval commander for general alexander in this hibernation set is that in the end this is about how to build an integrated team that harnesses the power and the expertise of every element? while the united states navy does not have a card structure, the reserve structure we use has been very effective for us. i've worked hard to try to plug in my cart role. >> frankly those members of the naval reserve or of the national guard, the army national guard or air force, bringing capabilities, training, education, skills that are very valuable. >> yes, sir. >> turning to another area if i
may, the use of contractors. following up on the very important questions asked by my colleague, senator mccain. just to state the obvious, here was a contractor who was entrusted with responsibilities that never should have been, and i think many of us are concerned by the scope and scale of the use of private contractors even to screen and evaluate other contractors. are you concerned speak with yes, sir. i share your can -- concern but if confirmed i think i need to ask some hard questions, why where we are today and i'm comfortable with the position we find ourselves in with respect to the role of contractors. >> are there obvious defects that you can see right away they need to be corrected? >> nothing comes to mind immediately. though to be honest in my current duties this is not in the same issue on the navy side, but i have seen on the joint
aside. >> and do you think that concern is shared widely in the intelligence community? >> i would believe so. >> general, general selva, if i could ask you a question to the chairman began by asking some questions about how quickly we need to make determinations about our presence in afghanistan. what's your assessment now about how flexible we are in determining our time frames in drawing down, withdrawing the equipment and personnel power that we have? >> today i was aware of the greatest flexibility we've had in the past several months as each day passes as you're probably aware, options decrease. there is a limit to the capacity of the networks to bring that equipment and those personnel
out. i will commit to consulting with general austin for his assessment and for general dunford's assessment in isaf of the specific limits of those networks. and trends, our obligation is to make sure that the transportation later and the dissolution where of those networks is prepared for whatever capacity comes at us. >> thank you. my time has expired. i thank you both for your very helpful answers and again for your service. i look forward to working with you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator chambliss. >> thanks, mr. chairman. and gentlemen, to both of you, thank you for your service, your commitment for freedom. we appreciate the great job you do. i just want to make a comment for the record. first, admiral rogers, with regards, comments of senator udall me. i do want to leave a false impression with the american people here that if we had had 702 and 215 in place in 2001,
there is a strong probability that we would have been able to determine that major attack was going to occur and there is the probability that we would have picked up on conversation between al-mihdhar and those in yemen with whom he was planning the attack. knowing that he was in country versus knowing that he was in communication with terrorist planning an attack are two different things. we didn't have 215. we didn't have 702. we knew that a phone call coming to the united states we did not know it went to san diego. it's pretty clear that if we have had more definitive information that we would have gleaned from these programs that there is strong probability
within the intel community that we might have picked up on that. i won't make you have a comment on it but i want to make sure the record really reflects the actual facts on the ground relative to al-mihdhar. now, admiral rogers, you and i discussed something that senator mccain mentioned a little earlier. and that is with respect to trying to communicate these programs to the american people that it's going to be very difficult. he mentioned doing speeches and whatnot and i think you and i agree that that's part of it. but i would like for you to elaborate a little bit more on really what you think we can do to show more transparency and to let the american people understand how these programs work.
>> as i said i think we can be a little more communicative with why we're doing this, what led us to these kinds of decisions. i also think it's important that dialogue needs to be much broader than just the director of the national security agency, regardless who ever that individual is. there's a lot more aspects to this discussion than just the intelligence peace. in the end this fundamentally boils down to an assessment of risk, both in terms of our security as a nation as well as our rights as individuals. we value both him and got to come up with a way to enable us to ensure that both sides of that risk going are addressed, but we should never forget that there's a threat out there that aims to do us harm, that does not have the best interest of this nation in mind and wants to defeat what this nation represents. >> well, you're exactly right, and it's truly unfortunate that
general alexander was put other kind of on a limb by himself by the administration to seek to explain these programs. while he did a very good job of it, had the president with a bully pulpit been out there with him, i think we would have already had a better understanding on the part of the american people. number one, the misrepresentation of the facts regarding what information is collected on individuals, what's done with that information, and every difficult it is to be able to access personal information on any single american. it simply is extremely difficult, and requires the same process virtually that you would have to go through if you were a u.s. attorney seeking to get information on an individual american.
and the fisa court is not a rubber stamp. all you have to do is look at the makeup of the court as well as look at the decisions now which some of them are going to be made public. and i think that's a good idea. as long as we don't reveal sources and methods. but the fact that the administration did not give general alexander the kind of support they showed is really pretty discerning on my part. and i'm very hopeful, and again, as i mentioned to you yesterday, i have expressed this to the administration. i hope they will give you more support in explaining these programs than they've given to general alexander. and i have confidence that maybe they will. let's talk for a minute about information sharing. as you know we've been working on a cyber bill for years now,
and we are getting very close to agreement within the intelligence community between the chairman and myself on a cyber bill that is much needed. one of the key provisions, and kind of the last remaining obstacle we've got is the immunity provision or the liability protection provision. would you talk for a minute about in your opinion regarding how necessary liability protection is to companies who will share privileged and personal information if we are truly going to have a program that works relative to cyber? >> yes, sir. i'm not a lawyer, but my sense is it's a critical element in any legislation. i avoid to be successful you ultimately have to provide the corporate partners that we would share information with some level of liability protection. >> and do you think that firms
will participate in the sharing of information if they are not granted pretty much blanket liability protection? >> i think it would be much less inclined to do so. doubt it. >> thank you very much. >> senator donnelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral, thank you. general, thank you, and your families. and the chairman mentioned an article in "the new york times" today, and i'd know one of the interesting quotes was where this is why would somebody want to be the head of cybercom now. and it reminded me very much of the movie apollo 13 where they said this might be one of the worst things that could ever happen to us, and they looked and they said, well, this could be the best. this could be the most amazing time, and with more challenges may be than ever before. so we are giving you the football and expecting big things from both of you. and i want to ask you, general,
in regard to what we've seen in ukraine and dealings with had with russia before, are you making ultimate plants in terms of transcom after the work we do with russia? are you gaining at worst case and is how we proceed in the future? >> i would have to say if confirmed, that is a priority. i do know as the economic trends, and working director with the transcom director of operations that we have been building alternative plans. the northern distribution network, part of which flows through russia consists of five different options for how we move cargo in and out of afghanistan. we will have to look at using other options and the overflight or transit through russia, should the conduct in the ukraine continue. continue. >> i would recommend we get working on that right away. in light of what we have seen going forward these days.
admiral, when you look at what happened with mr. snowden, i know we have done reviews. as you continued to look and ask what it about this or about that in regards to where we are now on operations now to make sure we are not going to face this again internally? >> as a nominee i haven't done that for cyber command or nsa, but if -- >> have you thought that through? >> if confirmed, yes or. i do believe we need to ask yourselves, second discover mice what would be the indicated that highighlight to us that, in fac, would point out, now we are seeing changes in behavior and how are we going to have to change that just ahead of the threats that face us as a nation. >> i was just one of the first thinthings you do is sit down ad determine what policies, where did we go off the highway, how do we fix it, how do we square
it away? one of the areas of interest to me is contractors, and i guess, again, you're not in a position yet, but why, why is it that we have contractors in those positions as opposed to perhaps military personnel or other government personnel who are expert in those areas? is it a lack of individuals who can fill those positions? >> i can't speak to the specifics of mr. snowden, the function uses the link, was chosen to become a contractor, vice government if you will. but i think it is reflective of a trend over the last decade or so where as a look at the size of government we looked at the size of our workforce, some decisions were made that perhaps some of these functions could be executed on a contractor basis by using permanent government employees. i have always believed as a
commander that what we should use contractors for our for those functions that are either so specialized that you don't have the capability or skill within the government workforce, whether uniform or civilian, or it is prohibitively expensive to try to achieve that the capability. but what we considered to be core operational function, those need to be government. >> i guess in regards to mr. snowden's area, will there be a review through all of these contractor areas as to what his core to what we need to do, and when we regard and review expense? i guess the next question is what is the expense of what we're dealing with now with the situations that have been created by mr. snowden's conduct? >> i apologize, i don't know the answer to that. >> i understand but i guess i'm just trying to lay out, here's some things as we move forward that we look at. mr. snowden also remarked
recently, the u.s. government has no idea what i have, and will not know what i have and they will find out as it goes on, in effect. not his exact words, but when we look at ukraine, one of the concerns that has to come up is, you know, how much of mr. putin's actions were based on knowledge that may have been given to him by mr. snowden. and how good a handle do we have at this point on mr. snowden has and what he does not have? >> we have an in depth analytic effort ongoing within the department to determine that and ask that question. i haven't been part to that review although i've seen some of the initial work which is highlighted with the data comics i've read came from. we have tried to identify exactly what the implications are of what he took. that operation is ongoing and will take some period of time to finish. >> in another area it would be
remiss of me not to ask you about supply chain integrity, something of concern to me. counterfeit parts and that would be for both. how are we going to partner with industry? how were we going to work together with our intelligence officials and others to secure the integrity of the supply chain of what we have? we see counterfeit parts in missiles, and planes, and it is an extraordinary dangerous situation. and i was wondering what your plans are as we move forward to try to get this squared away. >> senator, our obligation and transcom it to work as the distribution process under the unified command plan. part of the obligation is to work direct with the defense logistics agency on the issue of supply chain management and integrity of the supply chain. it's out of the lane that i've been in for the last year and
half as the commander of air mobility command but it is one of the areas that i've committed to spend time with with admiral at doa to get at the details of the supply chain integrity process. it's more than just the data. it is, in fact, the ability of counterfeiters to bring to the market parts that appeared to be genuine but, in fact, art. so it's a physical issue as well as a data security issue. it goes right to the heart of our and josh capacity and the ownership of intellectual rights and be able to produce the products that our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines use in battle. >> i would ask you to make that a priority because we are one counterfeit parts away from disaster on a constant basis. >> yes, sir. >> thank you both for your service and your families. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator ayotte. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank both of you for your service to our country and to your families as well for their support and sacrifices. let me just start, general
selva. with regard to dod's air refueling capability, how important is it to our military capabilities and our national security? >> senator, the capacity of air mobility command to operate at the u.s. transcom's be asked to provide refueling around the world is critical to be able to move our forces to the places they need to be when they need to be there. the air force as you probably heard over months and years talks about global vigilance, global reach and global power. tankers are what make us global. >> and i'm really pleased, we, the air refueling wing, the new hampshire air national guard as you know has been chosen as the top air national guard unit to receive the new tankers, the kc 46 a. i want you to know what we had a very positive public hearing for the basing of the kc 46 a last
week in new hampshire. i want to ask you, in your role as commander, to be air mobility command what is your assessment of the 157th air refueling wing? how they perform and how important is the guard in all of his capabilities as we go forward? >> the 157th has a pretty storied heritage in the tanker world and they are high-performing organization. they are one of the units to which we have upended and active duty associate unit and the unit is performing quite well. the base and the unit exists in an area of fairly high demand for tanker services. and as a result their performance speaks for itself. they are a great unit and we look forward to being able to base the kc 46a pegasus, subject to the outcome of the environmental impact. >> i think you get a very positive outcome. the whole community is really excited and very supportive of having a new tanker and i look forward to working with you on
that. it's an incredible important to our national security. i also want to ask you, i know that senator donnelly asked you about the issue, i don't know specific he got into of the northern distribution network with regard to our retrograde from afghanistan. and in light of what's happening in ukraine, we are as you know on the president to many of us are pushing for further economic sanctions and other types of sanctions against russia for their invasion of crimea. and if the russians were to take retaliatory action as a result of that to shut down the northern distribution network with regard to the transit operation on those roads, what impact would that have to us and how would we address it? i think it's something we have to understand and be prepared to address. >> if the russians were to take action to constrain our access
to the russian segments of the northern distribution network, we have other options to move the cargo in and out of afghanistan. the singular item that moves across that network that would concern me at this point is the subsistence of cargoes in the form of food and noncombat articles. i'm told about 20% of the subsistence cargoes move through that network so we would have to use another option to get it in. we have several options in the northern destitution networks that do not include transiting russia. >> if for some reason which i hope they wouldn't take that type of action but we would be prepared to use other options if we have to and could do so? >> yes, we would. >> i appreciate it. admiral rogers, thank you for taking on at a very challenging time this important position. last week it was recorded in the press that russia is using cyber attacks against the ukraine
telecommunications system to block the ukrainian leadership from assessing, accessing, excuse me, the country's phone network. to what extent do you believe russia is conducting cyber attacks against ukraine? and what could the u.s. do to help the ukraine better defend itself against attacks from russia's? >> in an open unclassified form i'm not prepared to comment on the specifics of nationstate behavior. clearly cyber will be an element on almost any crisis will see in the future. i believe we see today in the ukraine. we've seen in syria, georgia. it increase of is becoming a norm. as we work to partner with others to develop norms of behavior and expectations for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, examples like this highlight to us i think what is not acceptable. we work with the ukrainians and other nations to attempt to figure out what's the best way to address them, whether it's ukrainians as for specific
technical assistance, i think would have to work everything through a case-by-case basis. >> do you believe we should help our allies if they are receiving cyberattacks and working with them to combat these attacks? >> yes. >> i think that's pretty important particularly what's happening in the ukraine right now that we are active in this area in counting in types of actions by the russian. cyberattacks or otherwise. i wanted to ask you about the department of defense a bullet of the overall to a cyber attack. in january 2013 that defense science board issued a task force report entitled resilient military systems in advance of cyber threats. the report concluded that the united states cannot be confident that our critical information technology systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well resourced upon it. utilizing cyber capabilities in common is with all of the military and intelligence capabilities. in other words, we are not confident many of our military systems would work if we are
attacked. by high and peer-to-peer adversary. do you share that assessment? how can we make sure that dod is more resilient to cyber attacks? >> i certainly share that concern which is one reason why i believe creating a defensible architecture has got to be one of the most important things we do. the network structure of today reflects a different time and place. i have explained that firsthand in the navy as an operational commander for the navy's networks to i've watched that jobs across the entire department. that's why the joint information environment i think is so critical for the future for us. we got to get to defensible -- >> with that work with you on the. finally, let me just, there's been a lot of discussion about edward snowden here today. do you believe that the disclosures that he made have put, potentially put at risk the lives of americans and our allies, are at greater risk because he has released this type of classified information? >> yes, ma'am spent so yes is
the answer to that? >> yes. >> i think people need to understand that, that he has put potentially at risk american lives and the lives of our allies. that is very, very important for people to understand in terms of what we are addressing and what we are dealing with and how we characterize his behavior. thank you both. >> thank you, senator ayotte. senator king. >> thank you, senator. general selva, good to see again. if i was in an airplane out of just over the north atlantic i would call the guys from bangor. forget about those guys from -- >> i don't think so. >> they will take a few quite adequate. as you look across the broad range of commercial assets, military assets that transcom employees across the globe, what do you feel of the greatest risks and pool abilities to transcom today to execute its
responsibilities? and how about the possibility of commercial carriers to events like cyberintrusion's? what do you see, going into this new job what is going to keep you awake at night? night? >> i think there's probably two things that worry me the most over the coming couple of years. the first is, once we have completed whatever retrograde operation happened in afghanistan come with we have a residual force or no force remained behind, the demand signal for left, surface and air will diminish significant. we've already seen in the last year nearly 50% reduction in the requirement for sustained the cargoes into and out of afghanistan. combat articles as was just regular sustainment. that hasn't implications for our organic fleets, sea lift, air lift, as well as surface. and for our commercial partners whose networks we access to make
the entire dissipation network work. so that decline in requirements, and return to more stable environment if you will actually has some negative implications across the enterprise. we are studying those in all of the organic and commercial sectors of the market to try and understand those duplications. they have significant impacts on the commercial cargo carriers, both sea lift and air lift, have been such an integral part of the network into and out of afghanistan spent what percentage of transcom's assets are -- at this moment? >> that's a difficult number to quantify, but i'll take a stab at it. roughly 40% of our capacities are organic. in the air environment, and about 50%, if we access all of the available assets through the civil reserve air fleet would be brought to us by our commercial partners. i don't have the specifics spent
as the demands of afghanistan's diminish, is there kind of an industrial base issue here in terms of the commercial carriers? are they going to go away? will they be able to find other business. is there risk of not having capacity when we need to? >> there are two dynamics at play in that incitement to what is the help of the airline industry as a whole both commercial cargo carriers and commercial passenger carriers. and two segments within that industry, the charter carriers and the scheduled carriers. the decline in the demand signal on those commercial carriers will change the economics of that industrial segment. the second thing that's changing is the very nature of commercial charter cargo across all of the global economy. with the introduction of large aircraft with large cargo bays below the passenger decks. we now see commercial passenger
carriers we entering the charter cargo market. that is change the dynamic of our civil reserve air fleet partners and we have to understand the impacts of that changing the economy on the capacity to be with us in a crisis. >> that's an issue we'll just have to watch as it evolves to? >> yes, sir. to be there right now we have an ongoing study. we're about a year into working with our commercial partners to understand the economic dynamics of what's changing in the cargo and passenger markets. we are right now in about a three-montthree month period ofg their comments on the work we have done. we owe this committee a report in mid-june, if i understand quickly, on the outcome of that discussion. >> thank you. admiral rogers, i'm going to ask a question that i don't think you're prepared to answer but i may ask it again in a year. i've been in a number of hearings both in intelligence and in this committee on cyber issues, cyber command, nsa.
how can you possibly do both of these jobs? [inaudible] >> there is no doubt it's a challenge and i'll be in a much better position as you indicated if confirmed to look back and say how hard has it been and would've been the challenges. but i believe where we are right now, many of their missions and functions are so intertwined and related that to not do it this way would create real concern. and i say that right now in my current duties on the navy, i work for general alexander both as u.s. cyber command and as nsa, as i've experienced these same judges for stand within my own service. >> you understand how over the past year both jobs have grown in responsibility and you've got to be a spokesman, you've got to manage, and i just think it's something that we're going to really have to think about with the administration going forward. i understand the desire to have it in one person, but boy, i
would think running the nsa itself is more than a full-time job. >> i will be busy, sir. >> one of the major issues that we have been discussing again for the past year and have actually for the past i don't know him years before i was here is the necessity of some kind of cyber legislation that allows better coordination between the private sector and the government. how do you assess the importance of that kind of legislation coming out of this congress? >> i believe that legislation is key for our future. we've got to change the current dynamic. >> well, i certainly hope people are listening around her, because ever since i've been everybody has been saying that but it doesn't seem -- bipod uses it if you drove straight to the pentagon a kid getting further and further away. i feel like that's what we are with this legislation. everybody is talking about but i certainly hope you will work with us to try to develop that legislation in the multiple committees that have jurisdiction.
we have the whole strategy on the nuclear side and i think we have to develop a strategy of deterrence on the cyber side if somebody comes into our networks they are going to have serious problems with their networks. thank you admiral. >> senator leahy? >> thank you both of you for joining us today. and for the service to the country. i thank you in particular for visiting with me in my office. i appreciated the opportunity to discuss those important issues. there does have to be a balance struck between achieving our national security goals and protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of american citizens. and ultimately, i agree with my friend, senator udall, that's properly understood, these two things are the same thing, our
security lies in our constitutional protections. so we can't overlook the constitutional protections in the interest of national security without compromising a good deal of what is embodied in our national security interests. in our well intended efforts to recover and move forward past september 11, 2001, we have at times tried to strike a balance in a way that i find troubling. as i stated before, i have some pretty deep seeded concerns. in some to the public things that were previously known to the members of congress and to other people with the right security clearance within the government. i worry about the nsa surveillance and metadata programs and are proposed to the
protected rights of american citizens. but to safeguard those rights even if one assumes for the purpose of the discussion but the only people and avoid out of the nsa and people with only our best interest at heart. we still run a risk even if that assumption is made at some point in the future and ten or 20 years from now unless we have the right safeguards in place those powers will be abused. particularly given the mission related to the foreign intelligence gathering we need to make sure that we protect
american citizens and the constitutionally protected rights. so, admiral rogers confirmed this position how would you work to protect the rights of american citizens while doing your job. >> i would be as transparent as possible about what we are doing and why. i would try to ensure a sense of accountability. we are given if confirmed if the nation place is a great deal of trust in this organization and haithas an incredibly important mission that involves attention in our society given the fact the fundamental rights of the individual are so foundational to our very concept of the nation. i welcome a dialogue and i think it's important as a nation. i look forward to being part of the dialogue and as you and i previously discussed i am committed to try to be a good partner in that effort.
>> any level of confidentiality must unavoidably surround many of the nsa programs that might be of concern to the american people for their effectiveness and to keep our enemy actors from working around or systems. but the public has developed a certain distrust of many of those programs. in discussing the concept with senator mccain a few minutes ago, you mentioned that there might be a range of options available to us. can you describe what some of those options might look like in balancing the need for confidentiality on the one hand in order to protect our programs and the need for transparency on the other? to assess the value portion of this and how can we do this.
i think it is something incredibly important and something to director of national security if confirmed to lead an honest and open dialogue about what is the value of the efforts as we try to move forward. >> we need to get much smarter and committed to doing so. >> but director starts to transmission out of having the government itself hold onto the metadata collected pursuant to the session 215 of the patriot act and given an update how that process is going and how that might unfold. i can't give you a sense of how it's unfolding. i know it's ongoing that indicating he wants feedback on how the best way to move forward
was it's among the many that's important to me as we move forward and we tried to figure out what is the best way we address speed, ability and the data in a way that protects the rights to the individual. but it enables us to get actions in a reasonable time period. in a speech in january the following they directed the attorney general to work with the foreign intelligence surveillance court so ther durie transition it can be inquiry after the judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency. what do you think might constitutthatconstitutes the try in this context? >> criminal kind of scenarios. >> and i assume that in those stereos there would have to be a
time component for that to qualify. >> i would think so. >> it needs to be government personnel involved with some practical reason that would make it impossible rather than just inconvenient to go to the court. is that your understanding click >> that is not a standard. >> i see that my time is expired. thank you very much. >> we want to congratulate you and help spread the resume and thank you for the service to the great country. also i want to acknowledge the passing on sunday march 9 with 1 of your air force officers that came to one of your fellow comrades if you will at the air force academy and passing of the major general we are very sorry
for that. >> if i can if you would start with me the equipment in iraq, how much did we leave behind, where did we go with it and how did that lead us to what we are going to do in afghanistan? i'm hearing there was only so much stuff behind, and from a standpoint of coming from a state of west virginia and kind of watching its keys and cues and nickels and dimes how does the fair? >> i a >> i'm not into position to comment on what we left behind in iraq, but -- >> i wasn't party -- i can try to find out for you. i will let you know that in the current discussions we are having on what we might leave behind in afghanistan, one of the key issues that we have to address as the residual value of the equipment and whether or not
the cost of lifting it out in afghanistan is worth the investment and so we have to do that essentially in the business case. >> it would have been disposed of in the military and others grants, but i don't have the specifics. >> if you can give me an overview of the cyber attacks from russia and especially with ukraine and how that escalates to concerns of more activity for the soviet union countries such as cosmi kazakhstan are you seen uptick in those cyber attacks. >> in the specifics i would ask
what would be best shared classified setting. >> if you could do that i would appreciate it, sir. my state has gone through a water crisis if you will because the spill and i said this before if anyone could to know the effect it has on the population, and the concerns and the hysteria that we have no los haf life and no one seriously ill of what the cyber attack would do if you can come down and work with us and help us on that. what i see as the water and food in the grid system are we taking active -- are you interacting and how much are you
interacting? >> if confirmed that would be an aspect of the mission. we are attempting to do that in a partnership basis in some areas working very well and others not as mature as we would like. >> maybe you can even elaborate more. i know the senator could answer a year from now. tell me what has been thrown into the mix of what you're expected to bring everything together with the growth of demand and if we should still send under one umbrella, chore has been thrown at you? >> it is a demanding set of duties and i would highlight the director and the commander of the u.s. cyber command and not operate alone by themselves as a strong team in place. i had the honor of working on the cyber command side and the
national security side the last two and a half years they were strengths for the team. >> it's amazing to me and i don't see this in west virginia at all they are trying to lift him up to any kind of hero. he's basically a traitor in our eyes. but there have to be a frustration level where he felt maybe that was the direction for him to go because there was no outlet. are you able to look -- you are going to have contractors involved. are they able to come and have their concerns or do you have any outlet that will work with them so that we don't continue to go down this road? >> there are avenues in the national security agency chain of command and both within the inspector general structure both within nsa and cyber command as
agencies. >> did snowden try to air his concerns click >> as we review the particulars that will be one of the questions of interest. >> basically he just went down the sabotage root and you said before some of the things he has done and has continued to do is a recordabl -- i'm not sure thad not repairable but had a certain significant consequence. >> so you would look at him as a traitor. >> i don't know if i would use the word traitor but i do not consider him to be a hero. >> thank you, senator. senator graham. >> i look forward to working with you in the future and i have every confidence that you will be confirmed these are very rewarding jobs. on the transportation side of
the effect will sequestration have on the ability of the transportation command to meet our defense needs over the next eight years? >> i think there are two significant impacts. the first will be as an industrially funded organization where the users that use transportation services paid out of their operation maintenance accounts and decrease the availability of the fund is likely to cause a decrease in demand signal. the corollary is that would force our organic capacity to training the people that do that work whether it is military command or mobility command to spend more of their dollars to achieve that training by moving the requirements around the world so there is a bit of a two-sided claim on the impact on the readiness of that fleet. >> would it be really damaging?
>> yes, sir. >> from the point of view that you are very familiar with how is it affected by the operational tempo of the last ten years? >> we have had a fairly high tempo in the airlift and the fueling fleet holding up pretty well. we do a continuous assessment of the structures in the aircraft -- >> is it fair to say that when we accepted each one into the fleet the operational tempo has been unprecedented since world war ii and that when it comes time to evaluate our future needs, we are flying the wings off this place. i want the committee to understand that no one envisioned this level of the tempo and we are going to have to make accommodations for it.
>> are we at war? >> there is no doubt we are in a conflict. >> if it isn't a war, what is it? is a disagreement? i guess i didn't understand the question. >> i said are we at war and you said i think it's something else, conflict. how can you say that we are not at war? >> it has a very specific legal definition and i don't believe -- >> do you believe that al qaeda p6 we are at war with al qaeda and its affiliates? senator if i could i apologize. i assume that you were talking in a cyber -- >> my dad. -- my bad. i got you. but we are at war in radical anl islam being interviewed in the
nation. the nsa program was designed to protect us against an enemy who is hell-bent on attacking our nation at home and throughout the world; do you agree? >> yes, sir. >> is it likely that the fifth column movements are in the united stateunited states endede country sympathetic to the enemy? >> we have seen those kind of actions by people in the united states. >> okay. >> do you beat me that we have had the capabilities and effect in september, 2001 that we have today is a high likelihood we would have intercepted the attack of 9/11? >> the potential would have been greater. >> as we reform the program will you keep at the forefront of your thinking not to take us back for the 9/11 capability? >> yes, sir. >> when it comes to the monitoring content of a citizen on the phone, the nsa program is
very restricted in that regard; is that a true statement? >> very true. >> that the threat we face is very real. major are you familiar with that? >> at fort hood, i believe. >> how could he come a major in the army, communicate on the internet with mri lucky, the leader of al qaeda and eminent american citizens and we don't understand about war not find or detect that, do you know? >> no other than ie bbc took advantage of the protection of the citizens. >> can you do me a favor and evaluate how we missed the major? because i believe in privacy and transparency but i believe that any system that is going to protect america from an attack has to be able to pick up a communication from a major in the united states army and one of the leading terrorists in the
world. if we can't do that, something is wrong. would you please go back and evaluate how we nested the major if we need to change the law against the future i would like to help you in that endeavor. the austin attack is it fair to say that our ability to pick intercept communications, identify the perpetrators fairly quickly and get some leave time about anything they may have been planning in new york? >> yes, sir. >> when it comes to being a radical islam do you consider the homeland one of the chief targets? >> yes, sir. >> if they could attack any place in the world of the top priority would delete be here at home. when it comes to reforming this program, how much can we talk about how the program works
before we destroy its ability to protect us? >> there's always an element that we don't want to divulge versus a method. >> what you say that discussions about how the program works in the details ar of the plea have already helped the enemy in terms of being able to adapt? >> it's giving them greater insight into what we do and how we do it. >> is it fair to say that when they communicate to use commercial networks like the rest of us? >> yes, sir. >> and the only way we would be able to detect what they are up to is to eat able to access these commercial networks in a reasonable fashion? >> yes, sir. >> do you agree the only way to detour them is to prevent them from attacking us because killing them is not a deterrent created a welcome death. the best way to protect against radical islam is to find out what they are up to and hit them or stop them before they hit us. is that of the world in which we
live? >> thank you very much gentlemen and your families for your devoted service to the nation. let me begin with the general. one of the important components is a civil reserve air fleet and i know that you're undergoing to study the relationships and what we do now so we reset after significant extensions in afghanistan and iraq around the globe. can you give us an idea, pulmonary at least on what we have to do to ensure the program continues to support the needs and any highlights of the study that are ready for primetime? >> inside the relationship in the civil reserve air fleet week of 28 separate carriers that provide cargo and passenger services each with their own ss
plan coming each with their own motivation for how they run their businesses. so, part of the study was to get at the each of how the industry runs and get at the broad macroeconomics of how the industry is going to involve overtime. so we got the big pieces together and work with the executives together in the individual carriers to come to some degree and in some of the contract mechanism might look like to incentivize the volunteer service in the civil reserve air fleet. as you may be aware, the policy that governs how we manage the airlift policy was last updated in 1987. so the study is the first major effort post desert storm to get at the economics of the industry looked like and how they affect the relationship in the craft. i fully expect based on my interactions for senior executives from many of the airlines that it will continue but the question is how do we make it a meaningful business
incentive for them to do that. >> do you anticipate any legislative requirements but he woulthatyou would have that woup you achieve a more efficient outcome for the government? >> based on the work we did in the study of the interaction i don't delete any legislative changes were required to the policy to make it successful. >> admiral congratulations. i don't know if that is i an orr or not but congratulations. you have to huge response abilities. cyber command which is a function. in your organization are you going to contemplate or have deputies, principal deputies that would essentially focus exclusively on one or the other? >> each has its own deputy and a complete operational organization.
at those times. i believe you see it changing in the course of the next few months but that is a part of -- >> part of the anticipated. let me change gears slightly in that we all recognize the growing importance of cyber in every capacity. and i think the lessons of history suggest the more we practice the better we are when the game starts. i don't think that we have had the kind of coordinated exercises between the sovereign command, homeland security, every other agency which basically would give us some -- confirmed what we be we banned there may be surprises we don't
know. is that your impression? >> we have done a good job exercising in the department as we bring more capability and capacity online. the next for us is how do we exercise more broadly in the government in th and the fightit capability. >> there's the issue not only in the u.s. government but also reaching out to the utilities of financial utilities and public utilities. is that something where again you would need either funding or authorization or encouragement? i do make the commitment that if i am confirmed i would assess that and believe that the authorities or the support on the legislative side i would approach it. >> i would encourage you to do that because there are so many different moving parts in these issues that you're addressing
not just in terms of operational, but in privacy, constitutional policy, commercial enterprises, not-for-profit that i think this exercise would be hugely important. this is the most precise analogy. but when we saw the war beginning in 1939, 1940, we've learned a lot because in fact we discovered by the way some very capable leadership at the junior ranks and bolted over some others very quickly and i don't sense that we have done that in the scale that we talked about and i would urge you to quickly and get back to what we have to assist. i think both of you bring a dedication and service in not
just your selves personally, but your families and also i think that you bring appreciation that all of what we do ultimately is about the young men and women that wear the uniform that are in harms way and what you do for them i think you. >> thank you senator. >> thanks to both of our witnesses today. let me try to be brief. general, i want to talk about moving to the air force base. but let me say that they want to do another background and often we hear that defense officials say it's not going to be like a 2005 background. they say the days of spending lots of money and moving things around old result in the financial savings. those days are over.
but with the air force plans to shut down the airlift squadron in the active-duty partners and move the aircraft away from the air force base it seems to me the reasons have never been fully explained. the official announcement came yesterday and i have a news report in mississippi which says the air force base will lose ten aircraft under the proposed defense cuts and presented a congress. the air force command plans to transfer the aircraft to the newly reactivated line 13.
i am willing to work with the air force in making an overall savings. it's going to defend our own bases. but if it's going to help the greater good, count me into the your teammate. but first we are going to go to georgia. the air force abandoned that and sent them to the field to the 44th airlift wing in north carolina. now that is going to be deactivated. we are activating the group in little rock and sending bees from keesler to little rock air force base to the newly reactive
group taxpayers have spent millions of dollars to provide the air force base with state-of-the-art modern hangers and facilities. as a matter of fact they have enough space to house the two squadrons. it continues to propose to spend millions of dollars to move these aircraft away and i just want you to help us understand the committee level the reason for this. the reason it would also cause destruction every time there is a move that i want to ask three direct questions, general. general. how much will this move cost. >> my understanding is that it is cost natural to little rock. the savings are on the order of 600 manpower across the air force reserve specifically as
the reserves looked at this decision which it creates to $100 million across for savings. >> okay. is there going to be any needed at little rock. i want you to supply be a statement on the record not to your knowledge to look in the eye of the committee general. to accomplish this move in the specifics of what might be required at little rock that would be required at hope based at the unit and it is the
testimony and is it your butt moving these aircraft from the base where there's already modern layers and facilities to the new base is actually going save enough money to offset the cost of making this move? >> based on the consultations that the air force reserve command and making the decision recommending it to the air force. the manpower will save us $100 million across the fight but it's a reasonable thing to do. >> i want you to get back to us with a specific numbers. >> the equipment being left afghanistan i think your testimony was that you were not in a position to comment about equipment left in iraq; is that correct? >> not in a position to testify about the details of the equipment left in iraq because i wasn't in the decision process.
>> that you are going to get back with the committee when the senator has a follow-up answer regarding equipment being left in afghanistan; is that correct? >> the decisions would be up to general austin as well as the dod leadership. the comment i made it to the senator is there is some equipped magic that would normally be left in afghanistan as a result of the value and equipment, the residual value being the standard transformation costs to bring it home. are you suggesting that we look elsewhere. >> is the question for another command. >> but it goes without saying number one we are going to be friends with their, hopefully a follow-on force to try to
continue to be successful in afghanistan. and there is a force that is going to need this equipment. and secondly, it would be a cost to the taxpayers of transporting some of this equipment back that's not going to be necessary but to be successful in the long haul and it would make but to spend the money to bring it ba back. >> thank you senator. >> first the vote has now begun. ideally that is the first of four that are still scheduled. so, i will be -- after senator vitter i think that senator cain is coming back and if there are
no other senators, then i'm going to ask the senator that is coming back to close off unless senator inhofe has a different plan. >> thank you mr. cherry and into the witnesses for all of your service and for being here. admiral rogers, do you think that cyber com has the most necessary policies and authorities in relationships in the will to act or are all of those in place and if you would supplement any of those with additional authorities were policies would you like to see? >> in general, my immediate answer would be yes. i think as i have already indicated the things i think that we need to continue to work on for this idea of deterrence, this idea of developing the norms in the cyber arena, that is going to be much broader than just the u.s. cyber command, i believe it is a part of the dialogue. >> dot within the cyber command,
do you have the authority and the policies that you need to do all of that defectively? >> yes, sir. >> if i am confirmed in actually executing the mission i did come back. >> and you said, quote, the level of expertise required to conduct potentially damaging operations have steadily lowered enabling waistcoat of electors to achieve a level of the fact. how does this impact our allies and partners and ability to work with them. >> is it in particular a problem when we have allies and partners with less capable defenses than we do and how do you handle that? >> yes sir and one of the ways we handle that is through
stronger partnerships. we have a strong dialogue in the arena now and many of our allies and partners need to continue to build on mac. >> i know the pentagon wants more members to have more access to the unmanned aircraft. are there particular issues or threats or vulnerabilities related to that given these advanced opportunities for the enemies to have an effect? hell do we mitigate against that risk? we ask ourselves what can we do to try to mitigate the risk whether it is changes to the physical system in the aircraft or what kind of tactics and techniques and procedures are we doing that can help maximize the attempt to mitigate risk. >> are those efforts such but with regard to particular systems we were to change our wd
in the transfer to an ally? it would be on a case-by-case basis none that i am criminally aware of. >> last week the press reports that russia had used cyber attacks against the communications to hamper ukrainian leaderships ability to access do you believe that they have sophisticated cyber capabilities and if they used them that card and part considerable damage to the critical infrastructure? >> i would agree with both of those. >> i want to murder you need to move to the guard and reserve. a lot of us are interested in better integrating and using and leveraging the guard and reserve
capabilities. clearly it is a long-term trend that is in the effort of any fights we have. what specifically is cybercom doing to fully utilize and maximize? >> first it is part of that discussion that is ongoing right now that will be finished by july to take a look at the mission analysis as it is associated with what kind of reserve capability in the cyber arena do we need and how do we bring it to bear, how do we structure the reserve components to maximize its effectiveness and its part in this mission? in addition they currently have an ongoing series of exercises designed for the guard units in the cyber arena. the cyber command also has an ongoing dialogue and as a part ois a partof the broad dialogueh governors and the genitals as we work our way forward to find out
what is the best way to maximize the capability and we have to maximize that capability. >> okay. well, i would underscore and encourage that with regard to the cyber command in particular as i hope you know there is particular language in the last defense authorization bill requiring maximization with regard to the guard and reserve so i would commend this to your focus and intention. final question i think some of your comments have gone to the fact that the appropriate leadership needs to make the case more fully and publicly and persuasively for the use of important authorities that do exist and laid out in language terms if you will of why it's important. in that spirit, can you talk to
the capability that has been hotly debated which is the use of geographic information regarding cell phones? >> to be honest it's not an issue i've dealt deeply into. it's one of those issues i need to get smarter on to discuss publicly and i think that is an important part of that public discussion. >> if you could look at that and supplement that with regard to your thoughts on that i would appreciate it. >> okay. that's all i have mr. chairman. >> when you are done, you voted on this one have you? >> you can turn it to whoever is next in line. thanks to the witnesses for your testimony today. my questions will be primarily for the admiral and i have a little bit of an unorthodox view
of the challenges about the programs. many of my colleagues to talk about the programs and the controversy is fixing the programs themselves and i actually think the bigger challenge is many of the programs are being carried out pursuant. the added -- admiral of what we are in you indicated that you thought the revelations cost american lives but you hesitated about whether to use the word trade to describe edward snowden. when you were asked by senator graham whether we were at war you said we were in a disagreement but then you said there was that there was a misunderstanding in terms of what he was asking. you thought he was asking about the cyber war in particular. my concern is we are carrying
out a whole series of military actions in the intelligence programs that are being done pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force on september 14, 2001, that has no temporal limitation and no geographic limitation. and that it has been defined by both the bush and obama administration to extend to taking action not only against those that planned the 9/11 attack but against the associated forces. that language doesn't appear in the authorization but it has been the administration's decision about what that authorization means. so we are currently in a war but it does not have a geographic limitation. it does not have any kind of temporal limitation or expiration date. this committee held a hearing on the military force in may and i asked to be obama administration witnesses when does this end and
they said we are not sure it could be 25 or 30 years. i asked the witnesses if someone who is born in 2020 and when they are 15-years-old in 2035 join an organization that is associated with al qaeda that only popped up again and has nobody sign against the united states does the authorization of why wants to take military action against that individual and the answer is yes. there is no reform that we are going to be able to make to any of these programs that i think we'll answer the questionwill ae citizens or civilians if the intelligence gathering operation is done in a significant way pursuant to an open-ended military authorization. and the questions you have received about the dual headed nature you are part of a military command that is executing an authorization with no limitation whatsoever with no practical purposes and you are
also in the position where you are gathering intelligence and i just feel like the challenge about limiting these programs were trying to find the right balance between fighting terrorism and stopping evil and protecting citizens rights we can do anything we want in the four corners of the programs if we do not as a congress revisit the 2001 reauthorization and try to put some sense of definition and scope. we continue to have sharp witnesses come before us is describing what we are in the middle of because the primary job of congress is to give definition at the front end in terms of what the mission is and if the militar military commander-in-chief executes the mission that the congress has given no definition of what it is that we are doing at this point and that we will always have a controversy in my opinion going forward.
now admiral you were asked about what constitutes the cyberspace in relations with the war powers act in self-defense under the un charter and the collective defense authorizations. if you could elaborate on that today, the use of force and cyberspace and how that trigge triggers. >> i apologize the 120 questions. i don't remember word for word the specifics to please accept my apology. >> what are the unique challenges in defining the war in cyberspace and what the hostilities are? >> from a policy perspective we are trying to work our way through those issues. the tenants that are applicable
are whatever we do in the cyber arena and the international law would pertain that if we find ourselves getting to the point that we believe slavery is taking us down the armed conflict scenario the rules and the law would pertain every bit as much in this domain as it does in any other. i don't think cyber is inherently different in that regard. the sets of procedures and policies and as a nation have been in good stead. >> the phrase you use if we believe cyber activity is taking us down the path of conflict in the international would it be your view somebody wipes out the grade and we think about seeking the activity to respond it could have a huge effect on human life and on the economy is that's not
war unless it leads to army conflict clicks >> it leads to a destruction act that has a significant impact. i believe now we are starting in the boundary of is that an active war. everything is in a case-by-case basis and i'm always concerned about the broad general statements. >> just that question we do have some important work to do in the absence of a cyber bill that makes this hard for all of us. switch topics. yesterday i visited the college and was fortunate to be there at a time when there was a meeting of the dc-based organization which was set up a number of years ago to help colleges, community colleges and private sector coordinate what they think are the skills that cyber professionals need. it's a workforce organization. i was interested that someone isn't commonly around the table
and might want to follow up separately to suggest that would be a good avenue for purchase a patient. but there has been testimony general alexander was here last week and the need for 133 cyber missions managed by highly trained personnel in 2016 as the leader of the cyber command what would be your approach on these recruiting and training issues because first they need is intense and the competition in the private sector is intense for people in this skill set. what is your approach in staffing out this mission? >> we pay particular attention and there are responsibilities to equip the cyber force on the individual's right now. on the uniform cited it exceeded the expectations and we've been able to recruit quality individuals and maintain them. it's something i continue to pay close attention to what are the indicators that would suggest that that is changing. in some ways the civilian side
represents and even potentially greater challenge. i think we need to look at incentives. whether they be pay or the ability to focus the individuals on particular areas for extended periods of time in ways we do not traditionally do now. >> to do the work of cyber command it takes a balance of service branch personnel and there has to be a good mixture. >> my time is up and all who are here for first rounds of questions is very second round of questions raging member in half? >> if you would like to go ahead and continue i know the senator is coming back all those you are in fault starting to talk about something that is desperate.
i fail to see there is a difference between someone who is attacking depending on what kind of weapon they are using a cyber attack. but we ask you do you belief that we are dissuading our adversaries and how do you think that we are detouring them? do you know what cyber deterrence looks like? that's the problem. there isn't a lot of public out there that is aware of the significance of what's going on. when i talk to people out there about what the capabilities are and what they are going to be by next year, we talk about a weapon and about the delivery system they understand that, but not the cyber attack. i look at this and i think that the senator from virginia was really onto something. the war is the war and we have to elevate the threat we are talking about in the kennedy and that both of you have been
dealing with. i think most people are not really aware of that. he used rail primarily for the large treaty exercise and also it depends on the industry to be ready to meet the dod search requirements. what is your assessment of the industry to support these requirements? >> i'm not in a position as the commander to give you a definitive answer other than to say that having consulted the recent work that has been done to look at the number of available cars and the status of the infrastructure is in the hands of the assessment division. i would be happy to look at that once i have the opportunity if confirmed but it is so far out
of the area that it wouldn't be appropriate for me to give you a definitive comment. >> i mentioned earlier that i've gotten to know the outgoing man in charge quite well and i got the chance to talk to him sometime ago early on in the stage and i think that he has really done an excellent job and he has informed me you have the type of background that is going to be able to do the same thing and i would hope that we could work together in raising the views of the public so that he would understand how real the threat is and look forward to working with you. >> thank you ranking member and off. inhofe. >> thank you both for your long distinguished service to the
nation. i would like to talk about the nsa policies and i have long expressed concerns about the policies on two fronts. one on the overbroad in true shame into the privacy rights of law abiding citizens. number two, the pattern of not focusing sufficiently on bad actors and not collecting the information the intelligence needed to prevent the terrorist acts it seems to me to focus overall of our intelligence and defense community in the law-enforcement community is correct it far too much by the citizens and too little at the individualized bad actors so i would like to ask questions on both fronts. starting out with the citizenry at large as you are aware, president obama's group on intelligence and communication
technology has said that the metadata collected should be held by a third party. and the privacy and civil liberties oversight board has recommended ending the collection altogether. do you agree with either of these proposals? >> yes ideally there is a standard we can work towards that would enable us to do that while still meeting the requirements generating the evidence we need and ensuring the protection of the u.s. citizens. the civil liberties oversight board recommended ending the metadata collection altogether and i was asking if you agree on that recognition. >> we can still do this any way that ensures the protection of our citizens while also providing a value. >> that the information should not be followed by the u.s. government. is that correct? >> i supported the decision from
the national security agency. >> and if confirmed, what would be the timetable for implementing that reform? bedecked to be honest i'm not sure. it will be driven by the solution that we come up with. that dialogue is ongoing right now. i haven't been part of that as a nominee. >> what you commit if confirmed to working with vendors to implement an expedition seasick >> yes, sir. >> when i asked more generally the fourth amendment protects the privacy of law-abiding americans. what is your view on the appropriate limitations on the ability of the government to search through phone or e-mail communications of law abiding citizens not figures are under suspicion. >> it shouldn't be done without the corresponding framework for the execution. >> does that framework work in your judgment of individualized suspicion?
>> i think it varies by the specifics of the threat we are talking about which is one reason the approach was taken to try to address that to deal with no content, no geographic location to try to strike that balance if you will. >> from telephone to e-mail requires under the fourth amendment individualized suspicion or judicial oversight? >> i don't know that i would make a blanket statement. >> that isn't an area of my expertise. >> i would ask after this hearing if you would follow up and ask that question in writing and then you certainly could solve the council and in terms of how you would implement the policies i think is a question of the great interest to the great many citizens.
we failed to prevent the tragic bombing and bought him. i would like to ask you, why do you think that was what can we do to correct it so we don't fail to present the next austin bombing clinics >> the reality is i don't know the specifics of the boston bombing. not an element of that occurring duty, not something i express direct knowledge of. to comment knowingly a need that knowledge. >> well, a second example deals with nidal hassan and the ford hood. hassan with an